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This thesis seeks to better understand and evaluate the practice of Islamic finance. 
In order to do this, the thesis employs a practice-dependent, or constructivist, 
approach with the aim of identifying the principle or principles that inform, 
constrain and guide Islamic finance practices. The thesis proceeds by arguing that 
Islamic finance is a salient site of justice, with a clearly identifiable set of 
participants and shared set of aims. Having established this, the thesis goes on to 
demonstrate, through an analysis of the rules and operation of Islamic finance, 
that a distinct conception of justice can be identified as informing the practice. 
The central claim of the thesis is that the practice of Islamic finance is guided by a 
sufficiency-constrained luck egalitarian principle. This principle, it is argued, not 
only helps us to better understand Islamic finance, but can also help us to 
evaluate existing Islamic finance practices and, where they are found wanting, 
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Whenever a theory appears to you as the only possible one, 
take this as a sign that you have neither understood the 
theory nor the problem which it was intended to solve. 
KARL POPPER (1972: p. 226) 
 
1. Background  
 
While theories of distributive justice, which are concerned with distributions of 
burdens and benefits within a society or across societies, have been highly 
prominent in normative political theory since the early 1970s (Rawls 1971; see 
Lamont and Favor 2016), relatively few theorists of distributive justice have 
looked outside Western political theory traditions or economic and political 
practices. One aim of this work is to reinforce the importance of expanding the 
dialogue. It does so in part through pursuing its central aim of demonstrating the 
coherence and significance of an Islamic theory of distributive justice.  
Islam comprises a religious and social tradition that is fundamentally 
concerned with socio-economic objectives such as wealth distribution, poverty 
eradication, abolition of inequalities, to name but a few. Yet it is almost wholly 
absent from the distributive justice dialogues. This absence can be attributed to 
two factors. First, as critics of political theory as it currently stands (Ball, 1995; 
Carver, 2004; Bleiker, 2004) observe, the political theory canon continues to be 
Eurocentric.  A number of theorists (Dallmayr 1997, 2004, 2009; Euben, 2002, 
2004; March, 2009) have sought to address this shortcoming in calling for a 
‘comparative political theory’ as an alternative discipline or sub-discipline to 
integrate non-Western political ideas. Second, there is another clear gap in the 
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Islamic literature itself, in terms of treatments of distributive justice. To date, 
there has been no comprehensive theorization of Islamic distributive justice.  
2. The Absence of an Islamic Conception of Distributive 
Justice 
 
There are, in fact, extensive literatures on Islamic economics and Islamic finance, 
and these will be crucial to the development or extrapolation of a conception of 
Islamic distributive justice. Islamic economics as a discipline was established in 
the 1970s with the First International Conference on Islamic Economics, which 
established some basic common concepts (Zaman, 2008: 27-28, Ahmad, 1984: 
xviii) as reflected in concerns for Islamic philosophy and its moral and ethical 
dimension in regulating an economic system. Prominent Islamic economists 
(Naqvi 1984, 1994, 1997; Mannan 1984, 1986; Siddiqui 1981, 1996; Kahf 1991, 
2004) produced an extensive canon of literature on the Islamic worldview, 
features of an Islamic economic system and how it differs from a capitalist or 
socialist system.  
Discussions of different economic ideas from an Islamic viewpoint in 
many instances, however, did not produce widely accepted Islamic conceptions. 
Islamic economists responded to different stimuli producing thereby a wide range 
of different understandings, interpretations and ideas (Haneef, 2005: p. 3) and “no 
comprehensive attempt has been made to compare and categorize the views of 
Muslim economists based on their understanding of certain major areas in 
economics such as ownership and distribution” (Haneef, 2005: p. 3-4). Thus, 
distributive justice, albeit noted in Islamic economic literature (Ahmad and 
Hassan, 2000; Heidari, 2007; Baidhawy, 2012), has not been systematically 
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theorized in the context of Islam, and there has been no comprehensive effort to 
reconcile tensions in the underlying normative suppositions among varying 
accounts of Islamic economics. 
To illustrate, while Naqvi, a prominent Islamic economist, explains that 
Rawls’s principles of justice, particularly the difference principle, is the most 
relevant to the Islamic view as it promotes the maximization of welfare of the 
least advantaged (1997: 5), Choudhury, on the other hand, criticises and objects 
to Rawls’s theory, asserting that “despite his claim, Rawls is altogether a 
neoliberal libertarian and utilitarian” (2011: 94). This gives a glimpse into how 
diverse the ideas of Islamic economists are, and into the absence of a systematic 
understanding of what distributive justice entails within the Islamic economic 
discourse. There are also a number of other attempts to conceptualise distributive 
justice from an Islamic perspective such as Distributive Justice and Need Fulfilment in an 
Islamic Economy, which entails a collection of six papers delivered at The Second 
International Conference on Islamic Economics held in Islamabad in March 1983.   
3. Importance of Islamic finance Justice in Practice  
 
The second, highly salient Islamic literature is concerned with Islamic finance 
practice, understood broadly as lending and related banking activity that 
conforms to principles of Sharia law; Islamic law produced primarily from the 
Qur’an. The academic literature on Islamic finance has developed alongside the 
successful, steady and rapid growth of the practice over the past decades. It is 
reported that Islamic financial institutions exist and operate in at least 105 
countries, and Islamic finance products are multiplying and attracting more 
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customers every day (Warde, 2012) and are expected to cater for a growing 
Muslim population of 2.5 billion by 2020 (Global Islamic Finance Report).  
A remarkable phenomenon is how Islamic finance practice is multiplying 
in non-Muslim majority countries. The UK, for example, has repeatedly 
announced its intention to become a global hub for Islamic finance. It is now the 
home of almost half of the Islamic finance institutions in non-Muslim majority 
countries, and comes globally as number eight in terms of the total amount of 
Shariah compliant or Islamic assets. While attempting to establish its reputation 
as an Islamic finance hub, the UK adopted a number of regulations and taxes to 
serve this purpose, and the UK Treasury has stated objective of guaranteeing that 
no person in the country to be denied access to financial products due to his/her 
religious beliefs (Pollard and Samers, 2013: 8-9). Islamic finance has been viewed 
in Britain as a means of further integrating a Muslim community that reached 
more than 2 million, as well as economically attract more foreign investment 
(Pollard and Samers, 2013: 8-9). 
Apart from the UK, other non Muslim majority countries also have 
expressed strong interest in the sector. Singapore, a country with a Muslim 
minority of only 14% of the population also announced its intention to become a 
hub for Islamic finance. Other countries, including Australia, France and South 
Korea, are undertaking major legislative changes to attract Islamic finance into 
their economies (Warde, 2012: 10).  
The global prevalence and growth of Islamic finance is also reflected in the 
significant increase in the number of academic programmes and modules, 
publications, conferences, etc. that are concerned with this sector. In this respect, 
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the UK, second only to Malaysia, comes in the leading position, with 28 
academic programmes.  
No doubt, Islamic finance practice is very dynamic and its development is 
not completely detached from political events both domestically and 
internationally. Islamic finance is known for its political nature, and for the way it 
was continuously shaped by its political surroundings. As will be explained in 
more depth in chapter IV, the rise of Islamic finance in the 20th Century took 
place as a response to the identity problem faced by Muslim nations, particularly 
after their independence from Western colonization. Their attempt to search for 
their Islamic identity and values, from which they were long disconnected during 
colonization, was reflected in their demand for Islamic financial institutions and 
for the infusion of shariah teachings into the financial sector. The political nature 
of Islamic finance is also evident during most global political and economic 
circumstances, which also had direct impact on the development of the practice. 
For example, the massive increase in oil prices in 1973 led to a vast amount of 
petrodollars to flow into the Muslim Gulf countries. The wealth resulting thereof 
needed shariah-compliant investment opportunities, which led to further 
expansion of the sector. Within similar context, Islamic finance was also affected 
by the suspicion and financial scrutiny Muslim countries faced after the terrorist 
attack in 9/11. This resulted in a counter-effect of greater religiosity among 
Muslim nations and more pressing need for Islamic financial institutions. Clearly, 
Islamic finance practice is continuously responding to political and economic 
circumstances both in specific countries and on the global level, thereby 
incorporating new tools, products and transactions to serve the growing demand 
for shariah-compliant financial services.  
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The global financial crisis of 2007 is another important example of the 
political and dynamic nature of Islamic finance. The practice has continuously 
presented remarkable prevalence complemented by superior performance during 
the crisis. An IMF paper on The Effects of the Global Crisis on Islamic and 
Conventional Banks revealed that Islamic banks have performed relatively better 
than conventional banks. Alternative measures used by Islamic banks did not 
only include additional buffers, but also made “their activities more closely 
related to the real economy and tend to reduce their contribution to excesses and 
bubbles” (Hasan and Dridi, 2010: 33). It also appears that “adherence to Shariah 
principles precluded IBs [Islamic Banks] from financing or investing in the kind of 
instruments that have adversely affected their conventional competitors” (Hasan 
and Dridi, 2010: 33).Consequently, the better performance and rapid 
development of Islamic finance attracted attention to its political nature as well as 
to the moral paradigm it is based on, particularly due to the number of concerns 
raised regarding the ethical dimension in the conventional financial practice. The 
financial crisis highlighted a number of questionable aspects of practices in 
conventional finance, including a lack of transparency, financial incentives which 
encouraged excessive risk taking, among others. Such ethical failures of the 
conventional financial practice attracted more attention to Islamic finance 
practice, particularly as it is continuously promoted as an alternative to the 
conventional system that infuses ethical and moral dimension into the financial 
sector. 
There is a misconception about Islamic finance, however, that it is 
primarily concerned with the elimination of interest-based transaction. Although 
indeed avoidance of interest is an integral part of Islamic finance, it is not limited 
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to that tenet. Islamic finance is established and designed to provide all ranges of 
financial services, e.g. loans, investments, insurance, etc. It is a comprehensive 
financial system, offering similar products and services to those offered in the 
conventional system, yet according to the ethical and moral rules of Islamic law 
(El Gamal, 2006: 8). Accordingly, three main transactions are prohibited in 
Islamic finance. First, interest-bearing transactions are prohibited. Second, 
transactions including excessive or unnecessary risk, uncertainty or gambling are 
also prohibited. This is not to say that risk and uncertainty are totally 
impermissible, as this is impractical in the financial world. However, these 
elements need to be kept to a minimum level. Finally, Islamic finance also 
prohibits hoarding and accumulation of idle wealth.  
Based on these prohibitions, alternative Shariah compliant practices are 
established, such as financial partnership practices. These are financial contracts 
that aim to create partnership between financiers and entrepreneurs according to 
which profits or losses resulting from investments are to be shared between them 
as partners. By sharing the outcome of the investment the practice also distributes 
risk between partners. Other practices include Zakah, or compulsory wealth tax. 
This taxation is of utmost importance, as the rules governing its collection and 
distribution clearly shapes the distribution of wealth between participants. 
Thus, it is clear that Islamic finance is a complicated practice that has 
evolved and developed over 14 centuries since the beginning of Islam. It provides 
its participants with a range of services, all formulated according to Islamic moral 
principles. The way these transactions are established, creates a different set of 
relationships and interdependence between the participants that is distinct from 
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conventional finance. The practice also results in a different scheme for the 
distribution of burdens and benefits among participants. 
4. Approach and Contribution  
 
Three important gaps in the relevant literature are identified so far. The first is 
that the longstanding debate on distributive justice has neglected the Islamic 
tradition. Second, Islamic economists who attempted to examine the notion of 
distributive justice in the Islamic economic literature attempted only very limited 
engagement with Western theories of distributive justice. Third, the successful 
performance of Islamic finance practice and its worldwide prevalence is not 
reflected in any attempts to employ the practice to construct principles of justice 
that reflect the Islamic worldview. 
Accordingly, this thesis explores the Islamic conception of distributive 
justice as could be interpreted from the established practices of Islamic finance. It 
examines how Islamic finance practices shape the distribution of burdens and 
benefits within the society in which they operate. The objective of the thesis is to 
put forward an Islamic practice-based distributive justice theory; or principles of 
justice that dictate how benefits and burdens ought to be distributed to adhere to 
the Islamic moral and ethical code. Accordingly, the overall research question of 
this thesis can be stated as this: What are the principles of distributive justice that govern 
Islamic finance practice and dictate the just distribution of burdens and benefits among its 
participants? 
Since the focus will be on an existing and well established practice, the 
most appropriate approach to address the question is a practice-dependent 
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constructivist approach. As an alternative to the practice independent approach 
that aims at abstract theorizing, the practice-dependent approach places high 
importance on existing practices, institutions and arrangements in moral theory. 
It focuses on the interpretation of existing social practices and the construction of 
principles of justice accordingly. That is, the existence of social practices that are 
endorsed by participants to achieve a common goal is the starting point from 
which principles of justice are to be constructed (James, 2005a; Sangiovanni, 
2008; Valentini 2011; Banai, Ronzoni et al, 2011; El Kholi, 2013). Accordingly, 
as this thesis is presenting a practice-dependent theory, it relies in essence on two 
theorizing tools; interpretation and constructivism. In the context of practice-
dependence, the role of constructive interpretation is to connect the constructed 
principles to the objectives of the practice and the viewpoint of the participants 
(James, 2005a; Sangiovanni 2008). Constructivism, on the other hand, is a moral 
reasoning and justification approach that constructs principles of justice in the 
light of the context in which they operate. This approach aims to identify 
principles that are consistent with the ideas and values rooted in the society, in 
the form of the prevailing conceptions of the society and conception of the 
individual (James, 2007, 2013).  
5. Argument and Structure  
 
This thesis presents a comparative political theory project to reveal the principles 
of justice that underpin the practice of Islamic finance. It uses a practice-
dependent approach to offer a systemic conception of Islamic distributive justice. 
The theory reveals that the most appropriate principle to be constructed from the 
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interpretation of Islamic finance practice is a sufficiency-constrained luck 
egalitarian principle. To clarify, the practice is interpreted as being governed by 
two principles simultaneously: sufficiency and luck egalitarianism. Although both 
principles appear in the first instance as contradictory bases for justice, in practice 
they supplement each other. That is, Islamic finance, in the way it is organised and 
according to its philosophical framework, is primarily endorsing a luck egalitarian 
conception of justice.  However, a sufficiency principle is also operating. The 
constructive interpretation employed in this thesis demonstrates how both principles 
operate alongside each other in guiding Islamic finance practice. 
The thesis argues that the constructed principles are of explanatory as well 
as evaluative and action guiding values. Practice-dependence theories are said by 
some critics to be only descriptive theories, not capable of playing critical or 
constructive roles (see Meckled-Garcia, 2013). This idea is contested on the 
grounds that a reliance on the shared values and viewpoint of the participants in 
fact allows practice theories to perform critical and reformative roles (James, 
2013; Valentini 2011). This thesis, illustrates how practice-dependent principles 
are capable of evaluating the practice, identifying existing injustices and guiding 
the practice to eliminate them and prevent future injustices. 
 
The thesis is divided into six substantive chapters. The first three chapters 
deal with contextualising the thesis, conceptualising the problem and introducing 
the methodology and approach. In chapters four, five and six I present my actual 
practice-dependent constructivist theory, showing how aspects of Islamic finance 
practice align with the elements of a theory of distributive justice, and examining 
the implications of the derived principles on the practice.  
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Chapter one aims to contextualise the theory within the overall project of 
comparative political theory. I illustrate how political theory, as it currently 
stands, is mainly focused on a Eurocentric canon and rarely provides adequate 
attention to non-Western traditions, thinkers and perspectives. This limitation of 
the literature alienates many salient non-Western traditions and ideas. 
Consequently, there was an important call for their integration in a wider 
comparative political theory project that aims to achieve political understanding 
across philosophical and political discontinuities. I present this thesis as a 
justificatory CPT project, as the demarcation between the Western and the 
Islamic tradition is clear and unchangeable, and the topic of inquiry is common 
and of mutual interest across traditions. 
 In chapter two, I illustrate the complexity of the notion and the richness 
of the debate addressing it in political theory. To this end, I provided a conceptual 
analysis of distributive justice and theories dealing with it. Much has been written 
about the distribution of burdens and benefits between persons and arguments in 
this respect are diverse and in many instances contradictory. Theories of 
distributive justice vary in who they include in the distribution, what the currency 
of distributive justice is, how to distribute it and their moral justification for their 
arguments. Each theory and every theorist appears to have answers, yet what is 
certain, as could be seen from the analysis, is that the debate is ongoing, as the 
notion of distributive justice is complex and multifaceted. The importance of this 
conceptual analysis was to highlight the main elements of a distributive justice 
theory and how to address each one of them. 
This is followed by chapter three in which the practice-dependent 
approach and the role played by constructivism and interpretation are detailed, 
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and I make the case for viewing Islamic finance as a salient social practice. 
Practice-dependence is a new approach to political theorizing and it relies on the 
interpretation of social practice in the light of its cultural context to construct 
principles of justice that best describe the practice. This thesis is using an 
institutionalist approach to practice-dependence. To this end, the thesis identified 
Islamic finance practice as a salient social practice for interpretation. 
In chapter four I demonstrate why the practice should be viewed as an 
appropriate site of distributive justice. The thesis explains the Islamic 
philosophical axioms that guide our identification of a correct course of action to 
establish an Islamic economic system that corresponds with the Islamic tradition 
and philosophy. This is combined with a historical account of the development of 
the practice and the existing rules, regulations, procedures and tools used. The 
identification of these important background information highlighted the 
significance of recognizing Islamic finance as a salient site of distributive justice 
that has a profound impact on the lives of the participants and the distribution of 
burdens and benefits between them. 
Chapters five and six are the paramount contribution of this thesis. In 
chapter five I provide an interpretation of the Islamic finance practice and 
construct the principles that guide it.  By presenting the point and purpose of the 
practice and the reasons of the participants to take part in it, I offer the two 
requirements of a comprehensive interpretation of a practice. This is followed by 
a construction of justice principles as could be understood from all the different 
aspects of the practice. The interpretation reveals that the practice is guided by 
both sufficiency and luck egalitarian principles. 
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Finally in chapter six, I present the implications of the theory by using the 
principle to evaluate the practice and to guide it towards becoming more just and 
in coherence with its point and purpose. I use the sufficiency-constrained luck 
egalitarian principle to evaluate the practice and to assess if it is achieving its 
distributive role. Following the assessment, I use the principles to guide the 
practice towards reformation to become more just. 
Overall, the thesis aims to develop a systematic and coherent conception 
of distributive justice from the increasingly prevalent practice of Islamic finance. 
It offers potentially significant contributions in expanding the dialogue and 
literature on non-Western conceptions of distributive justice, in systematizing the 
conception of distributive justice that underlies Islamic finance practice, and in 
showing how critical contestation within the practice itself can be analysed to 









We are all humiliated by the sudden discovery of a fact 
which has existed very comfortably and perhaps been 
staring at us in private while we have been making up our 
world entirely without it. 
GEORGE ELIOT (2008, p.407)  
  
 
Our world today is defined by a dynamic globalisation process that undermines 
the importance of geographical boundaries and makes coexistence between 
different cultures and traditions inevitable. This has created a growing need for an 
academic approach that can address globalisation’s challenges and bring the study 
of Western and non-Western traditions closer. Critics, however, argue that 
traditional political theory projects continue to centre on Western ideas, 
perspectives and thinkers, neglecting thereby extensive academic knowledge that 
exists outside the Western tradition. Consequently, an important call for a new 
approach to integrate non-western perspectives emerged, in Comparative Political 
Theory (CPT). It has slowly gained ground as an attempt to draw more attention 
towards traditions and thoughts outside the West.  
One of the non-Western traditions that require more attention in political 
theorizing is Islam. No doubt it has attracted some attention from academics, yet 
this has mainly been through a negative lens. Much has been written about 
Islamic radicalisation and extremism, yet little attention is given to Islam to 
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understand how conscientious it is to issues of mutual concern such as 
benevolence, fairness, compassion towards the worst-off, etc. These issues, 
although integral in the Islamic tradition, are rarely considered for examination in 
traditional political theory projects.  
Accordingly, the aim of this chapter is to contextualize my practice-
dependent Islamic distributive justice theory within the overall comparative 
political theory project. The discussion is structured as follows. I start in section I 
with a brief account of the common types of political theory, followed by some of 
the challenges facing the discipline. This section elucidates why my project 
cannot be contextualized within normative political theory, by highlighting the 
limitations of the political theory canon and the discipline’s inadequacy in 
addressing the challenge of coexistence between traditions. This is followed by 
section II, in which I give a detailed account of the different CPT approaches. I 
highlight how CPT can overcome political theory limitations, theorize political 
ideas and issues in the light of the traditions in which they exist and compare 
them across boundaries of geography, culture, language and religion. Finally, in 
section III, I explain why this project is a comparative political theory project that 
aims to examine Islamic distributive justice as practiced within the context of the 
Islamic tradition and offer it for engagement with the existing distributive justice 
debate.  
1.1. Political Theory: Setting the Parameters  
 
It is not an easy assignment to contextualise a project within the discipline of 
political theory, as there is no clear consensus even among political theorists as to 
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how to define the discipline (Farrelly, 2004: p. ix). As Vincent explains, “one 
should be careful of the idea, often fostered within conceptually-oriented 
analytical political theory, that there is just ‘one’ abstract method or subject called 
political theory” (2004: p. 2). There is indeed no such thing as a single identity of 
political theory, and activities within this discipline are diverse, and maybe even 
sometimes ‘mutually hostile’ (March, 2009: p. 534). This complexity is further 
exacerbated as discussions about the nature of political theory and what it 
involves are usually only very briefly tackled in introductory chapters of textbooks 
(Vincent, 2007: p. 1). What political theorists tend to do is to get over such 
discussions quickly in an attempt to dive straight into their analysis (Leopold and 
Stears, 2008: p. 1). Thus, most political theory books include a main body of texts 
aiming immediately at what may be called substantive normative analysis of 
concepts such as justice, democracy, citizenship…etc. and lack detailed 
discussions on political theory as a subject. 
Only in recent years have more theorists attempted to define political 
theory, its approaches and methodologies, etc. 1  Yet, it remains the case that 
political theory is a massive discipline that is challenged due to its ill-defined 
boundaries and complex relation with other disciplines such as philosophy, 
politics and history. It is a discipline that relies on a vast canon of knowledge 
“often referred to as Plato to NATO,” and its subject matter is often stretched to 
include subjects from outside the political realm such as cultural artefact and 
events from social and even natural science (Dryzek, Honig and Phillips, 2008: p. 
                                                     
1 See for example Andrew Vincent The Nature of Political Theory, which was published in 
2007 in an attempt to detail the evolution of the discipline during the 20th century. Vincent offers a 
full length work on the nature, domains and practices of the discipline, which are usually only 
briefly tackled in the introductory chapters of the different books on political theory of the 
discipline during the 20th century. 
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5). This dilemma is clearly expressed in the description by Dryzek, Honig and 
Phillips of political theory as an  
interdisciplinary endeavour whose centre of gravity lies at the 
humanities end of the happily still undisciplined discipline of 
political science. Its traditions, approaches and styles vary, but 
the field is united by a commitment to theorize, critique, and 
diagnose the norms, practices, and organization of political 
action in the past and present, in our own places and 
elsewhere…Political theory is located at one remove from this 
quantitative vs. qualitative debate, sitting somewhere between 
the distanced universals of normative philosophy, and the 
empirical world of politics (2008: p. 4-5).   
 
Accordingly, aiming to set a clear cut definition of the discipline is a daunting 
task that can even alienate and exclude projects that should otherwise be part of 
the discipline. 
Similarly, the attempt to categorize the activities within this diverse field is 
problematic and requires diverse ways of classification that rely on different 
conceptions of political theory2. For example, one way of categorizing political 
theory projects, albeit controversial, is to differentiate between ‘scholarly’ and 
‘engaged’ political theory. The former type is interested in how we understand 
something (text, phenomenon, etc.) while the latter is interested in exploring to 
what extent a specific idea or set of ideas are right and suitable for our lives 
(March, 2009: p. 534). A different way of classifying political theory is to 
differentiate between traditional attempts that explore the history of political 
thought and formal political theory that “draws upon the example of economic 
theory in building up models based on procedural rules” (Heywood, 2004: p. 10). 
                                                     
2 More details about these categories and others are to be found in March, Andrew F., 
What Is Comparative Political Theory?, The Review of Politics, 71, 2009, Glaser, William A. The 
Types and Uses of Political Theory,  Social Research, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Autumn 1955), Heywood, 
Political Theory: an Introduction. 3rd ed. New York: Palgrave Macmillan 
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Broadly following Vincent, I will briefly present five types of political theory. 
I will note that I do not include empirical political theory, as it is important to 
differentiate between political theory as theorizing about empirical phenomena 
and the theorizing of morally-laden political concepts. That is to say that political 
theory as discussed here is not primarily interested in explaining why certain 
political events did or did not happen, how those events were viewed by elites or 
non-elites, which lessons should be learned from them for foreign policy or by 
international organizations, etc. While some of the methods of explanatory 
theory, in particular those found in comparative politics, will be discussed where 
they are salient to comparative political theory, this thesis will not be concerned 
with the substance of explanatory theories per se. Rather, important for this 
project are ‘justificatory’ theories that are related to morally-laden political 
concepts such as justice, power, right action for individuals, etc. Generally, there 
is a commitment to such normative accounts among justificatory projects within 
political theory (Farrelly, 2004:p. ix). 
Most of political theory has an irreducibly normative 
component – regardless of whether the theory is systematic or 
diagnostic in its approach, textual or cultural in its focus, 
analytical, critical, genealogical, or deconstructive in its 
method, ideal or piecemeal in its procedure, socialist, liberal 
or conservative in its politics (Dryzek, Honig and Phillips, 
2008: p. 5). 
 
Accordingly, the five main approaches to political theory can be summarized 
as follows: 
1) Classical Normative Political theory: This type of political theory is presented in 
the conceptions of political theory by the end of the twentieth century, and 
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particularly from the 1970s. It is considered a generic category of political 
theory that “covers all theories whose primarily focus has been concerned 
with setting standards, prescribing forms of conduct and recommending 
certain forms of life and institutional structures” (Vincent, 2007: p. 23). The 
basic idea behind this category is to point out the continuous nature of 
political theorizing since the ancient Greek.  
There has been a clear commitment within this conception of political theory 
to common themes and universal concerns with the ‘polis’ or the state. Thus, 
theories falling within this type of political theorizing tend to describe the 
state of affairs, explain what ends in political life we need to work to achieve 
and prescribe how we may achieve these ends. Accordingly, common themes 
within this category include the nature of public institutions, significance of 
community life, realization and conception of the good, etc. Thus, themes do 
vary widely but can be seen to focus on three main issues. The first is ‘order 
and nature’, which identifies the divine and pre-established order we live in 
and how to regulate political life accordingly. Second is ‘empiricism’, which 
focuses on the human will and separates reason from faith by relying on 
empirical knowledge. Third is ‘historical reason’, which is concerned with the 
relation between life and sociological and historical circumstances (Vincent, 
2007: pp. 22-23). 
2) Institutional Political Theory: This type of political theory is concerned with the 
meaning and practice of the state or ‘staatslehre’; meaning to learn about the 
state both empirically and constitutionally, as well as about its normative 
Chapter I: Comparative Political Theory 
   
20 
 
ideals. Political theory projects falling under this category typically 
encompass historical, legal and philosophical dimensions (Vincent, 2007: p. 
28). 
It is worth pointing out that the concern with the state was crucial in classical 
normative political theory, and that this tradition focused on the state as a 
unifying theme. However, institutionalism was subject to criticism in the 
1920 due to the rise of empiricism and the call for separation of empirical and 
normative aspects. The argument for this dichotomy was that theorizing 
about the state requires empirical rather than normative studies. Accordingly, 
institutional political theory was weakened until the 1980s when it revived in 
the form of ‘new institutionalism’ (Vincent, 2007: pp. 29-36). 
3) Historical Political Theory: within this conception, theory is considered as an 
ongoing/historical contribution. In other words, political theory is viewed as 
an ongoing dialogue or conversation that extends through history. The 
complexity of this conception, as can be expected, lies in the understanding of 
what history is. There are various methods to understand history and its 
domain is wide and diverse (Vincent, 2007: p. 37).  
4) Ideological Political Theory: Ideology within this context is understood to be the 
‘truth’ about political theory. Hence, it engages practically in the political 
domain to change perception and construct public policy. It is directly 
concerned with political action as “ideology draws our attention, minimally, 
to one important dimension of theory — the practical, engaged dimension — 
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which can occasionally and unexpectedly get ignored in the sheer welter of 
abstract theorizing” (Vincent, 2007: p. 65). 
5) Justificatory Normative Political Theory: This has been the most dominant stance 
in political theory since the second half of the 20th century and in many ways 
overlaps with (Classical) Normative Political Theory. According to Vincent, 
the belief in concepts like freedom, equality, justice, etc. is not an ideological 
orientation but rather a conviction stemming from good justificatory reasons 
(Vincent, 2007: p. 73). Standard theories of distributive justice, such as the 
ones discussed this thesis, would generally fall under this category. They are 
concerned with identifying morally defensible principles regarding the fair 
distribution of burdens and benefits amongst a set of persons who usually are 
understood to share political, economic and other kinds of institutions.  
 
In spite of these various approaches to political theory and the immensity and 
diversity of the discipline, contextualizing a project that examines Islamic 
distributive justice within it remains surprisingly challenging. Although Islamic 
distributive justice is mainly concerned with theorizing a normative and morally-
laden political issue, it still cannot be easily integrated into the discipline. 
According to the discipline’s critics, alienation of some projects (such as Islamic 
distributive justice) may be attributed to a couple of concerns regarding the 
inadequacy of the discipline’s canon and its limited ability to address a few 
challenges of the 21st century.  
The first concern, and one of utmost salience to this project, is the discipline’s 
reliance on an inadequate canon of work. The political theory canon consists 
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primarily of the Western political thought, or as Ball sarcastically describes it, a 
“‘canon’ of works by ‘dead white men’ whose ideas are pickled and preserved” 
(1995: pp. 3-4). In other words, the discipline relies “on an established canon of 
‘great texts’ by ‘great authors’” that are traditionally white males of European 
origins (Carver, 2004: p. 1). Thus, there is a strong critique of the Eurocentric 
focus of the political theory canon by theorists of different backgrounds and 
interests such as feminists, cultural theorists and non-Western theorists. Critics 
study texts from the canon and highlight “their andocentric and Eurocentric 
content and limitations” (Carver, 2004: p. 2). Such limitations entail the exclusion 
and marginalization of all that is non-male, non-white and non-European. In 
other words, it is said to alienate women and non European peoples, cultures and 
perspectives. This argument is used against political theory by both empirical and 
analytical political theorists. The former group claims that the canon is impeding 
the development of genuinely scientific theories, while the latter group argues that 
the inadequacy of the canon is distracting our thinking for ourselves about 
contemporary issues of our modern times (Ball, 1995: p. 4).  
The second concern with regards to political theory is how to address 
changes attributed to globalization, such as the need for coexistence between 
different identities. The uncertainty created by the openness and rapid change 
associated with globalization has led to a widespread fear over loss of identity. 
Consequently, in our search for stability we tend to hold on to ‘stable identities’ 
(usually with roots in our religion, tradition, etc.) that are usually politicised by 
being contrasted with other different identities. This tension between difference 
and identity has always been a part of the political, and conflicts arising thereof 
become in many instances violent. Thus, there is an ongoing need for optimising 
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the relationship and coexistence between different identities. There is an urgent 
need to coexist and to handle difference “be it of an ethnic, racial, engendered, 
cultural, religious, political, ideological or any other nature” (Bleiker, 2004: p. 
124).  Accordingly, political theory is hindered by its currently Eurocentric and 
limited canon. Widening its canon to include non Western perspectives is a 
necessity for political theory to be able to address these changes and challenges.  
The task here consists of conceptualizing otherness within and 
across national boundaries in a way that optimizes 
possibilities for respectful, or at least nonviolent, relationships 
between identity and difference (Bleiker, 2004: pp. 124-125). 
 
1.2. Approaches to Comparative Political Theory   
 
The foundational premise for the establishment of comparative political theory is 
that it fills the important gap in the essentially ethnocentric, or rather Eurocentric, 
canon of political theory, as explained earlier, by identifying similarities and 
meeting points between cultures without giving in to stereotypical images (Bleiker, 
2004: p. 138). It is about understanding across philosophical and political 
discontinuities, and not only across borders. Accordingly, in this section I will 
examine the approaches of three of the most prominent theorists that called for 
CPT as either a new sub-discipline in political theory or a as a separate one. The 
aim here is to demonstrate ways in which these theorists -- Fred Dallmayr, 
Roxanne Euben and Andrew March -- have attempted to identify the gap that 
CPT is intended to fill, and how they have defended their claims about the best 
approaches to fill it.  
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1.2.1. Fred Dallmayr - a Gadamerian hermeneutical approach 
 
Dallmayr is regarded as the founder of CPT not only for his inauguration of the 
discipline in 1997, as I will explain in this section, but also for his proposal to 
adopt a dialogical approach in CPT. For him, to achieve the all crucial dialogue 
with the ‘other’ requires that all parties engage into a mutual learning process. 
Hence, his main contribution in CPT is his own practice and work that entail 
hermeneutical dialogue and the fusion of different traditions, as shall be described 
below. 
Dallmayr called for the establishment of comparative political theory as a 
separate discipline, as he was sceptical of the attentiveness of political theory to 
contemporary issues. He identified two main factors that necessitate the 
establishment of CPT. The first factor is the unprecedented and ongoing process 
of globalization that resulted in the geographic reshaping of the world. 
Geographical boundaries have declined in importance and human lives have 
become more and more affected by the forces of globalization. He argues that not 
only radical and shocking events like 9/11,  ethnic cleansing and genocide affect 
the global community, but also economic globalization, in particular the rise of 
global markets, technological advancements, etc. All these factors take the 
political life into a global context that needs to be taken into consideration when 
theorizing it. Hence, a new mode of theorizing that can reflect the geographical 
proximity that distinguishes our world today is needed (2004: pp. 249-250). 
The second reason Dallmayr sees for situating CPT as a separate discipline 
is the limitation of the academic Western intellectual discourse to a Eurocentric 
canon. Dallmayr believes that the intellectual canon remains ironically 
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inadequate in spite of its attempt to gain insight into a universal political life that 
is affected by globalization. While disciplines like anthropology, cultural studies, 
post colonial studies, religious studies, etc. have to a large extent kept pace with 
the global changes, political theory in the West continued to rely on the western 
intellectual canon (2004) “with occasional recent concessions to strands of 
feminism and multiculturalism as found in western societies” (Dallmayr, 1997: p. 
421).  
Dallmayr also sceptically acknowledges the attempts within comparative 
politics to become more attentive to contemporary developments and to fill the 
gap in the academic discourse. He frequently addresses the shortfalls of 
comparative research projects caused by the existing universal approach. He 
explains that cross-culture comparative theorists should in practice be better 
universalists than other theorists, because they include and take into 
consideration multiple cultures and ideologies (2004: p. 253). However, the 
hegemonic influence of the universal approach is hindering theorists and is 
preventing non-western theorizing from being genuinely inclusive. For Dallmayr, 
comparative politics is too empirical, descriptive and governed by formal models 
of analysis. The explanatory models developed by political comparativists are 
derived from key features of the modern Western political structure. Features like 
secular nation state, separation of power, etc. are considered the yardstick 
according to which non-western societies and systems are being measured (1997: 
p. 421).  
Consequently, the hegemonic influence of the universal approach is said to 
be negatively affecting comparative research in two ways. First, political 
theorizing is attempting to come to terms with western political ideas.  It is 
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concerned with the universalisation of the western culture rather than the 
inclusion of different ones. It is portraying a global picture of the world based on 
the Western perspective (Dallmayr, 2004: p. 254), thereby transforming 
comparative research into a cataloguing of diversity rather than focusing on its 
broader goal of examining a problem or question that can be better understood 
through different examples from different cultures (Dallmayr, 1997: p. 423). 
Second, the Western critique of non-Western texts and ideas proceeds from a 
presumed self-righteousness or hegemonic arrogance and not from a shared 
engagement and willingness to engage in a mutually transforming learning 
process (Dallmayr, 2004: p. 254). Such a mode of study, according to Dallmayr, 
can only allow for the assessment of the relative proximity or non-proximity of 
non-western societies to the established western model (1997: pp. 421-422).  
Hence, his cynical stance from political theory’s ability to address the non-
West as well as his sceptical view of the different attempts outside of political 
theory prompted him to call for the launch of CPT as a new field of academic 
enquiry. Even though other remarkable and important CPT work, like Parel and 
Keith’s Comparative Political Philosophy: Studies under the Upas tree (1992), have 
been published before his call for the discipline’s inauguration, this was the first 
open and explicit statement of this kind. In his introduction to a special issue of 
The Review of Politics published during the summer of 1997, Dallmayr explained 
that the issue “is meant to inaugurate or help launch a field of inquiry which is 
either nonexistent or at most fledgling and embryonic in contemporary academia” 
(1997: p. 421). He elaborated that CPT is an inquiry and mode of theorizing that 
deliberately and notably reflects on the political life outside of geographical 
restrictions and within the process of globalization (1997: p. 421).  
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Dallmayr, therefore, has a unique understanding of CPT as a mode of 
theorizing that sheds the light on the status and meaning of political life within a 
global arena (1997: p. 421). For him, CPT detaches itself from formal theory that 
transcends diverse phenomena to a universal law “revealing its debt to the 
universalist claims of the European Enlightenment” (2004: p. 249) and allows for 
the emergence of a global society that is not monopolized by or limited to one 
dominant part of the world population (2004: p. 249). It is a new outlook that is 
capable of capturing the human diversity without considering any one culture, 
ideology, region or civilization as superior or ideal and is dedicated to regard non-
Western ideas with their complexities and diversity in the same manner like 
Western ideas. Hence, CPT complements, transgresses and unsettles the 
established fields of comparative politics and political theory and allows for 
theorists to accept a more humble position as co-participants with the non-West 
in search for the truth that none of the cultures can claim (Dallmayr, 1997: p. 422).  
CPT, for Dallmayr, is a mode of theorizing that calls for familiarity with 
different cultures as serving the highest good as represented in Aristotle’s concept. 
In other words, it is an inquiry undertaken for its own sake and is serving the 
progression of the good, because it is virtuous to know the other. To be living in a 
world full of complexities, it is advantageous to enquire and learn more about the 
people we share our world with. However, it is important to assess this point 
cautiously, for this good represented in knowledge can be utilized for the pursuit 
of self interest leading to selfishness. Knowledge becomes a selfish act if the other 
is not studied for the sake of genuine learning but for the purpose of gaining 
strategic advantage and increasing one’s sense of superiority. A clear example of 
such selfish form of comparative inquiry is ‘orientalism’, which corresponded to 
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such policy of domination. The intellectual agenda was associated with political 
selfish ambitions presented in imperialism and colonialism (2009). 
Thus, to experience a balance between self interest and the interest of 
others, the ‘other’ in Dallmayr’s approach is studied not only, or even primarily, 
in his/her difference, but in a search for the common and similarities in humanity. 
According to Dallmayr, the end served is the ‘moral-universal good’ and the 
attainment of truly universal principles of human conduct. This level of the good 
presents itself clearly in the very prominent example of International Law. 
Another example that is often given by Dallmayr is ‘the golden rule’ and how it 
can virtually be found in every culture. This can be extended to many maxims 
and principles (2009).  
However, existing commonalities among different cultures is not the sole 
focus of CPT as it also examines why and how they differ, which serves the 
‘ethically transformative good’. This higher level of the good, as Dallmayr 
explains, requires the descent to a ‘thick’ fabric of CPT. This understanding can 
only be acquired through the exploration and immersion into the ‘other’s’ distinct 
life style. This experience allows us to understand the limits as well as the 
particularity of our own tradition and the special character of our customs and 
preferences. This awareness in its turn reduces our claim of superiority, enhances 
our modesty and leads to a higher level of tolerance and genuine recognition of 
the other (2009). 
For CPT to serve such an understanding of the ‘other’, Dallmayr adopts a 
dialogical approach by which he transfers the application of the Gadamerian 
hermeneutical dialogue from reading texts to cross-cultural and/or inter-cultural 
dialogue (2009: p. 24). In hermeneutical dialogue, the reader (the self) when 
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approaching the text (the other) brings her personal ‘fore-meaning’ of the whole 
then triggers an ongoing adjustment of parts and whole to reach a better 
understanding of the meaning through applying her understanding to her own 
situation. One questions what she reads and applies what she reads to her own 
background and her own frame of reference. However, both frames of reference 
may not correspond, so one has to open his frame of reference in a broader way 
to come closer to the meaning of the text or the other. Within this process, 
understanding is no longer a method through which an enquiry targets a given 
object. “Rather, it means being situated in a temporal happening, in an ongoing 
‘process of tradition’” (Dallmayr, 2009bb: p. 29). Through this process, the self 
brings in her own pre-understanding and exposes it to revision in an interactive 
dialogical process; called the ‘hermeneutical circle’ (Dallmayr, 2009bb: p. 31).  
As one should note, this circle is not a closed sphere 
permitting only an empty turning ‘round and round,’ but an 
open circle fostering a learning process or a steady 
amelioration and transformation of understanding…Seen in 
this light, the circle is not ‘formal in nature’ but ontological; it 
is ‘neither subjective nor objective’ but rather pinpoints 
understanding as ‘the interplay of the movement of tradition 
and the movement of the interpreter.’ The anticipation of 
meaning that governs the interpreter’s understanding of a text 
is ‘not an act of subjectivity’ but proceeds from ‘the 
commonality linking us with the tradition.’ But this 
commonality, Gadamer adds, is never finished but in ‘a 
constant process of formation (Bildung).’ (Dallmayr, 2009bb: 
p. 28) 
 
Associated with the hermeneutical circle is the ‘fusion of horizons’, an 
important concept that differentiates dialogical hermeneutics from appropriation, 
where one recovers the other’s meaning (Shapcott, 2011: p. 230). The fusion of 
horizons requires a moment of application during which one applies the situation 
of the other to his own. Or better, one fuses his own situation with the horizon of 
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the other through application. Therefore, truths in CPT using hermeneutical 
dialogue cannot be fixed but “rather mediated through the realm of application, 
or practice. Thus universals and particulars are mutually entwined” (Shapcott, 
2011: p. 231). 
However, an important critique to Dallmayr’s hermeneutical approach to 
CPT is based on the ‘incommensurability’ thereof. For example, the ‘clash of 
civilizations’ theory, attributed to Samuel Huntington, emphasises the 
complexities of cultures and their internal diversity and accordingly rejects the 
possibility of cross-cultural hermeneutics. It argues that such a dialogue is deemed 
impossible due to the incompatibility between cultures that come from different 
backgrounds (Dallmayr, 2009b: p. 24).  
Dallmayr, although he acknowledges the difficulties encountered due to 
differences, answers his critics by proposing two main prerequisites for the success 
of the dialogue. The first precondition requires the removal of inequalities 
between the participants in the dialogue, which could prevent a successful 
dialogue from taking place. If participants are not on the same level, the stronger 
participant will dominate the dialogue and the outcome. Hence, it is crucial to 
establish a rough equality between the participants. The second precondition is 
the existence of ‘good will’ to dialogue between the participants. It is an ethical 
foundation to dialogue, which will allow the process to start by a will to engage in 
the dialogue. Much of the critique that has been targeting dialogue is based on the 
absence of good will. Hence, it is crucial to work on the existence of virtue ethics 
before the engagement into hermeneutical dialogue (2011). 
For Dallmayr, then, the aim is not to reach a bland consensus but to allow 
for a progressive learning process involving transformation. It is a process that 
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neither allows for the attrition of one’s tradition nor the subjugation of the other 
(Shapcott, 2011: 231). Rather it is aiming at a mutual understanding, recognition 
and appreciation of plurality and cultural differences. Hence, in an age of 
globalization, the significance of hermeneutical understanding is not in reaching a 
global uniformity but rather a form of unity in diversity. It reaches one level 
beyond toleration. As Dallmayr puts it, the ‘I don’t like you but tolerate you’ 
attitude is not enough. One needs to reach appreciation, recognition and respect3 
(Dallmayr, 2011). 
Dallmayr’s approach is crucial for my project, as the thesis will highlight 
an important similarity between Western thought on distributive justice and the 
practice of Islamic finance. The examination of Islamic finance, as will be 
explained in the next chapters, reveals the practical existence of a recently coined 
distributive justice principle. In other words, a principle which is relatively a new 
notion in the literature on distributive justice, appears to have been operating and 
regulating Islamic finance practice for hundreds of years. Hence, in an attempt to 
examine Islamic distributive justice as a set of practices within its own tradition, a 
clear similarity with Western ideas will emerge.  
As will be explained in depth in my interpretation of Islamic finance 
practice, the practice appears to be guided by two different principles that seem in 
the first instance contradictory: luck egalitarianism and sufficiency. Both 
principles are popular distributive principles, and I will explain them in depth in 
several sections in the rest of this thesis. However, the way both principles operate 
alongside each other resemble a principle that is only recently coined in 
                                                     
3 As Dallmayr translates Ghoete’s words “Toleranz ist nicht genug – Anerkennung ist gefordert” 
English translation: “Toleration is not sufficient, recognition is required”. 
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distributive justice literature. As sufficiency is guiding the practice to tamper 
extreme consequences of luck egalitarianism, the practice resembles a practical 
example of what was recently coined in distributive justice literature as 
sufficiency-constrained luck egalitarian principle. This commonality between a 
non-western practice that has been operating and developing for over 1400 years 
and a relatively new concept of a combination of both principles is an important 
contribution to the distributive justice literature. 
1.2.2. Roxanne Euben – A postcolonial travel 
 
Similar to Dallmayr, Euben is an eminent comparative political theorist who is 
regarded as one of the key contributors to the shaping of the discipline. Her full 
length, first of its kind, book, Enemy in the Mirror, is a work of CPT that broke the 
boundaries in presenting the possibility of handling ideas and thoughts of radical 
Islamic thinkers and comparing them to contemporary western thoughts. 
Although she agrees with Dallmayr on the importance of CPT, Euben, as I will 
explain in the coming paragraphs, differs with him with regards to her conception 
of political theory, her approach to CPT as well as the boundaries of the subject 
matter of CPT.  
Unlike Dallmayr, whose justification for a call for CPT is primarily based 
on the shortcomings of political theory and comparative politics, Euben openly 
acknowledges and believes in the ability of political theory to progress to face 
contemporary events. This is not to say that Euben did not clearly highlight that 
political theory is produced by, associated with and sometimes even limited to 
Western civilization. However, she complements her critique of political theory 
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with her expressed confidence that the discipline is still well equipped to offer 
both substantive and methodological perception of the world from the other side. 
She sees political theory as an inherently comparative discipline and that it 
always has been.  For her, political theory is comparative by nature, because 
comparison with other ways of living allows for the coherence and naturalness of 
our own (2002: pp. 25-26). Since political theory is inherently comparative, it 
contains the resources for understanding other traditions. As Euben explains,  
the Western philosophical tradition contains within itself the 
methodological resources for problematizing Western 
parochialism, even or especially in its most universalizing 
forms; decentering what political theorist Fred Dallmayr aptly 
refers to as the Western "conceit of superiority"; and bridging 
cultural and linguistic divides of meaning without erasing 
them (2002: p. 25).  
 
These abilities present themselves in political theorizing of issues like 
deterritoralization of democracy, postcolonial cosmopolitanism, etc (Euben: 
2002: p. 25). 
Accordingly, and fundamentally for this thesis, CPT for Euben is designed 
as a project that transforms the focus of existing and accepted debates of political 
theory from Western dilemmas to human concerns through the integration of 
non-western perspectives into these debates. She sees it “as the attempt to ask 
questions about the nature and value of politics in a variety of cultural and 
historical context” (2002: p. 25). It is the type of political theorizing that entails 
open investigations of coexisting problems and seeks to ask questions rather than 
search for specific answers. Hence, CPT for Euben is an explicit argument that 
knowledge about the political outside the western canon of political thought is 
noteworthy, and a claim of the possibility of conversation between disparate and 
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fundamentally different cultures despite moral and political disagreement (Euben, 
2002: pp. 25-26). 
Thus, Euben introduces distance and travel as her preferred approach for 
CPT. Travel in this context signifies not only the important physical movement 
across lands and cultures, but also an epistemological journey to unknown worlds 
(2004: pp. 148-149). She acknowledges the fact that the connection between travel 
and knowledge is not usual, yet she also emphasises that theorizing entails a 
journey to a different perspective that allows us to see the larger patterns and 
connections that inform our lives as well as the lives of others. These journeys not 
only pave the way for better attentiveness of the world of the other but also allow 
for a significant distance from the familiar (2004: p. 149). 
Relevant to Euben’s discussion of the distance that the theorists need to 
attain from the familiar is the blurring of theoretical boundaries that resulted from 
globalization, modernization and imperialism. Globalization not only declined 
the importance of geographical boundaries, but more importantly it paved the 
way for the further proliferation of Western lifestyles, thereby maintaining and 
exacerbating inequalities. Hence, the most important challenge of globalization as 
identified by Euben is the identification of authentic non-Western traditions. 
Non-Western traditions are surrounded by Western paradigms, making it more 
and more difficult to define distinguishable non-Western perspective. Euben 
emphasises that this challenge is neither due to superiority of the West, nor due to 
complete isolation between the West and non-West before colonialism. However, 
the hybridity between the West and non-West is a result of a postcolonial world 
that is characterized by globalization (Euben, 2002: pp. 27-28). 
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As boundaries between the West and non-West begin to blur, non-
Western traditions start to appear as examples of cultural amalgamation of 
Western and non-Western traditions. Hence, she explains that distinguishing 
between ‘us’ and ‘them’ is very difficult in an increasingly globalized world, and 
this difficulty should not be mistaken for sameness of Western and non-Western 
perspectives or more importantly for non-existence of non-Western perspectives. 
Consequently, this difficulty and increasing hybridity requires CPT to take “these 
borders as appropriate subjects of analysis rather than a premises of it” (2002: pp. 
27-28). 
This hybridity creates two ‘methodological implications’ for CPT 
according to Euben. First, CPT is becoming essentially linked to historicizing the 
meaning of modernity and is required to be attentive to those factors that are at 
times the product of colonialism and globalization yet falsely appear to be 
essential to non-Western traditions. Second, symptoms of the globalized world 
include Colonialism, which was a fundamental step in the construction of 
modern societies in the metropoles as well as the colonies. Consequently, the 
west consists of diverse and maybe even opposing ethnic, religious and racial 
identities. Hence, “borders stopped marking the limits where politics ends 
because the community ends. Geographical location-itself often contingent, 
fluctuating, and transient-is hardly coterminous with the political, cultural, 
religious, and ethnic identities of those who live there (2002: pp. 47-47-8). 
Euben’s understanding of CPT is fundamental for this project, as I am 
aiming to present research that will attract attention from distributive justice 
theorists, thereby introducing principles of justice embedded in the practices of 
Islamic finance to the overall debate of distributive justice in political theory. 
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Minimal is the work of political theory and CPT that integrates the Islamic 
conception of distributive justice into this extensive debate. As explained in the 
introduction, this is partially the result of the absence of a systemic conception of 
the notion in Islamic economic and finance literature. Thus, this thesis is 
introducing a systemic Islamic conception of distributive justice as a CPT project 
that presents a non-Western perspective on an important normative issue.   
1.2.3. Andrew March – Justificatory CPT 
 
Similar to Euben, who integrates travel and distance in her approach to 
emphasise the blur in theoretical boundaries between the West and non-West, 
March calls for CPT to require a strong level of alienation between the West and 
those traditions that are being studied. He calls for a CPT that addresses first 
order of normative argumentation from traditions that extend beyond mere 
difference from the Western culture to a status of alienation. His approach relies 
on the clear demarcation between those Western and non-Western traditions, 
thinkers and ideas examined in CPT. He introduces the justificatory CPT account, 
which fruitfully contributes to the overall discipline of political theory and is 
salient for the purpose of this thesis as shall be discussed later. 
Although he bases his CPT approach on an important critique of the 
justifications typically used to call for CPT, March does not reject the call for the 
discipline/subdiscipline. March acknowledges how important comparative 
research questions can easily be asked in political theory. However, his concern 
with regards to CPT is how it can be “comparative in a meaningful and rigorous 
way” (2009: p. 536). For him this is a particularly important concern as, like 
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Euben, he believes that political theory is already comparative by nature. This is 
the case either because it is always interesting to compare Western traditions to 
non-western ones or because the wide and ill-defined nature of political theory 
means that much of the work associated with it is produced in other disciplines 
where comparative methods are already well established such as sociology, law, 
ethics, etc.  
March explains that comparison projects require two main assumptions, 
which are usually not given full attention in political theory in the west. The first 
assumption is to have a ‘specific common object of inquiry’, in the sense that 
there is a specific issue or problem that will benefit from a comparison between 
different cases. This comparison is thus used as a method for a better 
understanding of the issue. The second assumption is ‘distinction’ of the tradition 
that will be examined. There need to be distinct entities that can easily be 
distinguished from each other (2009: p. 537). However, most of the comparative 
projects in the West do not highlight the underlying importance of studying non-
Western traditions and do not associate the comparison to specific areas of 
common concern. Within this context he identifies the main reasons that are 
given for the call for CPT as follows:  
 Epistemic Justification: From this viewpoint, CPT is advocated in order 
to enrich the Western canon with non-Western experiences and 
practices. Universalism, as sought after by political theorists, cannot 
be attained without the inclusion of the non-Western perspectives 
into the discipline’s canon. Advocates of CPT claim that this 
inclusion of non Western perspectives is crucial for filling a gap in the 
literature that neglects much of what is taking place outside of the 
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Western tradition. Some even expand this argument to claim that the 
discipline is missing out on much of what is going on outside of the 
Western tradition and which could entail substantive ethical 
knowledge from which much could be learned (2009: pp. 538-540). 
 Critical-Transformative: This claim is an expansion of the 
epistemological justification, as it calls for CPT as an approach to 
prevent the hegemonic power of the Western perspective over the 
non-West. It is a justification connected to the postcolonial claim that 
Western perspectives have hegemonic influence on the non-Western 
traditions and thus there is a need for CPT to counter-combat this 
influence. Critical transformative justification aims to transform 
political theory by exploring how the non-west is theorizing the 
political. This shall allow the non-West to challenge, offer 
alternatives and even point failures of Western views and ideas (2009: 
pp. 540-541).  
 Explanatory-Interpretive: This is the claim that CPT highlights the 
political problems in common between the West and non-West. It 
allows for more comprehensive theorizing in different contexts and 
requires textual interpretation. As March puts it, justification for CPT 
is that “studying non-Western perspectives illuminates common 
problems at the intersection of political theory and comparative 
politics” (2009: p. 541). 
 Rehabilitative Justification: This seeks to identify similarities between 
Western and non-Western perspectives, thereby restoring the fact that 
any tradition is not as alien, irrational or irrelevant to the other 
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traditions as it may be presumed. As March explains, “the point here 
is not so much to justify a given norm or practice... but to rehabilitate 
a non-Western tradition or trend by showing that it is less alien or 
hostile than its crudest opponents charge” (2009: p. 542). This 
justification is particularly advocated when Islamic or Chinese 
traditions are examined. It invokes a sense of appreciation to and 
familiarity with these traditions. 
 Global-Democratic: This is the claim that CPT is fundamental for 
achieving the desired universalism during a time of heightened 
globalization. Theorizing in a globalized world requires an equal 
weight to all theoretical frameworks and perspectives. This shall be 
the only way to achieve what Dallmayr calls “planetary political 
philosophy” (2009: p. 540).  
 
Not entirely satisfied with the justifications given for the call for CPT, 
March presents his own approach of a justificatory CPT. For March, CPT 
needs to be distinguishable from anthropology and area studies. Hence, it 
needs to reflect more than a mere interest and scholarship in the non-
Western tradition. He acknowledges that the Western canon of political 
theory is undeniably inadequate when it comes to the representation of non-
Western traditions, perspectives and thinkers, and that a deeper 
understanding and reflection of the non-Western political thought is needed 
to enhance the canon. However, CPT needs to show more than mere 
interest in non-western traditions that are not represented in the Western 
academic canon. He believes that a simple justification of a cross-cultural 
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understanding or a decentralisation of the Western canon will only produce 
zoological CPT work (2009: pp. 547-548).  
Alternatively, March introduces what he calls ‘justificatory CPT’ as a 
type of activity that can engage the interest of non-comparativists and 
theorists who have no particular interest in the specific tradition under study. 
It takes the traditional idea of CPT as a discipline one step further, by 
requiring an important ‘first order’ of normative argumentation or 
explanation to be present in order to justify the comparison. In other words, 
cross-cultural dialogue should not be merely treated as Dallamyr uses the 
hermeneutical approach, to deepen our understanding, tolerance of and 
respect for the other. Rather, cross-cultural dialogue should serve as a means 
to a more important end of identifying first-order moral argumentation 
(2009: pp. 549-550). To illustrate, March explains that Ghandi’s views on 
tolerance and civil disobedience are often “invoked as bearing an 
independent normative force outside of their original cultural context” 
(2009: p. 540). 
However, March warns that although first order normative explanations 
from non Western traditions provide genuine justifications for the study of the 
tradition and stimulate the interest of theorists whose primary scholarly interests 
may not include the tradition, they also produce political value conflicts. He 
explains that through highlighting differences between traditions, CPT directs 
attention to important normative disputes. These disputes create a dilemma; if 
CPT is aiming to clarify the distinction between the Western and non-Western 
traditions and demarcate the boundaries between them, then in case of value 
conflict no tradition should be faulted on the grounds of the perspectives of ‘the 
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other’. In other words, any tradition should be evaluated and examined in its own 
right. The fact that they challenge or disagree with Western tradition should not 
be a justification for acceptance as correct. As a matter of fact some non-Western, 
or third world, perspectives regarding neoliberal ideology may be faulty and may 
be forms of subaltern fault consciousness. For example CPT projects can 
highlight the non-Western disagreement and critique of Western imperialism. 
This in essence represents a genuine first order moral argument. However, what if 
this argumentation fails to stand against the Western tradition? Should this 
happen, will it implicitly justify imperialism? (2009: pp. 550-551). 
To overcome such challenges, March requires CPT to look beyond mere 
differences between the traditions to a deeper factor that allows for alienation. 
This requirement distinguishes his approach towards CPT from other 
conventional comparative political theorists. For March, non-Western traditions 
have to remain alien to the west no matter how long and how deeply they engage 
with it. Alienation in this respect does not mean unfamiliarity, as March 
acknowledges the fact that engagement can lead to understanding, appreciation, 
acceptance, toleration and respect. However, alienation should be understood in 
the sense that the boundaries between the traditions remain clear in order to 
alienate ‘us’ from ‘them’ (2009: 552). March explains that for a tradition, thinker, 
perspective, etc. to be ‘alien’ does not indicate mere difference. Alienation 
requires “something that seals it from us, so that it will remain alien to us no 
matter how long we engage with it” (2009: p. 553).  
Accordingly, March explains that religious doctrines are the most suitable 
entities for CPT projects, especially in an era where boundaries between 
traditions have become blurred with imperialism and globalization. Hybridity 
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between the west and non-west has reached a very deep level, making the distinct 
differentiation between the traditions continuously more difficult. However, 
particularly religious political thought entails the best entities that clearly mark 
the boundaries between traditions, or as March puts it, “religious doctrine best 
accounts for the comparative element in CPT” (2009: p. 552) as they help in 
setting the boundaries between traditions without ‘patronizing non-Western 
thinkers’. 
To clarify, when examining religious doctrines, boundaries create a sense 
of alienation that arises from the distinct semiautonomous application of reason. 
This alienation allows for a clear demarcation between traditions no matter what 
level of appreciation is reached. Alienation in this respect comes not only due to 
conflicting value commitments but more importantly from incompatible ‘source 
of authority’. In other words, the adherents of each tradition do not regard the 
adherents of the other tradition as part or members of a common community of 
moral argumentation (March, 2009: pp. 553-554). 
Accordingly, the distinctiveness of the religious traditions combined with 
the claim of genuine first order argumentation results in moral disagreement. For 
this moral disagreement to represent an important moral issue for both the west 
and non-west it needs to revolve around important questions of common 
concerns. Issues like justice, war, etc. offer cases of moral values that matter 
between multiple and conflicting systematic doctrinal systems (March, 2009: p. 
558).  
Accordingly, the examination of the normative implications of the conflict 
should be the greater goal for CPT work. CPT should aim at demystifying and 
interpreting moral disagreements within multiple moral traditions. Therefore, the 
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best justificatory comparative political theorists will be experts in multiple 
traditions, who have something to say about moral conflicts from different moral 
perspectives: “A post colonial argument that uses epistemically distinct non-
western experiences, perspectives or views to show Westerners that they ought to 
change their minds about their present normative commitments or beliefs” 
(March, 2009: pp. 561-562). 
March’s CPT approach is criticised for the many valuable and important 
projects that will be excluded due to the alienation requirement, or the doctrinal 
orthodoxy he emphasise. His CPT proposal highlights the “deeply moral 
disagreement between highly distinct modes of political thought, focusing on the 
most orthodox and ideal-type representatives across this divide” (Godrej, 2009: 
568). As a result to this centrality of doctrinal orthodoxy, many non-ideal thinkers 
will be neglected and excluded. For example thinkers such as Al-Qaradawi and 
Al Ghazali can be included in the overall CPT project, as “they represent the 
authoritative center of orthodox Islamic theology and jurisprudence” (Godrej, 
2009, 568), yet great thinkers like Ibn Khaldun and Al Farabi are not. 
Accordingly, the justificatory approach proposed by March is criticised for its 
limitation and narrow focus.  
In spite of the critique addressed to March’s CPT proposal, it remains 
salient to this project, due to the doctrinal orthodoxy of Islamic finance practice. 
The relevance of March’s understanding of CPT will be explained in depth in the 
next section, which is primarily concerned with contextualizing Islamic 
distributive justice within the overall CPT project. 
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1.3.  Islamic Distributive Justice: A CPT Project 
 
In this section I will contextualize my project within the CPT and illustrate it’s 
relevance to Dallmayr, Euben and March’s proposals for CPT. March believes 
that the comparison aspect in CPT as it is now does not reflect an approach or 
method, but rather a research interest and substantive commitment. It no longer 
refers to an approach but rather to a commitment to the study of non-western 
cultures as a means to enrich the Eurocentric political theory culture. This 
justification, according to March, does not identify the benefits of this inclusion 
and comparison (2009: p. 537). Indeed, in many instances the specific 
justification behind CPT work is quite unclear. This may be particularly true with 
regards to Dallmayr’s work, where the study and understanding of traditions and 
perspectives of the non-West is regarded as a target in itself, and knowledge about 
the non-West is considered a measure of the good of CPT. Although important 
and indeed serving the good, this justification does not go beyond regarding study 
of the non-West as a target in itself. 
However, apart from Dallmayr’s philosophical argument for the inclusion 
of the non-West in political theorizing, Euben for example highlights the 
importance of studying common issues in the non-Western context and 
introducing these non-Western perspectives into common and existing debates. 
This, I believe, is a fundamental justification for the inclusion of non-Western 
perspectives in political theorizing. Normative issues such as justice, freedom, 
equality, etc. are values debated in western and non-western cultures alike, as 
March noted. However, the way these issues are perceived, debated, addressed, 
aspired for and achieved differ according to the culture and tradition. Thus, 
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studying these issues in non-Western contexts and introducing these studies into 
the existing debate will enhance our understanding and analysis of these values. It 
is, therefore, quite evident in Euben’s work that the study of the non-West is a 
means to a better understanding of the political. She clearly explains that the call 
for CPT is in itself a claim that there is much to learn from the long forgotten 
political thought, traditions, and perspectives of the non-West. Moreover, the 
concept of distance and travel assumes that the study of non-Western texts or 
traditions allows us to understand the tradition we are familiar with better 
through asking more questions about the political life. 
Accordingly, CPT offers different perspectives regarding issues of interest. 
This challenges the Western knowledge and pushes its existing debates further. 
The mere inclusion of the ideas, perspectives and thoughts of the non-West leads 
to better understanding of specific political issues at stake. Ideas are not merely 
different because they originated in different places, but because the perspectives 
and traditions are different. Thus, these differences in their turn expand our 
knowledge of the political issues under investigation. Shedding light on different 
traditions, even without pointing out failures, can challenge existing and accepted 
ideas and arguments.  
Therefore, this justification is very important for the call for CPT, and is 
fundamental for studying Islamic distributive justice. Examining distributive 
justice in an Islamic context and introducing it to the rich debate taking place in 
political theory on distributive justice allows for a more comprehensive 
understanding of distributive justice as a value. Understanding how practices of 
Islamic finance aim to achieve distributive justice enriches our knowledge about 
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how principles of justice guide practice and how universal principles are at work 
in different philosophical contexts.  
It is worth noting here, however, that the actual dialogue between the 
Islamic theory of distributive justice and the existing debate on distributive justice 
is out of the scope of this project. The main objective of the project is to develop a 
practice-dependent Islamic distributive justice theory. It is a project that required 
an intensive research in the fields of distributive justice and Islamic finance, and 
the outcome is a theory that is groundbreaking in both fields. Hence, it is 
presented as an important academic contribution not only to the Islamic finance 
literature, but even more importantly to distributive justice theorists, who will 
find a fruitful project they can engage with regarding core issues such as 
egalitarianism, sufficiency and practical implications of justice principles. As I 
explained earlier, the way Islamic finance offers an established institutional 
arrangement and practice that resembles a new principle that was only coined in 
2007 in distributive justice literature is a genuinely important contribution. The 
apparent commonality between a non-western practice that has been operating 
for hundreds of years and a new principle in western distributive justice literature 
should be considered an important contribution to the existing literature. 
What is worth noting here, though, is what to look for in non-Western 
perspectives to be able to achieve such an enrichment of the canon. While 
Dallmayr highlights the importance of finding the commonalities between 
different cultures within their own cultural particularities, March stresses the 
importance of differences and disagreement without superiority of either tradition. 
However, what should be more important, in my opinion, is to address similar 
issues objectively and within the particularity of their distinctive tradition. One 
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should not aim to find either differences or similarities. One should rather aspire 
to objectively understand the different culture, tradition and perspective within 
the context where they originate and then the comparison will automatically fall 
into place. Only through an objective understanding of the non-western culture 
we can achieve the higher good sought for by Dallmayr, the global democratic 
objective of March as well as the introduction of different perspectives into 
familiar and existing debates as aspired by Euben. 
To elaborate, in my attempt to derive distributive justice principles from 
the practices of Islamic finance, as I will illustrate in the rest of this thesis, an 
important similarity seemed to be in place and a western principle appeared to be 
operating to regulate the practice. At first glance, this may seem like an example 
of the hegemonic role that the Western tradition assumes. In other words, it 
appears as if the project is imposing the Western perspective on a non-Western 
tradition. However, this should not be regarded as the case. Throughout my 
examination of the established Islamic finance practice it appeared to resemble a 
newly coined principle of distributive justice. As I will explain in the coming 
section as well as the rest of the thesis, Islamic finance practices that emerged 
longer than 1400 years ago appeared to resemble a principle of justice that was 
coined a decade ago. Thus, this connection between the Islamic and the western 
tradition was not highlighted to impose a western principle on the Islamic 
tradition. To the contrary, it was a remarkable point of similarity that successfully 
illustrated how a relatively new and limitedly used principle in the ongoing 
debate on distributive justice has been operating in a non-Western tradition for 
longer than 1400 years. It was not a hegemonic imposition of a Western principle, 
because the practice is interpreted in the light of the Islamic tradition, its 
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philosophical axioms, historical development, etc. Thus, the particularity of the 
context in which the practice is operating was fully integrated into the 
construction of the principles as I will illustrate in the rest of this thesis. 
Finally, I believe that March’s justificatory CPT approach is of importance 
to this project. As explained by March, a justificatory CPT project requires a 
tradition that can present a high level of alienation and prove the existence of first 
order of normative argumentation and this is evident in my research on Islamic 
distributive justice. This is not to claim that March’s proposal of CPT is the most 
appropriate for the entire reformation of the discipline, as in deed the restriction 
of the discipline/subfield to doctrinal orthodoxy will limit it and may even 
“reinforce the substantively and methodologically Eurocentric focus of political 
theory” (Godrej, 2009: 567). However, in the particular case of Islamic finance 
practice this doctrinal orthodoxy is present as will be explained next. Therefore, I 
claim that the thesis represents a good example of March’s account of 
justificatory CPT. This contextualization of my project will be further illustrated 
in the rest of this chapter. 
 
‘Islamic tradition’ – Alienation and first order moral argumentation 
There is a very clear gap in literature and research when it comes to looking at 
moderate Islamic traditions. Islamic fundamentalism has attracted a large amount 
of interest and generated research within and from outside CPT. Especially after 
9/11, the danger of Islamic fundamentalism has presented itself clearly, thus 
becoming a priority on research agendas in many areas of political scholarship. 
However, it is quite unjustifiable to presume that the Islamic tradition is 
Chapter I: Comparative Political Theory 
   
49 
 
associated with fundamentalism and terrorism only. There is an academic gap in 
addressing the moderate and non-terrorist Islamic tradition. As a matter of fact, in 
addressing Islamic finance practices similarities were revealed and Western 
principles appeared to be functioning in a non-western tradition. Such similarities 
that appear in comparisons between traditions are fundamental in easing the 
tension of difference and identity and in promoting coexistence between cultures 
and traditions. 
Moreover, I claim that the moderate Islamic tradition is one of the best 
traditions that illustrate March’s proposal of CPT. As a religious doctrine, the 
boundaries between the Islamic tradition and the Western traditions are clearly 
marked, thereby providing a clear example of alienation and distinction. As will 
be discussed in depth in chapter IV, its authoritative moral justification arises 
primarily from the Holy Book (the Qur’an) and the Prophet’s sayings and deeds 
(sunnah), which are interpreted in Shariah law, the framework that regulates the 
Muslim’s worship practices and day-to-day relationships and practices. 
Alienation in this respect flows in both directions. Non-Muslims, no matter how 
much they respect and sympathise with the Islamic tradition, still will not follow 
the doctrine and will remain non-adherents and non-members of the Muslim 
community. The doctrine is not imposing any moral authority on the non-
Muslims as it is strictly addressing Muslims. Hence, the boundaries between the 
Islamic tradition and other western traditions remain well demarcated and the 
blurring thereof is almost impossible. 
Furthermore, Islamic finance practice is a salient practice for this purpose 
as it presents itself as a manifestation of the Islamic ‘first order’ moral 
argumentation. As will be discussed in detail in chapter IV it is based on the 
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Islamic Shariah law and it claims to be a reflection of the Islamic tradition. 
Islamic financial practices prevailed predominantly in the Muslim world as 
prophet Muhammad was a businessman and merchant and many Muslim 
merchants led long distance (international) trade and managed a system for 
recording financial transaction. The rules regulating the Islamic financial and 
commercial systems are derived from Shariah, which clearly distinguishes the 
system’s rules, standards and tools from the conventional system.  
 
‘Distributive Justice’ – existing moral debate 
Distributive justice is an issue of common concern both for western and non-
western traditions. The distribution of benefits and burdens within any society is a 
core issue that reflects the level of justice, equality, welfare, freedom, social 
responsibility, etc. There has been extensive work in the Western tradition 
examining possible premises of distributive justice theories and assessing the 
impact of distributive systems. However, and in spite of the vast and extensive 
literature that tackles Islamic finance and the fact that Islamic economics is in 
essence a normative discipline that comprehensively tackles issues of justice, 
morals and ethics, there is no extensive and comprehensive work that examines 
the ethical foundations of Islamic finance in order to identify the principles of a 
theory of Islamic distributive justice.  
 
‘Practice-dependence’ Approach 
The practice-dependence approach, which is thoroughly addressed in chapter III, 
rejects abstract theorizing and aims to present theories and principles that are 
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constructed from, and should be regulating of, existing practices (James, 2013b: 
43). This approach to moral theorizing has recently become more popular 
between theorists as it overcomes the critique of practice-independence 
approaches that detach theorizing from the existing establishment and offer 
abstract and ideal theories. Accordingly, I claim that adopting a practice based 
approach to theorizing is taking CPT a step further. 
Within this context, Islamic finance practices offer a significant subject for 
a CPT project. Islamic finance practice has proliferated within Muslim and non-
Muslim societies alike. Although it has been first launched to fulfil the financial 
needs of the Muslims within the Islamic world and Muslim communities in the 
West, it is attracting more and more non-Muslims who prefer the ethical 
component of Islamic finance practice over the conventional financial system. 
Although this will be addressed in detail in Chapter IV, what is important to 
highlight here is that while the geographical boundaries seem to blur, the 
authoritative boundaries remain solid when it comes to this practice. Thus, 
examining and interpreting Islamic finance practice is a crucial exercise that 
benefits CPT in highlighting how globalization and blurring boundaries does not 
necessarily affect how distinguishable the entities of comparison are. Although 
Islamic and conventional financial practices exist alongside each other, they 
remain clearly distinguishable and distinct from each other. 
1.4. Conclusion 
 
In an era of globalization, when boundaries blur and there is a pressing need for 
coexistence, normative political theory, in spite of its wide variety of activities 
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and projects, has mostly continued to rely on a Eurocentric canon that does not 
integrate perspectives, thoughts and thinkers of non-Western traditions. This 
shortfall has encouraged many theorists to call for the development of a CPT 
discipline that would include the study of non-Western traditions. CPT is a 
project that aims to take political theory one step further in addressing non-
Western traditions.  Justifications for CPT and approaches to conducting such 
work varied between theorists, yet relevant to this thesis are Dallamyr, Euben and 
March.  
Fred Dallmayr, the founder of CPT, based his call for the launch of the 
field on the drawbacks of practices of political theory and the hegemonic stance 
that precedes the work of comparative politics. He is sceptical of the ability of 
political theory to address global issues and/or theorizing the political within a 
global context and he believes that comparative politics is dominated by Western 
modes of theorising that allow the West to assume a superior stance. Hence, he 
borrows the hermeneutical dialogue approach from Gadamer and applies it on 
inter-cultural and inter-civilizational relations and illustrates how the 
hermeneutical dialogue can lead to the fusion of horizons leading to not only 
toleration, but more importantly to acceptance, acknowledgement and respect 
between different traditions and perspectives. 
Euben, unlike Dallmayr, explains how political theory is inherently 
comparative and holds the required tools for overcoming the challenges imposed 
by globalisation. She introduces the element of distance, both spatial and 
theoretical, that allows for asking questions about the meaning of our own 
traditions. She emphasises the importance of the blurring boundaries between the 
West and non-West that creates a difficulty in identifying distinct non-Western 
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traditions, and she highlights the significance of historicising modernity as a 
prerequisite for demarcating the boundaries between traditions. 
March, on the other hand presents a ‘justificatory CPT’ project, which 
relies on the first order moral value of the tradition in question, a distinct 
separation between the tradition that reaches a level of alienation and finally the 
existence of the moral disagreement or value conflict. He explains how religious 
doctrines are considered the best examples to be used in CPT work, because no 
matter how sympathetic one is with them, the element of alienation is always 
existent. 
This chapter, thus, contextualizes my thesis of a practice based Islamic 
distributive justice theory within the overall CPT project and illustrate the 
relevance of Dallmayr, Euben and March’s proposal for the discipline. The 
Islamic doctrine provides distinctive first order normative judgments about many 
issues of common concern, one of which is distributive justice. Moreover, the 
practice-based approach allows for an interpretation of Islamic finance practice, 
which exists alongside conventional financial systems. Thus, it is a good example 
of how geographical boundaries occur while maintaining alienation from the 




Chapter II: Distributive Justice: 
A Conceptual Analysis 
 
 
All for ourselves, and nothing for other people, seems, in every age of the 
world, to have been the vile maxim of the masters of mankind. 




The objective of this chapter is to situate my theory of Islamic distributive justice 
in the context of the existing distributive justice dialogue. This is not to say that I 
will provide a detailed description of each and every distributive justice theory as 
put forward by prominent theorists such as Rawls, Nozick, Dworkin or Walzer. 
Rather, the aim here is to provide a conceptual analysis of what the notion of 
distributive justice entails. This analysis will have a twofold consequence. First, it 
will offer an understanding of the core elements that constitute a distributive 
justice theory. This will provide a general guideline for my proposed practice 
based Islamic distributive justice theory and shall assist in deciding whether there 
is indeed an identifiable and significantly distinct Islamic theory of distributive 
justice. Second, it will highlight how specific distributive justice theories flesh out 
the elements and develop their specific accounts. This will enable a systematic 
comparison with the account of Islamic distributive justice to be developed in this 
thesis.  
I discuss in this chapter five main elements common to theories of 
distributive justice. These are (1) site of justice or the entities that are assessed for 
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being just or unjust, (2) scope of justice or who is included within the just 
distributional scheme or system (3) principles of justice or the rules that dictate what 
a just distribution entails, (4) goods for distribution or what exactly we need to 
distribute, and (5) moral justification or how we come to decide which principles to 
endorse. Each of these aspects of distributive justice theories will be treated in a 
discreet section of the chapter and will include relevant examples to illustrate how 
different theories of distributive justice have addressed the specified issue. The 
discussion will lay the foundation for assessing the coherence of a theory of 
Islamic distributive justice embedded in the practice of Islamic finance. 
 
2.1. What Makes a Theory of Distributive Justice? 
 
In an era marked by scarce resources, tenacious poverty and increasing inequality, 
it comes as no surprise that the idea of distributive justice remains at the forefront 
of much of political theory and political philosophy. This current academic 
interest in distributive justice can be traced to the 1970s, with the publication of 
two of the most fundamental and influential works in this field; John Rawls’s A 
Theory of Justice in 1971 and Robert Nozick’s Anarchy, State and Utopia in 1974 
(Allingham, 2014: p. 4). The influence of Rawls’s work in particular in reviving 
interest in distributive justice and in stimulating other work cannot be 
overestimated. Thus, his work will be frequently cited and referred to throughout 
this chapter. 
Distributive justice will be understood as fundamentally concerned with 
the just allocation of goods, resources, burdens and benefits. Miller, for example, 
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describes it as the “fair allocation of valuable resources such as income and marks 
of prestige” (1992: p. 558). Accordingly, there are various conceptions of 
distributive justice (liberal, communitarian, libertarian..etc), different 
justifications for adopting them (realist, constructivist, conventionalist, etc.) and 
diverse criteria for distribution (sufficiency concerns, egalitarianism, self-
ownership). 
In general terms then, a theory of distributive justice is concerned with the 
meaning and nature of a just distribution (Allingham, 2014: p. 1).  To this end, 
theories need to answer certain questions and address specific issues in order to 
offer comprehensive rationalizations of what just distributional schemes require. 
However, theorists rarely specify which issues or elements need to be present in 
theories of distributive justice. Theorists tend to address concept analysis very 
briefly and seem to be keener on presenting their theorising of the subject matter 
rather than conceptualising it. Thus, to map the elements of a distributive justice 
theory for the purpose of my project, I will primarily rely on the criteria put by 
Caney (2005) and Cohen (1987), as they offer the most extensive analyses of what 
a theory of distributive justice should entail. Both analyses agree on the 
importance of three main elements that need to be addressed in distributive 
justice theories. These are; (1) the recipients of goods, who is obligated to 
distribute these goods, and the entities included within the system of distribution, 
whether it will be humans, all creatures, collective entities, etc. (all referred to by 
Caney as the scope of justice), (2) the goods that require fair distribution, such as 
income, happiness, etc., and (3) the criterion according to which the distribution 
will take place, whether according to equality, desert, etc. (the principle of justice). 
In addition to these three elements, Cohen highlights the importance of providing 
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a (4) justification, or the standard according to which this criterion is chosen; 
(Caney, 2005: p. 103 and Cohen, 1987: p. 20-21). 
Undoubtedly, all these elements are interrelated and cannot be completely 
separated. However, I will attempt to address all of them over the next five 
sections in the order that reflects the logical sequence used in offering a theory of 
distributive justice. For the sake of clarity of a conceptual analysis, however, I 
will discuss the site and scope of justice separately. I will start in the first section 
with a discussion on the site of justice, which theories of distributive justice, 
following Rawls’s identification of the basic structure, tend to identify before they 
address the other four elements. The specification of the site of justice has a direct 
impact on the identification of the scope of justice, which I will discuss in the 
second section. In the following two sections I will address the two questions any 
theory of justice needs to answer; i.e. ‘what are we looking to distribute justly?’ 
and ‘how should we distribute it?’. I will start with the ‘how’ in the third section, 
as it has a direct impact on the identification of ‘what’ we want to distribute, 
which will be addressed in the fourth section. In the final section I will discuss the 
moral justification of a theory of justice, or how a theory of justice can justify the 
principles of justice it construes.   
 
2.2. The Site of Justice: 
 
A theory of distributive justice needs, in the first instance, to clarify the site at 
which its principles apply, or the entities, practices or actions it is assessing. As 
Arash Abizadeh explains “the site of justice refers to the kinds of objects 
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(individuals’ actions, individuals’ character, rules, or institutions, and so on) 
appropriately governed by principles of justice, that is, to which the principles of 
justice rightly apply” (2007: p. 323). Thus, different theories of justice may 
endorse different sites of justice by specifying different entities or practices that 
are expected to be governed by the principles of justice.  
To better understand what a site of justice specifies, it is useful to 
determine what sorts of things can in practice be governed by principles of justice. 
Pogge explains that these will be things that are actually capable of being just or 
unjust and accordingly can be considered as possible ‘judicanda’4 for justice. Thus, 
he identifies four categories of judicanda to which distributive justice can apply. 
These include 1) individuals and collective agents; 2) the conduct of such agents 
including their acts and omissions: decisions, policies, etc.; 3) social rules, 
including social institutions, laws, conventions, practices, economic arrangements, 
educational and economic systems; and 4) states of affairs, including facts or 
combination of facts, particularly regarding distributions (2005: p. 101). 
Accordingly, theorists use different judicanda for their theories, and their sites of 
justice vary. I will illustrate how sites of justice can vary by examining Rawls’s 
influential institutionalism and objections addressing it.  
2.2.1. Rawls and the Basic Structure 
 
The literature on distributive justice has been dominated by a concern for 
institutions as the site of justice, especially since the publication of John Rawls’s 
A Theory of Justice. According to his approach, principles of justice would apply in 
                                                     
4 Judicanda is derived from the latin word ‘judicandum’ meaning ‘that which is to be 
judged’. 
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the first instance to institutional schemes and orders. The judgement of ‘just’ and 
‘unjust’ in this respect is relevant to the institutional structure. Thus, in 
developing his theory Rawls uses the basic structure of society as his site of justice. 
He explains;  
The primary subject of the principles of social justice is the 
basic structure of society, the arrangement of major social 
institutions into one scheme of cooperation… these principles 
are to govern the assignment of rights and duties in these 
institutions and they are to determine the appropriate 
distribution of the benefits and burdens of social life (Rawls, 
1999: p. 47).  
 
Within this context, institutions for Rawls are institutions of ‘promising’ that 
represent the rules that structure relationships and interactions among agents. The 
rules of these institutions determine which interactions between agents create a 
promise (Pogge and Kosch, 2007: p. 28). Moreover, an institution exists and is 
part of the basic structure when actions determined by it are regularly taking place 
based on a public understanding that the rules defining this institution need to be 
followed (Rawls, 1999: p. 48). Accordingly, all fundamental political, economic 
and social arrangements, e.g., the constitution, the economic structure and 
regulations, private means of production, and even the family, are included in the 
‘basic structure’ (Rawls, 1999: p. 6).  
Rawls justifies his choice of the basic structure as the site of justice by its 
profound effect on individual lives. The institutional structure of a society does 
not only affect the lives of its members but it also has a strong impact on what 
sort of persons they are and want to be. People’s position in the basic structure 
can limit their perception of the opportunities available. “The basic structure 
shapes the way the social system produces and reproduces over time a certain 
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form of culture shared by persons with certain conceptions of their good” (Rawls, 
1993: p.269). Moreover, the basic structure can entail significant inequalities, 
both economic and social, which can have a strong impact not only on the way 
they lead their lives, but also on their futures. These inequalities can depend on 
social origin, natural talents or historical contingencies. Even if these inequalities 
are not profound, their effects may be great and over time they can have 
increasing consequences. Hence, a theory of justice is to regulate how these 
inequalities are to affect people’s life prospects (Rawls, 1993: pp. 270-271). 
Accordingly, principles of justice should in the first instance apply to the 
inequalities in the basic structure of the society by regulating the basic institutions. 
The resulting social scheme will be considered just depending on how it 
distributes and assigns fundamental rights, duties, economic opportunities and 
social conditions in the various sectors of society (Rawls, 1999: p. 7). 
I will note that such an institutional approach does not deny that 
principles of natural duty need to apply to individual conduct. According to 
Rawls in his discussion of justice as fairness, a conception of justice will be 
“incomplete until these principles have been accounted for” (Rawls, 1999: p. 293). 
Accordingly, natural duties are presented in the individual’s support of the just 
institution. These duties are discharged through supporting, and complying with, 
the rules of existing just institutions and arrangements, or by assisting in the 
establishment of just institutions if they do not already exist.  
An understanding of the basic structure as a site of justice is of 
fundamental importance for this thesis. As will be explained in the next chapters, 
Islamic finance practice represents an institutional structure that has a profound 
effect on the lives of its participants. The practice does represent a promise, where 
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its rules indicate which promises are to be effective between members. Moreover, 
the practice affects the wealth, income and risk distribution among participants, 
as well as financial opportunities which have a profound impact on their financial 
lives. The influence the practice has on the lives of the participants will be 
discussed throughout the rest of the thesis.  
The next section notes some alternatives that have been offered to an 
institutional approach, by way of further clarifying its parameters.  
2.2.2. Objections to an institutional site of justice – Cohen and 
Caney 
 
Some theorists have argued that the site of justice should not be limited to 
institutions, as other entities also affect justice. Cohen, for example, rejects 
Rawls’s basic structure as a sole site of justice and emphasizes the importance of 
the conduct of agents alongside the structure as a site of justice. For him, the 
main concern for distributive justice is the actual pattern of benefits and burdens. 
Accordingly, he is primarily concerned with the results of the structure alongside 
the individual choices within it. He explains; 
[m]y own fundamental concern is neither the basic structure 
of society, in any sense, nor people's individual choices, but 
the pattern of benefits and burdens in society: that is neither a 
structure in which choice occurs nor a set of choices, but the 
upshot of structure and choices alike…My root belief is that 
there is injustice in distribution when inequality of goods 
reflects… myriad forms of lucky and unlucky circumstance. 
Such differences of advantage are a function of the structure 
and of people's choices within it, so I am concerned, 
secondarily, with both of those (Cohen, 1997: p.12). 
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Consequently, Cohen believes that justice, or the lack thereof, could exist 
within the basic structure, as it can be the result of the rules and conducts that 
operate inside the structure. Thus, the basic structure on its own should not be the 
exclusive determinant of justice or considered solely as the site of justice (1997: p. 
10-11). Hence, he includes, alongside the basic structure, three other independent 
factors that affect the conduct of agents and would need to be taken into 
consideration when considering the site of justice; 1) non coercive structures or 
conventions (e.g. prevalent division of household labour); 2) social ethos affecting 
interpersonal attitudes (e.g. ethos celebrating concern for the worst off); and 3) 
personal choices (i.e. decisions) (Pogge, 2000: p. 138). 
Separately, some cosmopolitans5, understood as theorists who grant no 
fundamental moral significance to the state, are critical of an institutional 
approach as it impacts the idea of a ‘global’ justice. Some argue that justice or 
injustice could exist even without an established institutional structure. Thus, for 
these cosmopolitans, individuals should have their rights met and should have 
equal access to certain opportunities. Caney, for example, in Justice Beyond Borders 
argues for the primacy of “three principles: the worth of individuals, equality, and 
the existence of obligations binding on all” (2005: p. 4). In such a non-
institutional approach, the site of justice is effectively construed as the actions, 
practices, discharge of duties, etc., of all of humanity.  
 
                                                     
5  This is not the viewpoint of all cosmopolitan theorists. Others, notably Beitz, 
Moellendorf and Pogge, have argued that there already is a global basic structure in place and 
thus an institutional approach would apply. I explain this in more details in section 2.3.2 Global 
Justice. 
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What is worth noting here is that theories identify different sites of justice 
based on which entities they consider as the contributors to the state of justice. 
The identification of the site of justice is fundamental for constructing an Islamic 
finance distributive justice theory. As I will explain in chapter IV, Islamic finance 
is a salient site of distributive justice as it appears to be governed by principles of 
justice and accordingly has a profound impact on the lives of the participants and 
on the distribution of burdens and benefits among them. This will be explained in 
depth as I present Islamic finance practice. 
2.3. The Scope of Justice 
 
The identification of the site of justice as explained has a direct impact on 
determining the scope of the theory or entities to be included within the system of 
distribution. Abizadeh explains that the scope of justice “refers to the range of 
persons who have claims upon and responsibilities to each other arising from 
considerations of justice” (2007: p. 323); in other words, those who will be 
included in the distributive scheme and will have the right to have a just share in 
the benefits and burdens.  
There has been an ongoing debate over whether distributive justice should 
be addressed nationally or globally. Issues such as poverty and inequality of 
income can clearly be seen both on the national and international levels, and, 
thus, theories vary with regards to whether the scope of distributive justice should 
be limited to the state, or whether there should, and actually could be a global 
scope of distributive justice. I will now discuss both the statist and the global 
scope of justice. 
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2.3.1. Statist Scope of Justice 
 
The more traditional stance with regards to the scope of distributive justice is the 
statist approach, which limits the scope of justice to the state. Although statists, or 
theorists who argue for a national scope of distributive justice (the most 
influential of which is Rawls), do not deny that injustices exist on the global level, 
they reject the application of norms of justice globally. In other words, they reject 
inequalities within states yet not globally. Undoubtedly, this stance is directly 
influenced by the identification of the site of justice, as I will explain. 
It is appropriate to begin with Rawls’s statist scope, which profoundly 
influences the argument both for and against limiting the scope of justice to the 
state level. Rawls’s basic structure as the site of justice for his principles is the 
fundamental reason for limiting the scope of distributive justice. As explained in 
earlier sections, Rawls presents his principles of justice to govern only the basic 
structure. Or as Nagel explains, they are not intended to govern “personal 
conduct of individuals living in a just society, nor the governance of private 
associations, nor the international relations of societies to one another, but only 
the basic structure of separate nation-states” (2005: p. 123). Rawls, according to 
Nagel, limits the role of the principles, as it is the comprehensive control of the 
state “over the framework of their citizens' lives, that creates the special demands 
for justification and the special constraints on ends and means that constitute the 
requirements of justice” (2005: p. 123). 
Thus, for Rawls the scope of justice is limited to those persons who share 
the basic structure. For him, citizens who share the basic structure have 
responsibilities and consideration of distributive justice towards each other yet 
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not towards individuals who do not share the basic structure. Consequently, the 
scope of justice is limited to the nation state where the basic structure operates. 
Rawls’s scope of justice to a nation state is extended by other theorists 
such as Nagel, Freeman and Blake. Nagel for example links the scope of justice to 
the issue of sovereignty. He explains that the political conception of justice is 
associative and dependent on positive rights that come to being only as a result to 
sharing “a political society under strong centralized control” (2005: p. 127). We 
can only claim the right to certain benefits such as democracy, equal opportunity 
or just distribution of goods from such a system, its members and institutions.  
Accordingly, Nagel bases his rejection of a global scope of justice by 
differentiating “between duties of humanity and duties of justice” (Moellendorf, 
2009: p. 1128). For him duties of justice are perfect and enforceable, thus, they 
need to be fulfilled every time and in every case. To the contrary, however, duties 
of humanity are regarded as imperfect duties that are not enforceable. 
Accordingly, we do not fail if we do not fulfil them each and every time they exist. 
Hence, although he does not deny the existence of inequalities and injustices 
globally, he denies the existence of positive moral duties towards global justice 
(Moellendorf, 2009: p. 1128).  
Freeman, on the other hand, links state justice to cooperation. He argues 
that if distributive justice principles take as their site of justice basic institutions 
that rely on social and political cooperation, then the scope of the principles 
should be the state, which is a scheme of social and political cooperation. 
Accordingly, they are not applicable on the global scale, as there is no existing set 
of global basic institutions of cooperation. This is not to say that Freeman denies 
the existence of global social cooperation, but he argues that this form of 
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cooperation is the result of decisions made by states. Thus, states are the main 
actor in this global cooperation (cf. Caney, 2008: p. 491-492).  
Similar to Nagel and Freeman’s statist scope, Blake links state justice to 
coercion. He claims that principles of justice that apply to the state are different 
from those that apply globally. For him, the state plays a coercive role to 
maintain its autonomy and therefore it needs to justify its policies to those who 
are being coerced by it. This commitment to justification includes a commitment 
to relative principles of distributive justice. Consequently, since there is no 
coercion in the global order, then there is no commitment to distributive justice 
on a global level (cf. Caney, 2008: pp. 498-499). “In the international arena…no 
institution comparable to the state exists. No matter how substantive the links of 
trade, diplomacy, or international agreement, the institutions present at the 
international level do not engage in the same sort of coercive practices against 
individual moral agents” (Blake, 2001: p. 265). 
There is no doubt that my illustration of the statist scope of justice is an 
oversimplification of the theorists’ arguments, yet the objective of this section and 
the chapter as a whole is not to present the details of the arguments, but rather to 
map how theorists vary in identifying the scope of their theories of distributive 
justice. Hence, I will move now to the arguments in favour of a global scope of 
distributive justice.  
2.3.2. Global Justice 
 
Theorists such as Charles Beitz, Darrell Moellendorf, Simon Caney and Thomas 
Pogge, advocate conceptions of global justice. According to Caney, cosmopolitan 
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principles of distributive justice share a few important characteristics. First, they 
affirm that duties of distributive justice attach to individuals and not states. 
Second, they differentiate between fundamental and derivative principles and 
accordingly understand that while all individuals are included within the scope of 
distributive justice, some principles “may sometimes best be realized if people 
comply with special duties to some” (2005: p. 105). A common example would 
be duties to children discharged by their own parents. Third, while some 
moderate cosmopolitans argue for principles of distributive justice with global 
scope alongside statist ones, more ambitious cosmopolitans claim that no 
distributive obligations are due to “fellow national or fellow-citizens”. Fourth, 
some ‘institutional’ approaches argue that principles are to be applied to existing 
institutions such as global trade, while other ‘interactional’ approaches argue that 
principles are to be applied globally even if institutions are absent (2005: pp. 105-
106).  
Accordingly, Caney suggests that the claim for a global scope of 
distributive justice should be understood as follows: 
the standard justifications of principles of distributive justice 
entail that there are cosmopolitan principles of distributive 
justice…the very logic that underpins most domestic theories 
of justice actually implies that these theories of distributive 
justice should be enacted at the global, and not (or not simply) 
the domestic, level (2005: p. 107). 
 
According to this account of a cosmopolitan approach to global justice, 
Beitz and Moellendorf, for example, argue that global phenomena such as current 
regional and economic integration, global markets, global trade and investment, 
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etc all imply that there are existing global forms of cooperation, or a global basic 
structure in Rawlsian terms. Moellendorf explains; 
Contrary to Rawls’s empirical assumption it seems reasonable 
to conclude that individual interaction mediated by market 
institutions is extensive and complex with profound effects on 
important human interests. Regardless of whether persons are 
directly engaged with the global economy, their local 
economy is significantly affected by international trade, FDI, 
finance and speculative investing. For theorists, such as Rawls, 
who take justice to be a property of institutions, there seems to 
be no reason to deny that the institutions of the global 
economy are subject to the standards of justice (2009: p. 1132). 
 
This argument for an already existing global system of cooperation and 
global interdependence, is further strengthened with Beitz’s argument regarding 
the distribution of natural resources. Beitz explains that the natural resources are 
arbitrarily distributed and that no individuals can claim desert of those natural 
resources they happen to find they own. Thus, for Beitz, the application of 
Rawls’s principles of distributive justice should not be limited to domestic spheres 
and should be of global scope. Further, as Moellendorf argues, “if a global 
original position were to include representatives of persons from around the 
world, one would expect principles of egalitarian distributive justice to be chosen” 
(2009: pp. 1132-1133). 
 
So far I explained the first two of five characteristics of a theory of 
distributive justice; the site and scope of justice. In other words, I explained what 
it means to identify the entities that we think are governed by principles of justice 
as well as those who are entitled to be included in the distribution. The two 
questions that naturally come to mind after we identify the site and scope of the 
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theory are ‘‘what are we looking to distribute justly?’ and ‘how should we 
distribute it?’. Over the next two sections, I will first address different principles 
that answer ‘how?’ and that have direct impact on the following section regarding 
‘what’ we are looking to distribute justly. 
2.4. Principles of Justice (How?) 
 
Theories of distributive justice need to offer a coherent set of principles that 
dictate the just distribution of burdens and benefits, or how goods ought to be 
distributed. Principles of justice answer questions about the distribution of goods 
and services such as; “should they, for example be distributed equally? Or in a 
way that maximizes total happiness? Or according to merit? Or according to who 
is most needy?” (Caney, 2005: p. 103). To this end, theories endorse different 
principles of justice.  
I will briefly discuss three of the most dominant principles of justice, those 
based in desert, equality and need. Each will be salient to the later discussion of a 
theory of Islamic distributive justice. I will start with desert based principles. After 
highlighting some practical challenges associated with them, I will move on to 
egalitarian and need based principles, which are of closest relevance to my thesis. 
2.4.1. Desert 
 
Desert-based theories are rivals to egalitarianism. For desert based principles 
justice is only attained when benefits and burdens are distributed according to 
what people deserve (Vallentyne, 2003). Desert, in this sense, can be understood 
as a claim to deserve something in virtue of a reason.  It is, thus, understood as “a 
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three-place relation of the form A deserves X in virtue of f (the desert-basis).” 
(Lamont, 1994: p. 45). The desert-basis virtue in this context is usually “a quality 
possessed by a person, including a quality such as ‘having performed action a” 
(Lamont, 1994: p. 46).  
According to Dick, there are four desert-basis virtues (derived from Joel 
Feinberg’s work on justice and personal desert). First, ability-based principles of 
desert dictate that a personal trait or characteristic can serve as a fair basis for 
differences in distributions (Dick, 1975: p. 259). However, since ability is an 
arbitrary quality that is beyond voluntary control, it is said to need to be 
combined with a principle affording persons fair opportunities to develop their 
characteristics or traits. “Ability as the product of effort may satisfy the fair 
opportunity principle, but ability as such cannot do so any more than mere height 
or strength can” (1975, p. 259).  
Second, effort as a desert-based principle is an appealing concept as it 
decides just distribution based on the effort a person exerts. The idea behind an 
effort based distributional scheme is mainly to commemorate a person’s free will 
to give more time and exert more hard work. It is envisioned as a principle that 
can take appropriate account of a worker’s choice to work longer hours or to try 
harder at achieving a task. However, it is a challenging basis due to the 
impracticality of calculating the amount of effort (Dick, 1975: pp. 259-160).  
Third, contribution-based criterion aim to reflect the product or outcome 
of the effort exerted (Dick, 1975: pp. 259-260). Contribution-based principles 
consider a just distribution to be reflective of the individuals’ contributions to the 
economic well being of their society. In other words, an individual’s effort is 
translated into the product of economic well being. Accordingly, individuals are 
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entitled to the proportion of national wealth that resulted from their achievement 
or contribution. Yet again, it is considered an impractical principle, as many 
challenges face the calculation of each individual’s contribution to a production 
process (Dick, 1975: pp. 260-264). 
Finally, a compensation based principle dictates that individuals are to be 
compensated for any costs they bear at work. Compensation is determined by 
equalizing differences and compensating for non-monetary differences in jobs. 
Hence, jobs that are considered to be not worth having become more appealing 
within a compensation-based distributive system. Within this criterion, jobs of 
unattractive nature (dangerous, boring, dirty, etc) will be filled because of the 
compensation. Persons who have greater responsibilities and/or burdens due to 
their jobs are compensated with greater benefits in order to achieve justice (Dick, 
1975: pp. 264-266). 
 
However, desert-based justice is, more often than not, difficult to achieve 
due to its impracticality and the integration of arbitrary qualities such as ability. 
Desert-based principles also impose a challenge particularly to the egalitarian idea 
of justice, which is mainly concerned with either an equal initial status for people 
or an equal outcome. Accordingly, I will illustrate now egalitarian theories that 
hold equality as the basis for justice. 
2.4.2. Equality 
 
Egalitarianism is a stance in political thought that is primarily concerned with the 
equality of people. It is based on the idea of moral equality of persons, and is 
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accordingly translated into distributive justice theories that endorse different 
forms of equal distribution between people. Egalitarian principles consider equal 
distribution of goods as the just distributional criterion and specify the 
exceptional cases under which unequal distribution may be permissible. Thus, 
such principles are usually comparative in the sense that they determine how 
much a person is being allocated in comparison to others, i.e. they are not only 
concerned with the alleviation of inequalities, but also with how persons fare in 
relation to one another. Thus, they are expected to remain operational as long as 
inequalities still exist (Tan, 2012: p. 11). 
In strict egalitarianism, which is not a common stance among egalitarians, 
a just distribution is achieved when people’s share of distribution is identical. 
Based on the idea that persons are capable equals, strict egalitarianism promotes 
identical equal shares. As Vallentyne describes it, a strict egalitarian principle 
“would require the homogenization of human differences, to the extent possible 
we should all look the same, have the same skills, etc” (2003). Accordingly, from 
a non-strict egalitarian perspective, such a distribution is far from optimal, 
because uniform allocations have “no clear sense for respect, self respect, 
satisfaction of needs, or attaining the best life of which a person is capable” 
(Nielsen, 1979: p. 210). Identical allocation between people with different 
preferences and dislikes will only lead to making everybody worse off.  
Thus, egalitarian principles need not necessarily promote identical shares, 
but rather different shares that produce or reflect equality. Each person has an 
equal right to certain treatment, but that is not to say that each person is to have 
identical or uniform amounts. Equality is achieved when each person has F1, F2, 
F3, etc., consistent with equal treatment. So, each person will be treated with 
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respect, but not necessarily treated identically (Nielsen, 1979: pp. 211-212). To 
illustrate, we can examine some of the different egalitarian principles of justice 
endorsed.  
 The Difference Principle 
The difference principle is a classic egalitarian principle, according to which 
distribution can entail inequalities that are to the greatest benefit of the least 
advantaged in the society. It is concerned with equality alongside the 
enhancement of the position of the worst off (Brighouse and Swift, 2006: p. 483). 
Hence, if a system of strict equality were to maximize the position of the least 
advantaged, then the difference principle would support and advocate strict 
equality in distributions. If, however, distributional inequalities can enhance the 
absolute position of the least advantaged, then such inequalities should be 
endorsed until the absolute position of the least advantaged can no longer be 
raised (Altham, 1973: p. 75). Hence, the difference principle calls for a basic 
socioeconomic structure that entails inequalities that work to the benefit of the 
citizens in the lowest-socioeconomic group. 
In Rawls’s account, the basic premise is equality, or that inequalities are 
morally arbitrary unless justified (Fried: 1983: p. 45). Hence, he uses the 
difference principle to show the acceptability of inequalities that otherwise could 
not be accepted under an egalitarian system. Rawls defines the socioeconomic 
circumstances, positions and inequalities through an index of the social primary 
goods including “powers and prerogatives associated with professional positions, 
income and wealth, and the residual social bases of self-respect” (Pogge and 
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Kosch, 2007: p. 107), although he does not explain how the goods are to be 
quantified or indexed for each person (Pogge and Kosch, 2007: pp. 106-7). 
 
 Entitlement Principle  
By contrast, equality in the libertarian context is understood to be equality of 
liberty and self-ownership. Although not traditionally regarded as an egalitarian 
principle, libertarianism is based on the idea that the most fundamental human 
right is the right to liberty: each person’s right to choose freely, provided the rights 
of others to do the same are respected. Thus, it can be understood as promoting 
“radical equality. Every person, regardless of ability, virtue, or social class, has 
fundamentally the same moral standing. We are all equally sovereign over 
ourselves and equally nonsovereign over others” (Brennan, 2012: pp. 3-4).  
Consequently, the libertarian principle of justice is based on the right to 
self ownership, or to be more precise the equal right of self ownership among 
people. Relationships among people are seen as appropriately voluntary, and 
“[t]o respect one another as equal human beings, we must not force people to 
serve society, each other, or even themselves” (Brennan, 2012: p. xi). Thus, 
instead of describing a just pattern of distribution, libertarian principles of 
distributive justice explain the sorts of acquisitions or exchanges which are just. 
For Nozick, individuals have rights so strong and far reaching that questions of 
‘what, if anything, the state role should be?’ come to the forefront. For a 
libertarian account of distributive justice, it is not enough to look at distributions 
to decide whether they are just or not, rather it is crucial to look at ‘how’ this 
distribution came to be. 
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Libertarianism is usually attributed to Nozick’s work, or his entitlement 
theory, which is more of a process of moving from one distribution to another 
through legitimate means. For a distributive system to be just, everyone needs to 
be entitled to what they possess within this distributive system. Hence, the theory 
consists of three aspects and each is required to be just in order for the entire 
distributive system and process to be just. First, the theory requires the ‘principle of 
just acquisition’; it is the just means of how unowned things become possessed, or 
the original acquisition of holdings that governs the appropriation of unheld 
property. If the means is just it should lead to a just distribution situation. Second, 
the movement from one just distributive position to the next needs to be through 
the ‘principle of just transfer’, which is a principle that “preserve(s) justice” (Nozick, 
1973: p. 48). However, on its own this principle does not guarantee justice in the 
actual distributive situation. A distributive process that entails past injustices 
would still be regarded as just by the justice in acquisition and justice in transfer 
principles. Therefore, the theory entails a third part to guarantee distributive 
justice, pertaining to the rectification of unjust holdings. This is intended to 
guarantee that the distribution process is abiding to the first two principles of 
acquisition and transfer justice (Nozick, 1973: 153). 
 Luck Egalitarianism 
A third example of egalitarian principles salient to this thesis is luck 
egalitarianism. For luck egalitarians, equality is achieved through the mitigation, 
or elimination, of the effect of bad brute luck on the lives of people. As Richard 
Arneson puts it “[i]n the ideal luck egalitarian society, there are no inequalities in 
people’s life prospects except those that arise through processes of voluntary 
choice or faulty conduct, for which the agents involved can reasonably be held 
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responsible” (2000: p. 339). Thus, it appears to be affirming a conditional form of 
equality; i.e. “it is morally desirable that everyone’s condition should be the same 
unless differential merit or differences in people’s voluntary choices give rise to 
inequality” (Arneson, 2000: p. 340).  
Luck egalitarianism is highly salient to the practice of Islamic finance, As I 
will show in Chapter V, luck egalitarianism is the set of principles primarily 
governing the practices of Islamic finance. The brief introduction here is simply 




A different basis for distribution that shifts our attention from equality is 
distribution according to need. This basis also will be shown to be significant 
within Islamic finance practice. According to Casal, three approaches take need 
as their main concern for distributions. First, the egalitarian difference principle 
gives priority to needs fulfilment, especially the needs of those in the worst off 
societal group. Second, prioritarians also favour the worse off and distribute 
according to need as they “assume that the moral value of a benefit, or disvalue of 
a burden, diminishes as its recipient becomes better off” (Casal, 2007: p. 296). 
Accordingly, distribution to the needy is of more moral value than distribution to 
the better off. Finally, the sufficiency principle also prefers distribution according 
to need, as it is concerned that everyone should have enough, or be above a 
certain threshold (Casal, 2007: p. 296-297).  
Chapter II: Distributive Justice: A Conceptual Analysis 
   
77 
 
Most important to the interpretation of Islamic finance practice will be the 
sufficiency principle, or the view that unmet need or deprivation causing a person 
to fall below a sufficiency threshold is morally wrong irrespective of where 
individuals stand in relation to others.  
When we consider people who are substantially worse off 
than ourselves, we do very commonly find that we are 
morally disturbed by their circumstances. What directly 
touches us in cases of this kind, however, is not a quantitative 
discrepancy but a qualitative condition-not the fact that the 
economic resources of those who are worse off are smaller in 
magnitude than ours but the different fact that these people are 
so poor. Mere differences in the amounts of money people 
have are not in themselves distressing (Frankfurt, 2007: 146). 
 
Sufficiency plays a major role in Islamic finance. The interpretation of 
Islamic finance practices reveals this role and highlights the importance of needs 
fulfilment and sufficiency in the Islamic conception of distributive justice. I will 
elaborate on the sufficiency principles and its role in Islamic finance in chapter V. 
2.5. Goods for distribution (what?) 
 
A distributive justice theory also needs to specify the goods or services that are to be 
distributed. It needs to identify which goods are included in the proposed 
distribution scheme and what the characteristics of these goods are. In other 
words, it needs to explain what exactly we need to make sure that there will be a 
just amount of. This element of distributive justice theories is identified in many 
instances according to how they answer the questions of ‘how’ distributions are to 
be arranged, as explained in the previous section. Before elaborating on how both 
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questions are connected I will first illustrate the different characteristics of what is 
to be distributed. 
When considering the goods to be distributed an important condition that 
needs to be taken into consideration is the supply thereof. A general presumption 
about the goods is unsurprisingly the ‘moderate scarcity’ of their supply. In a 
world where all goods and resources that are subject to distribution are freely 
available all the time and in any quantity, such as air, distributive justice would 
be considered useless. At the same time, a complete and grave shortage of supply 
would indicate that no form of cooperation would ever be successful in producing 
just distribution. Thus, a ‘moderate scarcity’ is assumed, where whatever will be 
allocated to one recipient will necessarily mean allocating less to the rest of the 
recipients (Barry, 1989: p. 154). 
In addition to the supply and scarcity, characteristics of goods for 
distribution are also seen as possibly varying in two dimensions; particularism 
and concreteness (Foa and Foa, 2012: pp. 15-18). Particularism, in this context, is 
the extent to which the value of the resource is relevant to and derived from the 
identity of the provider. For example, money would be the least particularistic 
and consequently the most universalistic. On the other hand, concreteness is the 
degree to which the resource is tangible in the form of activity or product. For 
example, information and status would be the most abstract and least tangible 
(DeVoe and Iyengar, 2010: p. 165). Clearly these two elements of particularism 
and concreteness have direct impact on principles of justice that would be 
adopted for distribution.  
Accordingly, there are different resources that need to be distributed fairly 
and that vary in their characteristics according to their scarcity, particularity and 
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concreteness. Answers from distributive justice theories on what we need just 
distribution of include happiness or welfare, capability functions (Caney, 2005: p. 
104), material or social goods, conditions, opportunities, roles, etc. (Cohen, 1987: 
p. 21). I will present in the rest of this section the three dominant approaches to 
answering the ‘what’ question: welfare, resources, and equality of opportunity. 
2.5.1. Welfare 
 
Welfarism is one form of material egalitarian theories that was more popular “in 
the olden days” (Vallentyne, 2002: p. 529), and its critique is in many cases the 
first step many theorists take to propose alternatives bases for justice.  As stated 
by Dworkin, welfare egalitarianism can be understood as the distributive scheme 
that “treats people as equals when it distributes or transfers resources among them 
until no further transfer would leave them more equal in welfare” (1981: p. 186). 
Arneson explains that according to welfarism goods and services are to be equally 
shared between persons “to the degree that the distribution brings it about that 
each person enjoys the same welfare” (1989: p. 82). Thus, it bases distributive 
justice on the level of welfare it produces and considers other elements as 
derivatives to a more important goal, which is the overall welfare of people 
(Dworkin, 1981). 
Utilitarianism remains a prominent welfare theory in moral philosophy. It 
appears in various forms, but all utilitarians agree about measuring justice 
according to the welfare of individuals, specifically the sum total of individual 
utilities. As defined by Sen, outcome utilitarianism dictates that “[a]ny state of 
affairs x is at least as good as an alternative state of affairs y if and only if the sum 
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total of individual utilities in x is at least as large as the sum total of individual 
utilities in y” (1979: p. 494). According to this understanding one should choose 
the option that produces the highest sum total of individual utilities or welfare, for 
the greatest number of people.  
2.5.2. Resources 
 
Resource egalitarianism calls for equal distribution of resources. Dworkin (1981) 
defines equality of resources as a theory that adopts egalitarian principle during 
the distribution of resources and ensures that no further transfer could create 
more equal shares of the total resources. As explained by Arneson, “to achieve 
equality the agency ought to give everybody a share of goods that is exactly 
identical to everyone else and that exhausts all available resources to be 
distributed” (1989: pp. 77-78). However, this basis of justice raises a number of 
objections, with regards to disabilities and inborn talents and differences. If equal 
shares of resources are distributed among people of different talents, abilities and 
personal qualities, then some will be able to make much greater use of the same 
bundle of resources than others, and the justice of the distribution can be 
questioned  (Arneson, 1989: pp. 78-80). 
Consequently, Dworkin suggests that abilities and natural endowments, or 
the lack thereof, are to be considered among the distributed resources. Arneson 
explains that “equality of resources ethics … count personal talents among the 
resources to be distributed” (1989: p. 78).  Dworkin envisions the hypothetical 
condition where people enter into a fair auction with each individual having the 
exact same purchasing power to bid on the different available resources. The 
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auction will end with each person having his own chosen and unique bundle of 
resources, that suits her/his needs, ambition, tastes, etc. (1981). The resources 
auction is expected to get rid of any trace of ‘envy’ since each person will find that 
no other bundle of goods would better suit her taste or preferences (Dworkin, 
1981). 
Another important form of resource egalitarianism is Rawls’s theory of 
primary goods. According to Rawls, his theory attempts to “incorporate only 
widely acceptable ideas” (Pogge and Kosch, 2007: p. 54). Thus, the primary 
goods are a criterion of justice that is informed not by all needs and interests of 
individuals but rather “by their needs and interests as citizens of a free democratic 
society” (Pogge and Kosch, 2007: p. 54). Individuals are to translate their 
envisioned good into a rational plan that highlights their main goals, and 
consequently, a person’s well-being will be attained through the successful 
implementation of this plan (Barry, 1973: pp. 26-27). Freeman, a well-known 
interpreter of Rawls, explains; 
The plan of life a person would choose under the ideal 
conditions of “deliberate rationality”. Rawls assumes a partial 
similarity in free and equal moral persons’ rational 
plans…they all have a “highest-order” interest and 
corresponding desire to develop and exercise the moral power 
that enable them to engage in social cooperation…on the basis 
of the account of rational plans together with these essential 
interests, Rawls argues for the primary social goods as 
necessary ingredient for the rational plans of free and equal 
moral persons (2003: p. 69) 
 
Hence, the core idea of ‘primary goods’ is that there are certain things 
which are means to a very wide range of ends, making them a want for any 
rational person, irrespective of ambitions, tastes, or beliefs. Regardless of the plan, 
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any rational individual will want more of these primary goods, since access to as 
much as possible of these primary goods is not only advantageous, but also 
necessary for the realization of the individual’s interest and for the development 
of moral powers (Pogge and Kosch, 2007: p. 73). As a result, “with more of these 
goods men can generally be assured of greater success in carrying out their 
intentions and in advancing their ends, whatever these ends may be” (Rawls, 
1999: p. 79).  
Within this context, Rawls puts forward a list of the primary goods that 
includes five categories, (1) certain basic rights and liberties (2) freedom of 
movement and free choice of occupation (3) Powers and prerogative of offices (4) 
income and wealth (5) and residual social bases of self respect. Rawls claims that 
these goods “are social goods in view of their connection with the basic structure; 
liberties and opportunities are defined by the rules of major institutions and the 
distribution of income and wealth is regulated by them” (1999: p. 79).  
Rawls’s theory of the good is particularly important for this thesis as it 
illustrates the relation between these social goods and the basic structure. An 
Islamic theory of distributive justice would be especially concerned with two 
categories of Rawls’s social goods: financial opportunities and income and wealth. 
Practices of Islamic finance, as will be detailed, are concerned with financial 
inclusion through provision of financial opportunities, as well as with wealth 
redistribution. The structure of the Islamic financial system, the rules governing it, 
the objectives behind it and the practices operating within it are all designed to 
regulate the distribution of these primary social goods, which have direct impact 
on the realisation of any rational plan of any of the system’s participants.  
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2.5.3. Equality of opportunity and capabilities 
 
Opportunities constitute an alternative answer to ‘equality of what?’. Amartya 
Sen, for example, gives emphasis in his capabilities approach to “what people are 
actually able to do and to be” (Nassbaum, 2003: p. 33). Sen sees his concern for 
basic capabilities as an extension to Rawls’s primary good; “shifting attention 
from goods to what goods do to human beings … there is evidence that the 
conversion of goods to capabilities varies from person to person substantially, and 
the equality of the former may still be far from the equality of the latter” (Sen, 
1979: p. 219). 
The two most challenging objections to Sen’s basic capabilities approach, 
as he foresees them, are the indexing and relativity thereof. He explains that 
indexing and ordering a bundle of basic capabilities cannot be based on a 
universal uniformity due to the relativity of such capabilities. Accordingly, 
indexing of capabilities is dependent on the cultural context of their application 
(Sen, 1979: p. 219). Sen explained in a later interview that the problem is not in 
the actual listing of capabilities, but rather in “insisting on one predetermined 
canonical list of capabilities, chosen by theorists without any general social 
discussion or public reasoning” (Sen, 2004: p. 77). 
Another example of equality of opportunity is Arneson’s equal opportunity 
for welfare.6 Arneson attempts through his proposal to shift welfarism from being 
an outcome based approach to be concerned with equality in initial conditions or 
equality in distribution of opportunities. According to this approach, justice is 
attained by providing every person equal opportunities to achieve welfare. To 
                                                     
6 It is worth noting here that Cohen also endorses this version of welfare 
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achieve equal opportunity for welfare between people, “each must face an array 
of options that is equivalent to every other person’s in term of the prospects for 
preference satisfaction it offers” (Arneson, 1989: p. 85). However, the actual 
outcome of how each person uses up these opportunities is not a concern of 
justice. Arneson explains; 
Suppose it is agreed that equal opportunity for welfare obtains 
among a number of persons in a given society and that the fact 
that this is so indicates that (one aspect of) distributive justice 
is satisfied in that society. No claim is thereby being made 
about the goodness of the lives that people live when equal 
opportunity in this sense obtains. The claim is rather that if 
equal opportunity for welfare obtains, to that extent 
individuals have received fair treatment at the hands of society. 
Suppose that one of the individuals who has equal 
opportunity for welfare squanders his opportunities recklessly 
and leads a terrible life the badness of which is squarely his 
own fault (1991: p. 188).   
 
For Arneson, individuals should be held responsible for their own bad 
decisions when those are made from appropriately equal initial conditions.  
It is clear from this brief listing of goods of justice, how complicated the 
matter is and how competing and challenging ideas emerged to answer the 
question of what we’re looking to distribute justly. However, irrespective of what 
we distribute, and how we distribute it, a theory of justice needs to provide an 
account of moral justification, and this I will examine in the next section. 
2.6. Moral Justification 
 
The fifth and final element of a theory of distributive justice is how principles of 
justice to be applied at the site of justice are derived or constructed. For a theory 
to be comprehensive it needs to be able to justify to non-adherents of the theory 
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the principles it considers as just and the conception of distributive justice it 
endorses (Pogge and Kosch, 2007: pp. 160-162; Roberts, 2007). To this end, a 
theory of distributive justice aims to directly connect the principles it endorses 
with ‘substantive moral claims’ (Scanlon,1995: p. 347). It puts forward a morally 
justifiable process that reflects the reasons for adopting specific principles in order 
to establish this connection between the principles and moral claims (Roberts, 
2007).  Such reasoning models or processes increase the possibility of reaching 
consistent conclusions; and, consequently, strengthen the authority of the moral 
claims. As Jaggar and Tobin explain, “a moral claim that is justified through 
good reasoning has rational warrant and is morally authoritative” (2013: p. 385). 
Theories use different processes for the justification of distributive justice 
principles. I will start this section by illustrating moral realism and cultural 
conventionalism as two alternative approaches to moral justification, followed by 
the constructivist approach, which according to Rawls offers an answer to 
objections of both approaches. 
2.6.1. Moral realism 
 
Moral realism, which was defended by a number of anti-realists such as Dworkin, 
is a justification approach based on the acceptance of the independent existence 
of moral reality. Most moral realists endorse the idea that when people issue 
moral judgments about what is right and wrong, they are in essence representing 
an already existing moral reality (Shafer- Landau, 2003: p. 13). Thus, they believe 
that moral reality is mind independent. As Russ Shafer-Landau explains:  
Realists believe that there are moral truths that obtain 
independently of any preferred perspective, in the sense that 
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the moral standards that fix the moral facts are not made true by 
virtue of their ratification from within any given actual or 
hypothetical perspective…realism...insists that the truth of any 
first-order normative standard is not a function of what 
anyone happens to think of it (Shafer-Landau, 2003: p. 15) 
 
Consequently, most realists believe that moral beliefs are self evident. In 
other words, beliefs or principles, such as ‘lying is wrong’, or ‘helping someone in 
need is good’, are self evident if “one doesn’t need to infer them from one’s other 
beliefs in order to be justified in thinking them true” (Shafer-Landau, 2003: p. 
248). Kaspar explains, the truth of a proposition such as the wrongness of lying is 
self-evident “and we grasp that truth” (2012: p. 11). Ross in The  Right and the 
Good explains this self evidence as follows: 
That an act…is prima facie right, is self-evident; not in the 
sense that it is evident from the beginning of our lives, or as 
soon as we attend to the proposition for the first time, but in 
the sense that when we have reached sufficient mental 
maturity and have given sufficient attention to the proposition 
it is evident without any need of proof, or of evidence beyond 
itself (Ross and Stratton-Lake, 2002: p. 29). 
 
Therefore, moral realism is not only a dominant justification approach in 
moral theory, but it is also of relevance to theism. This is not to say that moral 
philosophy and theism are traditionally connected, for “it is a common thought 
that moral and theological realism can easily be prised apart” (Shafer-Landau, 
2007: p. 311). Modern moral philosophy, at least since Kant, has been based on 
the assumption that there is no theoretical knowledge of God and that morality is, 
and should be, separated from theism. However, these moral assumptions are 
problematic from a theistic viewpoint (Meyer, 1997: p. 150). In religion, or 
religious ethics, “moral convictions would have no validity at all were they not 
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grounded in the nature of human existence and its relation to the ultimate nature 
of things or the character of ultimate reality” (Gamwell, 1993: p. 475). Thus, the 
moral validity of religion lies in the belief in a ‘fundamental nature of reality’, and 
accordingly, “it is clear…that any religious ethic in the sense mentioned must 
assert that the fundamental grounds of moral claims are realist in character” 
(Gamwell, 1993: pp. 475-476).  
This understanding of the relation between moral realism and theism, 
makes a theological realist approach the most natural justification to use in this 
thesis. This, however, is not the case, as I am not in a position to prove the 
existence of God, or to prove any religious claim. As will be clearer throughout 
the thesis, I construct those principles that guide the practice of Islamic finance 
from the rules that govern the practice. In other words, I claim that principles of 
justice are already operating and guiding the distribution of burden and benefits 
in financial practices governed by the Islamic tradition. Accordingly, I do not aim 
to defend any particular Islamic principle, but rather to construct those principles 
from the existing practice. Therefore, as I will explain later, my theory uses a 
practice-dependent constructivist approach. 
2.6.2. Cultural Conventionalism 
 
Instead of basing justification on our independent moral convictions, cultural 
conventionalism bases the justification of principles of justice in the cultural 
context in which they operate. It highlights the role of culture in shaping people’s 
identities and conceptions and “construe(s) principles of justice as a direct 
articulation of participants’ beliefs and self-understandings” (Valentini, 2011: p. 
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408) in a process that is “more a matter of cultural interpretation than a 
philosophical argument” (Kymlicka, 2002: p. 211).  Accordingly, it is an 
approach of moral justification that explains and reflects how each society puts 
different values to social goods.  
To this end, cultural conventionalism justifies an institutional structure by 
its relation to the culturally accepted distributive standards within the community 
or society. In other words, the structure is examined in light of how it 
incorporates within its rules and laws the values of the culture within which it 
exists. Hence, a “just institutional system realizes and embodies, in its law and 
public policy, the values implicit in its cultural practices, in this case values 
governing the distribution of social goods” (Sangiovanni, 2008: p. 7).  
It is crucial to note here, however, that participants are not expected to 
accept the criteria of justice in which they live simply because they belong to the 
culture. “Quite the contrary, the point of conventionalism is to show that 
participants have good reasons to honor the criteria of justice intrinsic to their 
cultural practices” (Sangiovanni, 2008: p: 9). These reasons could be either to 
respect social meanings as constitutive of people’s identity, or to respect social 
meanings as a product of mutual commitment “that stops just short of actual 
contract, but with the same normative consequences” (Sangiovanni, 2008: p. 9). 
A classical form of cultural conventionalism is Walzer’s ‘spheres of justice’ 
(Sangiovanni, 2008: p. 8). Walzer believes that there cannot be a conception of 
justice external to the community and that the only way to identify requirements 
of justice is through the community’s particularistic understanding of the social 
goods. Accordingly, he explains that 
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different social goods ought to be distributed for different 
reasons, in accordance with different procedures, by different 
agents; and all these differences derive from different 
understandings of the social goods themselves… the inevitable 
product of historical and cultural particularism (Walzer, 1983: 
p. 6). 
  
Consequently, a society is to be assessed as just or unjust according to how 
relevant practices are to the shared understandings of the members (Walzer, 
1983).  
Walzer’s morally justifiable process for adopting specific principles of 
distributive justice can be described as follows. First, one needs to identify a good 
that is being examined for just distribution. Second, the social meaning of this 
particular good within the specific community that is being examined needs to be 
determined. Finally, according to the specific good that is being distributed, and 
its social meaning, appropriate principle of distribution can be construed 
(Trappenburg, 2000: p. 343). 
A similar approach of justification, albeit in a different context, is used by 
Miller in his argument for territorial rights. Miller argues that an adequate 
justification of a state’s territorial right must treat people within the state or 
political community as the primary bearers of this right, which they acquire “by 
adding material value to the territory in question and endowing it with symbolic 
value” (2012: p. 252). Thus, he introduces the relation between the state and the 
people into traditional state theories. Accordingly, for a state to claim territorial 
rights it needs to “legitimately represent(s) the people who occupy that territory” 
(Miller. 2012: p. 255). 
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Within the context of his territorial rights theory, Miller explains that for 
such a theory to be successful it needs to address three issues, two of which are 
concerned with the people inhabiting the territory. First, it needs to highlight the 
characteristics of the group that makes it a “kind of collective that is capable of 
having territorial rights” (21012: p. 258). Second, it needs to identify the ethical 
force of the relation between the group of people and the territory. Thus, Miller is 
actually arguing that territorial rights are justified “by the material and symbolic 
value that becomes embedded in territory with the passage of time” (2012: p. 266). 
2.6.3. Constructivism  
 
Alternatively, constructivism attempts to reach a mid way between moral realism 
and cultural conventionalism. Constructivists try to avoid the shortfalls of both 
stances by being committed to objectivity and truth without denying the 
importance of ordinary moral values and judgments (James, 2007: p. 3). As 
Rawls explains, constructivism “does not require an idealist or a verificationist, as 
opposed to a realist, account of truth…a constructivist moral doctrine requires a 
distinct procedure of construction to identify the first principles of justice” (1980: 
p. 565).  
Thus, constructivist moral justification construes principles through a 
moral reasoning process that is based on distinct conceptions of the person and of 
practical reasoning or as Kauffman puts it “an appropriately designed decision 
procedure” (2012: p. 227). The principles produced through this moral reasoning 
process are ‘reasonably’ constructed based on these previous conceptions and are 
considered objective given that all parties in the decision procedure reach the 
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same conclusion. Thus, the objectivity of the principles is obtained from the 
objectivity of the reasoning process and deliberations (Freeman, 2002: pp. 27-28). 
Rawls’s theory of justice is one of the most notable examples of political 
constructivism (Freeman, 2003: p. 348). Rawls identifies four distinctive features 
of political constructivism. First, principles of justice are the product of a process 
of construction, within which “rational agents, as representatives of citizens and 
subject of reasonable conditions, select the principles to regulate the basic 
structure of society”. Second, the procedure of construction is mainly based on 
practical rather than theoretical reasoning. Third, it uses a complex conception of 
society and individual that helps in shaping the structure of the construction. 
Fourth, it also specifies an idea of the reasonable and uses it to various subjects; 
conceptions, principles, judgements, grounds, persons and institution (Rawls, 
1993: pp. 93-94). 
Based on this notion of constructivism, Rawls presents the original 
position; a hypothetical reasonable decision procedure. Parties in the original 
position have a specific task to achieve, which is to agree on a justice criterion for 
the design of the basic structure of the society. The participants are rational, not 
moral, actors who aim to maximize and safeguard their own interests. They also 
assume that citizens have three fundamental interests; (1) the capacity for a sense 
of justice, which is the ability and desire to govern one’s conduct in accordance 
with a shared public conception of justice; (2) the capacity for the conception of 
the good, which is the ability to form, revise and pursue a conception of a life 
worth living; and (3) the interest in being successful with regard to the conception 
of the good one chooses (Pogge and Kosch, 2007: pp.63-64). 
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Moreover, participants in the original position are behind the hypothetical 
veil of ignorance, where they lack factual knowledge that can affect their 
impartiality in the decision making. The veil of ignorance guarantees that the 
participants do not know facts such as their social positions, their talents, their 
conception of the good, their religion, the state of development within their 
societies, etc. This condition in its turn allows for impartial judgments (Barry 
1973: pp. 10-11).  Rawls always stresses these limitations placed on knowledge 
behind the veil of ignorance to highlight the virtues of the original position. 
However, he also explains that the choices in the original position will coincide 
with the requirements of justice, because the participants acquire psychological 
generalizations and elements of social and economic theory that enable them to 
predict the implications of choosing one principle rather than the other (Barry, 
1973: pp. 17-18).  
Another example of constructing principles is Onora O’Neill’s attempt at 
constructing an account of practical reasoning that addresses pluralism without 
relying on either metaphysical arguments nor subjective values of cultures. 
O’Neill, like Rawls to a large extent, works on finding a middle way between 
realism and relativism by emphasising the role of reflective reasoning. She 
constructs a Kantian account of practical reasoning that identifies objective 
reasons by using a process of ongoing reflection “that highlights and eliminates 
the partial assumptions underlying our reasoning and picks out less subjective 
assumptions on which we can provisionally rest our reasoning” (Roberts, 2007: p. 
82). 
According to Roberts, O’Neill identifies concepts of the society and the 
individual to serve as underlying assumptions. 
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The basic concept of the person is of an agent of 
indeterminate rationality and varying capacities for 
independence. The basic concept of society is of a plurality of 
potentially interacting agents with no necessary pre-
established harmony. Any form of activity, social life or 
conception of justice must assume at least these abstract 
accounts of society and person (2007: p. 98). 
 
Accordingly, we can justify principles if and when they can be “based on 
reasons that could be followed and adopted in a situation laid out by reference to 
the bare accounts of society and person” (Roberts, 2007: p. 99). This process of 
deriving and justifying principles is O’Neill’s ‘choice situation’. 
Constructivism is of particular importance for this project, as I will use a 
practice based constructivist approach to construe principles of justice for Islamic 
finance practice. As will be discussed in depth, I will explain in detail in the next 
chapters, a practice-dependence approach, or political theorizing that construes 
principles of justice from established and existing practices and institutions, 
mainly relies on an interpretation process of the objectives of these practices. It 
“uses Ronald Dworkin’s three-stage account of “constructive interpretation” in 
order to clarify how the point and purpose of practice conditions the construction 
of a conception of justice” (Gledhill, 2013: p. 65). Details of constructive 
interpretation will be presented in chapter III and constructive interpretation of 
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The objective of this chapter has been to provide a conceptual analysis of 
what distributive justice theories must address.  The chapter has discussed five 
essential elements of distributive justice accounts:    
I first discussed the importance of the site of justice, or the entities or 
practices that are considered to be subject to assessment for their justice. Sites of 
justice range from individuals to institutions and from conduct of agents to state 
of affairs, and it is clear that the identification thereof has a significant impact on 
all other elements of the theory. However, the debate with regards to the site of 
justice is to a large extent influenced by Rawls’s basic structure. Nevertheless, 
some theorists object the use of the basic structure as the site of justice and either 
included other judicanda such as personal conduct in addition to the basic 
structure as the site of justice, or they go a step further to argue that distributive 
justice does not require the existence of any institutional structure and is relevant 
to the rights of the individual. 
Second, I discussed how theories of distributive justice also need to 
address the scope to which they apply, or those persons who have claims and 
responsibilities of justice. Theories range with regards to their scope between 
statist and global approaches to distributive justice. Statist theories claim that the 
scope of justice should be limited to the state where a scheme of cooperation 
exists. The arguments behind limiting the scope of justice to the state range 
between sovereignty, cooperation and coercion of the state. On the other hand, 
other theorists argue for a global scope of distributive justice. They claim that 
individuals have distributive duties and responsibilities and accordingly, the scope 
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of justice should not be limited to the state level. Arguments for global 
distributive justice claim that either a global system of cooperation already exists 
and principles of distributive justice should apply to it, or that duties of justice are 
due whether an institutional cooperation exists or not.  
Third, I considered the ‘how question’: the element of theories of 
distributive justice which explains how burdens and benefits are to be distributed. 
This element pertains, in other words, to the principles of distributive justice in 
play. I considered principles of desert, equality and need, with emphasis on types 
of egalitarian approaches, in particular the Rawlsian difference principle. Fourth, 
I considered the what element: what sorts of goods would be specified for 
distribution within an account of distributive justice. I examined accounts which 
would apply principles of distributive justice in distributing welfare, resources, 
and opportunities.  
Finally, the moral justification process used for constructing or deriving 
the principles is a further crucial element in putting forward a theory of 
distributive justice. Moral justification is the logical process used by different 
theories to convince non-adherents of the theory of why it endorses specific 
principles. For example, moral realism relies on the existence of moral reality. 
Realists claim that there is no need for moral justification when moral claims are 
in accordance with moral reality. On the other hand constructivists depend in 
their moral justification on a moral reasoning process such as Rawls’s original 
position. Constructivists justify the constructed principles by the acceptance of all 
participants in the process. Meanwhile, a conventionalist justification depends on 
the social and cultural context and the participants’ understandings.  
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With this comprehensive understanding of what distributive justice 
theories entail, in the next chapter I will present my practice-based approach to 
political theorizing. I will illustrate why practices are important for political 
theorizing, and how constructive interpretation is employed to construe principles 
from practices. This account of practice and interpretation will present the 
required background for the rest of this thesis, where I will consider Islamic 
finance practice as a site for distributive justice and will use constructive 




Chapter III: Practice, 
Interpretation and Construction 
of  Principles 
 
  
All meanings, we know, depend on the key of interpretation. 




In the first chapter of this thesis I discussed how the Eurocentric academic canon 
of political theory and the discipline’s inability to address globalization issues 
such as coexistence paved the way for an important call for comparative political 
theory as a discipline that can integrate non-Western perspectives, thinkers and 
traditions into political theorizing. Accordingly, I contextualized my Islamic 
distributive justice theory as justificatory comparative political theory. It is a 
project that claims the existence of first order normative arguments in a tradition 
that is under-represented in normative political theory. Islam, as a non-Western 
tradition, is rarely considered in political theorizing except when examined for 
religious extremism, thereby excluding a tradition rich with moral arguments. 
Accordingly, I claim that the construction of an Islamic distributive justice theory 
can enrich the existing debate and attract the attention of not only comparativists 
and CPT proponents, but also theorists who are concerned with distributive 
justice in general. 
In this chapter I will present the Practice-dependence Approach (PDA), 
which I will apply in constructing my conception of Islamic distributive justice. 
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PDA is a relatively new approach that assumes a more fundamental role of 
practice in theorizing justice, as it relies on the interpretation of the existing 
practices and the construction of principles according to that interpretation. The 
constructivist approach is directly linked to the interpretation of the point and 
purpose of the practice and how it corresponds with the viewpoint of the 
participants. It aims to move beyond the meta-ethical nature of justice “to justify 
specific principles as a reasonable basis for public agreement in particular areas of 
social life” (James, 2013a: pp. 251-252). Constructivism and interpretation are the 
key PDA tools that I will use in developing an Islamic distributive justice theory. 
Accordingly, over this chapter’s four sections, I will present PDA and 
illustrate how interpretation and constructivism both play key roles in it. In the 
first section I introduce PDA by explaining why social practices are key in 
political theorizing and how to identify relevant practices for this matter. I also 
answer a few of the important objections to PDA. In the second section I present 
how interpretation is used to construct principles of justice from existing social 
practices. Here I will present Dworkin’s constructive interpretation account, the 
most prominent approach employed by PDA accounts. This is followed by the 
third section where I give a detailed account of constructivism as a key step in 
PDA. For this purpose I will use Rawls’s constructivism to illustrate how 
principles are constructed from practices: a different reading of Rawls’s work that 
practice theorists regularly use to support their arguments. In the final section, I 
explain how I use a constructive account in my practice-dependent Islamic 
distributive justice theory.  
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3.1. Why a Practice-Dependence Theory?   
 
Most normative political theorists have endorsed a practice independent 
view, which does not accept a relation between the content of justice and the 
justification of principles, on the one hand, and the context where these principles 
are to be applied on the other (Erman and Moeller, 2015: p. 4). It aims for an a 
priori moral premise, and accordingly, considers practice as useful for providing 
examples of justice and cases for application of principles, but not for determining 
principles of justice themselves (Gledhill, 2013: p. 64). Consequently, a widely 
accepted criticism of the practice independent view is that it gives too little 
attention to the fundamental moral importance of the political and social context 
in which principles of justice are to take effect. 
The practice-dependence approach became popular in post millennium 
political theory and political philosophy as a response to this criticism. For PDA, 
it is these social and political circumstances, which the practice independent view 
ignores, that explain the motive of individuals for accepting specific principles 
(Erman and Moeller, 2015: 4). Therefore, practice-dependence theorists consider 
the relationship between individuals and their membership in communities and 
practices as fundamental factors in construing the content of justice. For practice 
theorists political, social and relational factors are not to be considered arbitrary, 
as they do not aim to offer substantive arguments about the nature of justice, but 
rather principles of justice that are constructed from the interpretation of the 
practice they aim to regulate (El Kholi, 2013b: pp. 10-11). 
The next sections will discuss what PDA theorizing involves in practice, 
the types of PDA accounts, and some objections that have been raised to it. 
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3.1.1 The Approach 
 
As explained above, PDA is relatively new in political theory. It gained attention 
as an approach in particular with the 2005 publication of Aaron James’ article. 
‘Constructing Justice for Existing Practice: Rawls and the Status Quo’ (Ibsen, 
2013: p. 83) Since its publication and over the past decade, PDA has been further 
defined and shaped by eminent theorists such as James (2007, 2013a, 2013b), 
Sangiovanni (2008), Ronzoni (2009, 2011), Valentini (2011) among others, whose 
work about PDA mainly aimed to “sketch the contours of PDA as a distinct 
approach to the identification of principles or conceptions of justice” (Banai, 
Ronzoni and Schemmel, 2011: p. 49).  
According to most practice theorists, PDA is to be understood as an 
approach which  rejects constructing principles in the abstract without reference 
to existing practices and claims that principles are to be justified, both for and 
from practice. As explained by Banai, Ronzoni and Schemmel, “the fundamental 
idea of PDA is that conceptions of justice have to start from an account of the 
practices they are supposed to apply to” (2011: p. 49). Thus, instead of assuming 
a prescriptive role about which practices ought to exist, PDA starts by accepting 
existing social practices and constructs relevant normative principles that present 
constraints on these practices to make them more just (Ibsen, 2013: p. 81). 
Accordingly, the practice-dependence thesis as articulated by Sangiovanni, and 
widely accepted by PDA theorists, is that; 
the content, scope, and justification of a conception of justice depends 
on the structure and form of the practices that the conception is 
intended to govern (Sangiovanni, 2008: p. 138). 
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Within this context, relevant practices are not restricted to the political 
realm, because basic practices that define and enable the life of a particular 
community are also significant. Accordingly, social practices are understood as 
behaviours that are organized among a group of people because the participants 
introduced rules of conduct that aim at achieving some purpose or end. The 
desired social end is expected to be worthwhile and legitimate, although it does 
not need to be endorsed by all participants. “If enough participants simply 
presume that enough other participants endorse a goal as valuable and legitimate, 
they may stably organize around the end as established expectations require” 
(James, 2013b: p. 44).  
Fundamental to this understanding is the idea that when the relationship 
between people is organized by social practice it needs to be regulated by justice 
as a political value, which detaches itself from any connection with a 
comprehensive worldview and remains grounded in particular and reasonable 
worldviews that offer good reasons for participants to endorse (El Kholi, 2013b: p. 
10).  
[W]hen the relationship is mediated by a social practice, it 
should be regulated...by justice understood as a strictly 
political value. For in a socially mediated relationship, 
individuals do not get together on their own initiative in order 
to realize some private end that they happen to share in 
common. Rather, they are brought together in view of 
realizing some common social end that is most often imposed 
on them. So it makes at least intuitive sense that the structure 
and point of the practice in question be regarded as 
normatively relevant when determining the content of the 
principles of justice (2013: p. 11). 
 
Practice theorists, as will be explained in depth in section III, commonly 
rely on Ronald Dworkin’s ‘constructive interpretation’ approach for identifying 
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and interpreting the practice. In constructive interpretation the identification of a 
relevant social practice is the first stage of a three-stage process. The practice 
theorist identifies the form of social cooperation in the first, Individuation stage. 
The identified practice serves as a proposed object for interpretation. This is 
followed by the Characterization stage, which is mainly concerned with the moral 
elements of the practice; stated or implicit rights, goals, or principles described in 
moral language. These moral elements serve as part of a general interpretation 
and will override the need for attention to the idea participants have about their 
practice.  Finally, in the substantive argument stage, the theorist engages in a 
substantive moral theorising process about what it takes for the practice to be 
‘just’. It is a stage for a reasoning process about what makes the practice just 
against its objectives, structure, differences to alternative practices, etc. (James, 
2013b: p. 45). 
Thus, PDA relies on two fundamental concepts or steps: interpretation 
and constructivism. Interpretation, specifically ‘constructive interpretation’, 
explores the practice and connects it to its point and purpose and the viewpoint of 
its participants, while constructivism serves as the reasoning process according to 
which principles of justice are constructed. Both interpretation and constructivism 
will be discussed in the next section. However, before moving on to these 
discussions, I will first present the main types of PDA and the objections that the 
approach needs to address. 
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3.1.2 Three Types of PDA: 
 
In this section I will start with Sangiovanni’s influential, twofold classification of 
PDA into cultural conventionalism and institutionalism. This will be followed by 
functionalism, a third approach identified by Valentini. 
1) Cultural Conventionalism: 
Cultural Conventionalism emphasises the role played by the culturally distinct 
practices of distribution. It asserts that the “moral identity of individuals is at least 
partly constituted by their membership in a community having distinct cultural 
practices” (EL Kholi, 2013b: 15).  These cultural practices are regarded as 
responsible for giving social goods their value and meaning. Simultaneously, 
these value-laden meanings “give content to and bound the scope of first 
principles of justice” (Sangiovanni, 2008: p. 2). 
The most distinctive aspect of this type of PDA is the belief that culture 
should play a decisive role in the distributive justice question (El Kholi, 2013: p. 
15). According to cultural conventionalism, a just institutional system needs to be 
directly connected to the cultural practices and the distributive values and 
criterion it promotes. In other words, it needs to reflect these values in its laws 
and policies. Thus, a conception of justice is constructed through interpreting the 
meaning of social goods within the society or culture and deriving the criteria or 
principles that reflect this meaning. Interpretation, therefore, is successful if 
participants can envision themselves, and their beliefs, in the conception 
constructed by it. If the interpretive account reflects the beliefs and norms, and 
produces a conception of justice that entails the beliefs of the participants about 
justice in distribution, then the conception can be affirmed by the participants. 
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Accordingly, the normative force of the criteria of distribution does not stem from 
the mere fact that participants adopt them in their cultural practices, for this 
would be a relativist rather than a conventionalist account. The authority of the 
principle rather stems from the valid and good reasons the participants have for 
adopting this culturally laden criterion. These reasons can be understood in two 
ways, either the social meanings and criteria of justice are constitutive of the 
identity of the participants, or these meanings are the product of mutual 
commitments that have normative consequences and force, similar to actual 
contracts. Hence, to honour this commitment, we need to respect the best 
interpretation of the social practice and the obligations thereof (Sangiovanni, 
2008: p. 9). 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, Walzer’s Spheres of Justice offers a 
strong form of this stance. Walzer explains that the political community is the 
closest form of a collective with common meanings, and it is where language, 
history and culture come together to produce a collective consciousness. 
Members within the political community share sensibilities and intuitions. He 
elaborates that sharing usually takes place in smaller units, and this is the reason 
why we should take closer looks at these communities to assess the distributive 
decisions according to the requirements that depend on the shared 
understandings among the citizens about the value of culture diversity, autonomy, 
etc. (Walzer, 1983). Walzer’s theory, thus, “does not rely on the traditional 
philosophical approach, which accounts for objectivity in general in terms of a 
priori truth, but rather on commonsensical approach limited to these objects to 
which we attribute social significance” (El Kholi, 2013b: p. 17). 
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Institutionalism, the second type of PDA and most important for this thesis, does 
not reject the conventionalist claim of the influence of culture, yet it denies “that 
this influence should be decisive and points instead at a concern for the structure 
and point of already existing social and political institutions” (El Kholi, 2013b: p. 
18). For institutionalists, principles of justice vary not according to the societal 
culture but rather according to the existing institutional form. Although this 
institutional form may depend on cultural norms, beliefs and values, it is not 
exclusively dependent on them. In other words, the factors affecting the form and 
structure of the institution are not reducible to cultural beliefs and norms. Thus, 
culture is not enough of a determinant for the construction of a conception of 
justice (El Kholi, 2013b: p. 18). 
Institutionalists claim that institutions create special network of 
relationships, “that is, they establish a set of background conditions which alters 
the way in which participants interact” (Sangiovanni, 2008: p. 11). Accordingly, 
it is these relationships and not cultural identity or commitments that make us 
accept or reject principles. For this approach, it is these relationships, determined 
by the institution, that ‘condition’ (rather than determine) justice. It is the 
structure of existing institutions, which relies on the purpose for which they are 
created, that serves as a background condition that influences and changes how 
participants interact (El Kholi, 2013b: p. 18). Thus, “the normatively relevant 
factor, in this instance, is the influence of existing institutions over the 
interactions of individuals within the community” (El Kholi, 2013b: p. 19). 
Objectivity for institutionalism comes from accounting “for the decisive influence 
Chapter III: Practice Interpretation and Construction of Principles 
   
106 
 
of existing institutions in fixing social and political objectivity” (El Kholi, 2013b: 
p. 19). 
The distinctiveness of this PDA type stems from how it stands mid-way 
between universalism and contextualism. This is particularly so due to the 
importance it places on specifying the practices that it considers as “creating 
special obligations of justice. This account must explain what is so special about 
these practices that it justifies regarding them as normatively relevant when it 
comes to matters of justice” (El Kholi, 2013b: p. 22). The best example to 
illustrate this point is Rawls’s justification for choosing the basic structure as his 
site of justice, as explained in the previous chapter. Rawls emphasises how the 
practices within the basic structure have profound influence and impact on the 
participants’ lives, and how they can create inequalities and injustices within the 
society.   
Accordingly, interpretation of institutional practices aims to understand 
the motivation behind the participant’s affirmation of the practices and puts 
forward considerations and constraints that are fundamental for the construction 
of a conception of justice. The role of interpretation here is “to provide structure 
to the justification of a conception of justice” (Sangiovanni, 2008: p. 13). The 
interpretation is providing the conception with the relevant constraints that 
determine its content and application. The role of interpretation will be illustrated 
in depth in the next section. 
3) Functionalism 
Functionalism is a third type of PDA that, according to Valentini, cosmopolitan 
theorists use to argue for a global distributive justice “in virtue of the existence of 
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appropriate practices at the global level” (2011: p. 414). According to this type of 
PDA, principles of justice guide existing institutions and practices, yet “the 
content, scope and justification of principles of justice” are independent of these 
institutions and practices (Gledhill, 2013: p. 66). Valentini explains that 
functionalists determine the global scope of distributive justice “in terms of its 
practice-independent function,” after which they question the relations and 
practices to which the principles will be applied (2011: p. 414). To better explain 
the idea of functionalism, she presents a few examples of theorists who discuss 
patterns of practices that indicate the global functionality of distributive justice, 
including Thomas Pogge and Iris Marion Young among others. They highlight 
how current and existing practices and interactions require distributive justice 
principles to be applied globally. Valentini explains that “the functionalist version 
of practice-dependence offers a general account of the function of distributive 
justice…and selects the practices or types of interaction to which distributive 
justice should apply, in light of its function” (2011: p. 415). Accordingly, the idea 
behind this type of PDA is that moral equality of individuals is owed through the 
interconnectedness of people’s fates and lives on the global level (Gray, 2015: p. 
167). 
 
3.1.3 Objections to PDA: 
 
Now that it is clearer why and how practices are significant and how a practice-
dependent approach would be applied, we can address the main objections to the 
approach. It comes as no surprise that an approach that defies the mainstream 
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practice-independent and abstract methodology to political theorizing faces 
several objections.  
 
1) Communitarian inclination 
The first and most important objection PDA faces is how it allows the boundaries 
of the practice to have substantive influence and consequences on the scope of 
distributive justice. It is accused of discriminating in favour of membership to 
specific societies and fellow citizens, since principles of justice are derived from 
specific practices and are to be applied to participants who share the practice and 
endorse the objectives of the practices (Valentini, 2011: pp. 410-411). This 
limitation of the scope of justice to the “functional role of the practice” is 
considered morally problematic and unjust, particularly as it is jeopardising the 
basis of cosmopolitanism that regards the individual as the ultimate unit or source 
of moral concern (Meckled-Garcia, 2013: p. 107). For example, in the case of my 
project, the principles derived from Islamic finance practices are operating within 
the scope of the practice. Thus, they are not to be considered an a priori 
conception of justice and they do not provide a substantive argument about 
justice in itself. Hence, it could be criticised to be discriminatory in favour of 
those who participate in the practice and against other individuals who prefer to 
participate in the conventional financial alternatives.  
To elaborate, Meckled-Garcia suggests the inclusion of a justifiability 
constraint as an answer to this moral objection. The restriction of the scope of 
justice may be acceptable if it could be justified in reference to moral values to 
those who are affected. In other words, a practice theorist is required to justify the 
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limited scope of the theory to those affected by it by arguments referring to 
independent moral value (2013: p. 108). He sets out the thesis for this justifiability 
constraint as follows: 
Any argument supporting a substantive moral standard for a given 
group of people must be justifiable by reference to at least one moral 
value or independently derived moral principle (2013: p. 108) 
 
The justifiability constraint or demand may be rejected by practice 
theorists for several reasons. First, moral principles that are constructed from 
practice could be morally justifiable on an abstract level (Meckled-Garcia, 2013: p. 
109). In other word, the principles that are interpreted and constructed from the 
practice may be principles that are justifiable irrespective of the practice, e.g. an 
egalitarian practice-dependent principle could be justified on an abstract level and 
apart from the practice. Second, the interpretation of the practice may allow for 
insights that otherwise will not be disclosed through a priori moral reasoning. 
Abstract theorizing may not allow us to see the underlying structures that allow 
for the pursuit of justice (Meckled-Garcia, 2013: pp. 110-111). By interpreting the 
practices and the affirmation of the participants we may see new insights that we 
could have otherwise missed. Third, PDA is an alternative approach that is non-
substantive in nature. In other words, the practice acquires authority in this 
approach as it guides our thinking and understanding of the issue at hand (such as 
distributive justice in the case of this thesis) (Meckled-Garcia, 2013: pp. 111-112).  
However, as Valentini explains, practice theorists answer the 
communitarian inclination objection by promoting the idea that this difference 
from cosmopolitanism is in reality not a deviation from the moral supremacy of 
the individual, but rather a methodological difference of moral justification. In 
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other words, as it is agreed that global and domestic practices differ, it becomes 
acceptable to reject the global application of specific principles of justice without 
compromising the “liberal commitment to the moral equality of persons” (2011: 
pp. 399-400).  
To explain this in the context of my project, as I will illustrate in the next 
chapters, the rules, objectives and philosophical context of Islamic finance 
practice are substantively different from the alternative financial systems. The 
participants of Islamic finance practice choose to participate in these practices as 
they endorse a specific worldview and support the objectives of the Islamic 
financial practices and institutions. Accordingly, it is acceptable to apply the 
principles derived from these practices to communities and individuals who 
actually take part and endorse these practices, while rejecting the application of 
these principles globally. It might be wise to compare these principles to other 
principles and conceptions, yet it is not reasonable to claim that these principles 
provide a substantive argument about justice in itself. In this way, it is an 
explanatory process rather than a discriminatory process that favours fellow 
citizens or nationals. 
2) Lack of critical potential  
Relevant to the previous critique is the objection that PDA lacks critical potential. 
As this approach is based on “making the content of a conception of justice 
dependent upon the interpretation of an existing practice ipso facto limits the 
critical potential of this conception with respect to that practice” (El Kholi, 
2013b: p. 13). Beitz, a proponent of PDA in human rights theories, explains this 
objection by highlighting that a theory is needed in the first place to address the 
existing disagreement regarding various aspects of the practice “including the 
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composition and reach of its normative requirements. Another is that some 
aspects of the practice…may seem, from some perspectives, objectionable on 
their face” (2009: p. 105). Accordingly, the way practice-dependent theories give 
authority to practices as they exist is creating an objection with regards to how 
critical they can be (2009: p. 105). Although this objection does not deny practice-
dependence all critical potential, it is argued that practice theories do not have the 
capacity to criticise the actual point and purpose of the practice (El Kholi, 2013b: 
p. 13). 
However, this specific objection is taking practice-dependence outside of 
its context. As Beitz explains, the role of PDA is not only to interpret and 
understand the existing practice, but also to evaluate the importance of these 
practices in light of the relevant interpretation (2009: pp. 105-106). Practice 
theories, as explained earlier and in previous chapters, do not intend to offer 
substantive arguments about justice, “but only to spell out the most appropriate 
principle in relation to a specific interpretation of the point and structure of a 
given practice” (El Kholi, 2013b: p. 13). Hence, it is outside of the objective of a 
practice-dependence approach to criticise the point and purpose of the practice. 
Rather, it seeks to put forward the most appropriate principles for a specific 
political and social context. I will illustrate this role in the last chapter when I use 
my Islamic distributive justice principles to evaluate and guide Islamic finance 
practices. 
3) Indeterminacy 
Another objection that faces PDA, and is commonly directed towards approaches 
that require interpretation, is regarding the vagueness of and disagreement on 
interpretation. As previously explained, the principles of justice in PDA are 
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construed from the accepted interpretation. However, this is proven to be 
problematic, since theorists may reach an agreement on how to describe the 
practice but find it difficult to agree on which interpretation best describes and 
analyses the practice. In other words, there may be one description of the practice, 
yet a number of different interpretations (El Kholi, 2013b: p. 12).  
According to El Kholi, the answer to this indeterminacy objection is 
aiming for a “full-blown account of social and political objectivity.” Such an 
account is based on the relationship between the practice, the viewpoint of the 
participants and the interpretation that is the basis for attaining a conception of 
justice. Without such an account the possibility of a better alternative 
interpretation will always be present (El Kholi, 2013b: p. 13). Therefore, there is a 
need for practice theorists to actually reach a consensus with regards to the 
interpretation. To be able to attain an agreement on the interpretation, two issues 
need to be comprehensively addressed. First, it needs to be an interpretation to 
which participants can agree. In other words, participants need to identify 
themselves with the relevant interpretation. Second, there needs to be a clear 
relation between the convictions of the participants that led them to take part in 
the practice and the actual point and purpose of the practice. An interpretive 
account that can attain these two objectives can reach an agreement (El Kholi, 
2013b: p. 13). 
Now that I have given an account of the practice-dependence approach, its 
types and objections, I will give details on interpretation and constructivism as 
two important elements of PDA.  
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3.2. Interpretation and Constructing Principles in PDA 
 
As explained in the previous section, interpretation is a fundamental tool for 
political theorizing. It is used in cultural theories, such as Walzer’s social 
interpretation, as well as in constructivist theories, such as Rawls’s theory of 
justice. The role of interpretation is to connect the theory to the context from 
which it is emerging. Differences, however, exist in the extent to which the 
context plays a role in theorizing, and how and when interpretation is used to 
establish the desired connection with context.   
Within the context of PDA, the theorist constructs principles of justice 
from the interpretation of the existing practices. Thus, it is crucial to explain the 
role of interpretation in political theorizing. For the purpose of this thesis I will 
limit my discussion to Dworkin’s constructive interpretations, as it is the 
approach generally accepted among proponents of PDA. It is also the approach I 
will use in constructing principles of distributive justice from the practices of 
Islamic finance. 
3.2.1. Dworkin’s Constructive Interpretation: 
 
As noted, Dworkin’s approach to the interpretation of practices (1986, 2011) has 
been widely adopted by PDA theorists. As Valentini observes, PDA’s “classic 
and most articulated statement may be found in Ronald Dworkin’s account of 
‘constructive interpretation’” (Valentini, 2011: p. 403).  
Dworkin’s constructive interpretation proceeds from the importance of an 
agreed on understanding of the point and purpose of the practice. Although 
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participants of a social practice may all agree on the fact that the practice is 
intended to serve a purpose and express a value, they may still disagree about the 
nature of this value and how to convey it, and they may even have a critical 
attitude towards the shared practice. To resolve such a disagreement and to better 
understand the meaning, purpose and value of the practice, the process of 
constructive interpretation is necessary. Interpretation, thus, focuses on 
understanding the purpose of a specific set of social practices. Dworkin explains; 
interpreting a social practice, like your practice of courtesy, 
can only mean discerning the intentions of its members, one 
by one... interpretation tries to show the object of 
interpretation…accurately as it really is, not as you suggest 
through rose coloured glasses or in its best light. That means 
retrieving the actual historical intentions of its authors, not 
foisting the interpreter’s values on what those authors created. 
(1986: p. 54) 
 
Accordingly, constructive interpretation means to recognize the intentions 
of the participants of the practice and to see the practice accurately by assigning a 
purpose to it. It is about seeing the object that is being interpreted, social practice 
in this case, as a product of purpose-oriented decision. In other words, the 
interpreter proposes a set of goals or purposes that the practices are intending to 
serve (Dworkin, 1986: pp. 59-62). Consequently, each type of social practice has 
its pertinent purpose, and interpretation works on attributing to each practice its 
purpose. Therefore, the identification and interpretation of the point and purpose 
of the practice is a requirement for the justification of any practice-dependent 
conception of justice (Sangiovanni, 2008: pp. 142-149). The purpose in this 
context is the aim or telos of the practice that gives it a normative authority. 
People adopt special practices that are expected to achieve specific ends. 
Consequently, behaviour is organized so that participants can adhere to rules of 
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conduct that are expected to serve a specific purpose. That social purpose is 
assumed to be meaningful and sensible either for its own sake or as serving other 
reasons (James, 2013b: p. 44).  
Within this understanding of the meaning of interpretation of social 
practices, constructive interpretation is seen to take place again in three stages. In 
Dworkin’s words:  
we interpret social practices, first when we individuate those 
practices: when we take ourselves to be engaged in legal rather 
than literary interpretation. We interpret, second, when we 
attribute some package of purposes to the genre or subgenre 
we identify as pertinent, and, third, when we try to identify 
the best realization of that package of purposes on some 
particular occasion (2011: p. 131).  
 
I will adopt slightly different terminology here, more focused on the role of 
each stage in interpretation. In detail, the stages would be as follows:  
The pre-interpretive stage (corresponding to the individuation stage), is the 
step of identifying a form of social cooperation as a proposed object of 
interpretation and assessment. In this stage we identify the rules and standards 
constituting and governing the practices, which are not always already identified 
(Dworkin, 1986: p. 66). As Valentini explains, it is “the identification of the raw 
data for interpretation” (2011: p. 404). The task of identifying an object of 
interpretation provides a shared platform for further discussions about the 
practices and the conception. This task needs to remain uncontroversial in the 
sense that it ensures that the participants share the purpose of the practices and 
institutions that are being interpreted (Sangiovanni, 2008: p. 149). Therefore, this 
task relies on a high degree of consensus between participants about the practices 
and their rules (Dworkin, 1986: p. 66). 
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The Interpretive stage (or characterization stage), is the step in which the 
interpreter settles on a general understanding of the elements of the practice and 
determines the point and purpose of the practice or institution. This is usually 
achieved by identifying two elements of the practice; the point and purpose of the 
practice and the viewpoint of the participants. First, the objective of this stage is 
to identify why the practice is worth performing and adhering to, and what it is 
intended to serve. It is considered as a task of interrogation by the interpreter 
about the meaning of the practice in light of her convictions. The interpretation 
needs to ‘fit’ with data identified in the first pre-interpretive stage (Valentini, 
2011: p. 404), or as Dworkin explains, it needs to ‘fit’ enough with the identified 
aspects of the practice (Dworkin, 1986: pp. 66-71). 
Second, the interpreter is also concerned with developing an 
understanding of the reasons the participants have for adopting and adhering to 
the practice. She reconstructs their reasons for affirming the rules, procedures and 
standards, and addresses why and how the participants arrange their affairs in a 
distinct way to achieve the aims and goals intended by the practices and 
institutions (Sangiovanni, 2008: p. 149).  
Sangiovanni clarifies that by identifying the point and purpose of the 
practice, together with assuming the viewpoint of the participants, we seek to 
understand the sum of its unique parts.  The practice in this sense entails parts 
that contribute to the achievement of the purpose by working together. Hence, the 
role of interpretation in this crucial step is to connect and arrange the identified 
parts into a coherent whole entity of the social practice. The overall aim, within 
this context, is to explicate the parameters that need to be taken into 
consideration when putting forward a conception of justice (2008: p. 149). 
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The Post Interpretive stage (or substantive argument stage), is the critical 
step of constructing first principles by adjusting our senses about what the 
practices require to better serve the justification reached in the preceding stage 
(Dworkin, 1986: p. 70). It is in this stage that we use our interpretation to move to 
an understanding of the way institutions in reality shape the relations between 
participants. “Interpreters revise their understandings of what the practice really 
requires so as to best express its point and purpose” (Valentini, 2011: p. 404). This 
shift from interpretation to understanding the relation between the practices, 
reality and the participants requires answers to questions such as 
How are the relations in which people stand altered by the 
institutions they share? What kinds of interaction become 
possible within those institutions? To what degree do the 
institutions make their participants interdependent, and how 
are we to understand the nature of this interdependence? And, 
perhaps most importantly, what role is justice meant to play 
among participants? How does the demand for justice emerge 
within the contingent historical and political contexts 
constituted by the institutions? (Sangiovanni, 2008: p. 14). 
 
It is from the answers and understanding of these issues that we derive first 
principles.  
Now that I have presented details on constructive interpretation, I will 
offer an elaboration of the role of political constructivism within PDA. 
Constructivism was presented in the previous chapter as one approach to moral 
justification. Here it will be shown to be an integral step for PDA projects that 
aim to construct principles from the interpretation of existing practices.  
 
Chapter III: Practice Interpretation and Construction of Principles 
   
118 
 
3.2.2. Constructivism in PDA: 
 
Trends in moral justification usually fit in the ‘realism / relativism’ dichotomy. 
Moral realists and positivists hold objectivity as the priority for truths about 
principles and justifications, while relativists and anti-realists place higher priority 
on the embeddedness of morality into cultures, beliefs and convictions of societies 
and individuals, and thus are sceptical about the possible ‘objectivity’ of moral 
judgements. Alternatively, constructivists attempt to find a mid way between 
these two trends. They try to achieve a balance by abandoning the metaphysics of 
realism whilst staying committed to objectivity and truth in a non-sceptical 
fashion, and without accepting subjectivism that denies the importance and 
authority of ordinary moral and practical values and judgments (James, 2007: p. 
3).  
It is of no surprise that practice theorists “clearly have an affinity towards 
constructivist accounts of the nature of justice” (Erman and Moeller, 2015: p. 15), 
as they aim at constructing moral values that are rooted and embedded in the 
practices of societies, yet simultaneously objective enough to allow for ordinary 
matters of moral judgments to be part of it. It, thus, demonstrates how principles 
can be constructed through reasonable steps “from rudimentary and highly 
plausible ideas arising from within a society’s own essentially social kind of 
practical reason” (James, 2013a: p. 252). Therefore, to maintain objectivity of the 
moral claims that are constructed from practices and embedded in shared 
understanding of the society, a constructivist approach requires these claims to be 
the result of an appropriate reasoning process. Moral claims are true when they 
become the “output of a certain (hypothetical or actual) procedure of deliberation” 
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(Sangiovanni, 2013: p. 30). Thus, a claim is true “if and only if it would either be 
endorsed by an appropriately motivated actual or hypothetical deliberator (or 
group of deliberators) or entailed by norms that would be selected for mutual 
governance by appropriately motivated actual or hypothetical deliberators” 
(Sangiovanni, 2013: p. 31). 
Sangiovanni explains that a constructivist needs to satisfy four conditions 
to prove the truthfulness of a moral claim, such as slavery is evil or promises need 
to be kept…etc. First, an appropriate reasoning procedure, the output of which 
informative enough to help solve the practical problems they are intended to solve, 
needs to be specified. Second, it must be clear that the procedure does not allow 
for subjective deliberations and conditions, which is a crucial prerequisite to claim 
objectivity. Third, you need to explain why principles of such a procedure are to 
generate a normative force to which we need to abide. Finally, you need to 
specify the constraints on the procedure of deliberation that the theorist can 
defend. Thus, according to Sangiovanni, a constructivist approach needs to 
satisfy these four tasks to prove a claim is true (2013: pp. 32-33). 
Following from there, James puts forward a more detailed understanding 
of the elements that shape a constructivist approach. He explains that a political 
constructivist account needs to address the 1) the social role of the principles, 2) 
the sources used as background data for interpretation, 3) a constructive 
interpretation account, 4) representation of all moral strands and 5) a conclusion 
regarding the constructed principles. James uses his suggested elements further to 
provide an understanding of Rawls’s constructivist work and to highlight how his 
principles of justice are constructed from existing social practices, thereby offering 
a practice-dependent reading of Rawls’s work. Thus, I will follow James’s path by 
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presenting his elements of political constructivism through Rawls’s constructivist 
approach in the rest of this section. 
3.2.3. Rawls’s Constructivism and PDA: 
 
A clear example of political constructivism is the approach by which Rawls 
justifies his principles of justice. As James explains, “[p]olitical constructivism is 
associated with John Rawls more than any other contemporary philosopher” 
(2013: p. 251). His constructivist approach is at its clearest when the relationship 
connecting practices, principles and objectivity is understood. Rawls takes moral 
intuition very seriously and constructs principles that appeal to “intuitional and 
political pluralism” (Roberts, 2007: p. 9).  
However, more importantly with regards to Rawls’s constructivist 
approach is how practice theorists put forward their understanding of his work as 
constructing principles from existing practices. This became a strong argument in 
PDA, particularly with the publication of James’s article Constructing Justice for 
Existing Practice: Rawls and the Status Quo that presents a practice-dependent 
reading of Rawls’s conception of justice” (Ibsen, 2013: p. 83). James argues that 
Rawls’s work, even before A Theory of Justice, always argued for starting moral 
reasoning about justice from existing social practices (2005: p. 286). He argues 
that the original position is not a freestanding moral reasoning tool and that “it 
must be grounded in independent judgments about what social practices exist and 
what kinds of agents participate in them” (2005: p. 282). Consequently, the 
original position entails a reflection of what the participants understand and 
believe the basic structure is. It is, therefore, a device or tool that creates a “shared 
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moral understanding of the basic structure” and constructs thereof the principles 
of justice that are to govern it (Ibsen, 2013: p. 84). 
In his contribution in Blackwell’s Companion to Rawls (2013), James 
presents his practice-dependent understanding of Rawls’s work and presents how 
he addresses the five constitutive elements of political constructivism. I will now 
present these elements of political constructivism as illustrated in Rawls’s 
account: 
1. Social Role:  
In political constructivism principles are to play a “distinctive social role as a 
public standard of mutual justification within an independently identified social 
practice” (James, 2013a: p. 253). 
For Rawls, principles are to apply within a specific practice but not 
elsewhere (James, 2013aa: p. 253). Once a social practice is identified, “Rawls 
assumes that principles of social justice function not as normatively neutral 
standard of evaluation but in a guiding, “public” role” (James, 2013aa: p. 254). 
This is particularly relevant to the idea of cooperation in social practice, because 
cooperation implies that participants accept the already publicly recognized rules. 
Accordingly, Rawls explains that the “social role of a conception of justice” is to 
help members of the society to accept each other’s institutions and arrangements 
“by citing what are publicly recognized as sufficient reason” (James, 2013a: p. 
254). As James notes, 
the “social role” of principles in the sense that it picks out not 
simply a welcome ideal but the very task of justification. As 
Rawls explains, “whenever a sufficient basis for agreement is 
not presently known, or recognized,” the task becomes that of 
providing one (KC, 305) (James, 2013a: p. 254). 
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Thus, to summarize, for Rawls the social role of principles is to provide 
people with a basis according to which they can justify their common practice. 
They are a publicly agreed basis for evaluating common practice. 
2. Sources:  
This element is resembled in the idea that moral reasoning in political 
constructivism proceeds from “generally (if implicitly) affirmed fundamental 
ideas, and especially shared understandings of the nature of the practice at issue” 
(James, 2013a: p. 255). 
Rawls explains that his principles are best suited for democratic societies, 
traditions and culture. He attempts to articulate a conception of social justice that 
is embedded in “settled convictions and deep self-understanding of constitutional 
democracy” (1993: p. 24). Thus, in Rawls’s understanding, a theory of justice 
begins from an understanding of the solid convictions within the society, and it 
uses them as a framework that any conception of justice needs to account to. As 
Rawls himself explains: 
We collect such settled convictions…and try to organize the 
basic ideas and principles implicit in these convictions into a 
coherent conception of justice. We can regard these 
convictions as provisional fixed points which any conception 
of justice must account for if it is to be reasonable for us. We 
look, then, to our public political culture itself, including its 
main institutions and the historical traditions of their 
interpretation, as the shared fund of implicitly recognized 
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3. Interpretive basis: 
Interpretation aims to offer a generally accepted version of the practice. This is 
achieved through a constructive interpretation of the fundamental ideas (James, 
2013a: p. 257). For Rawls, we get involved in constructive interpretation by 
looking at ideas embedded in our political culture.  
The pre-interpretive phase, is represented in Rawls’s identification of the 
basic structure. Yet, to satisfy the condition of this phase, his characterization of 
the basic structure, its nature and purpose, all need to be accepted by a good 
number of the participants. Thus, he offers his sociological description of the 
basic structure in a way that is generally accepted (James, 2005a: pp. 301-302).  
In the interpretive phase, Rawls sees “himself as describing our existing 
basic structure in moral vocabulary” (James, 2005a: 304), and he describes the 
basic structure “as cooperative schemes for the sake of the relevant, specified 
goods” (James, 2005a: p. 301). James argues that Rawls shifted throughout his 
work from a ‘protestant’ interpretive methodology that does not give authority to 
the participants’ interpretation, to a more ‘catholic’ stance that allows for such 
authority. James explains that Rawls in A Theory of Justice (1971) proposes his 
own understanding of “domestic societal practice” yet gives little attention to 
those participating in the practice. This, however, changed in Political Liberalism 
(1993) where he gave greater attention to existing disagreements. Differences 
within a democratic culture can extend to understandings of the meanings 
embedded within the shared culture. “He thus offers not simply a constructive 
interpretation of what is available to its..participants. Their own presumed 
understanding of their shared practice is…an important source of argumentative 
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pressure against potentially resistant elements of their broader moral or 
philosophical outlook” (James, 2013a: p. 258). 
Finally in the post interpretive phase the “original position reasoning comes 
into play” (James, 2005a: p. 301). Accordingly, the original position reasoning 
comes after the identification of existing practices, determining the purpose and 
identifying the participants. 
4. Representation:  
The fourth element of political constructivism is in the need to represent all 
“morally relevant criteria” in the best way possible through a procedure or device 
of judgment (James, 2013a: p. 259). Accordingly, the original position’s primary 
aim is to adequately interpret our internal shared meanings and come up with a 
reasonable account of the political culture. Thus, Rawls introduces the device so 
that we can “emphasise some of our intuitions, relate them to one another in a 
particular way, and paint one picture of who we are” (Warnke, 1993: p. 45). Thus, 
it is for Rawls a valuable thought experiment that helps us reflect and work out 
what we think (James, 2013a: p. 259). 
Through the original position, Rawls claims objectivity, or the idea that 
reasons for principles are unbiased and impartial, and can therefore be considered 
acceptable and applicable to all parties. He lays out the features of the original 
position and characteristics of the parties as “an objective standpoint from which 
it is appropriate to identify principles of justice. His contention is that the 
principles chosen from this standpoint would be objectively justified as they 
would not have been chosen on obviously partial or subjective grounds” (Roberts, 
2007: p. 14). Tied to the original position, the veil of ignorance and other 
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constraints is the concept of reflective equilibrium. Rawls describes the concept in 
these terms:  
In searching for the most favored description of this situation 
we work from both ends. We begin by describing it so that it 
represents generally shared and preferably weak conditions. 
We then see if these conditions are strong enough to yield a 
significant set of principles. If not, we look for further 
premises equally reasonable. But if so, and these principles 
match our considered convictions of justice, then so far well 
and good. But presumably there will be discrepancies. In this 
case we have a choice. We can either modify the account of 
the initial situation or we can revise our existing judgments, 
for even the judgments we take provisionally as fixed points 
are liable to revision. By going back and forth …eventually we 
shall find a description of the initial situation that both 
expresses reasonable conditions and yields principles which 
match our considered judgments duly pruned and adjusted. 
This state of affairs I refer to as reflective equilibrium (1999, p. 
18). 
 
Rawls’s constructivist approach depends on selecting principles through an 
appropriate reasoning process in the original position and behind the veil of 
ignorance, meaning they are principles that are acceptable to self interested 
parties that are oblivious to their position in the society. This form of impartiality 
of the parties and the process gives the principles their objectivity and accordingly 
their authoritative power. “The aim is to “further [the] recognition” that we 
should accept certain principles, beyond considering the various underlying 
grounds of support directly and by themselves” (James, 2013a: p. 259). 
Accordingly, it is Rawls’s device to achieve a comprehensive representation. 
5. Conclusion of the construction:  
A political constructivist account needs to conclude whether we are justified to 
endorse the constructed principles or not (James, 2013a: p. 261). Given the 
presumption that all steps of the moral reasoning process are correctly executed, 
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we should have sufficient reasons to accept the constructed principles as justified 
requirements for guiding the practice and to serve their ascribed social role as 
presented in the first element of political constructivism (James, 2013a: p. 261). 
James explains that “the resulting principles can count as correct requirements of 
social justice simply because social justice is nothing more, and nothing less, than 
the outcome of some such constructive reasoning, carried out in appropriate 
circumstances” (2013: p. 261).  
 
Accordingly, for Rawls, principles of justice constructed in the original 
position are regarded as procedural justice as it is attained through a just 
procedure. In other words, we do not only endorse and accept principles because 
they are independently justifiable, but even more importantly “because of our 
sense of how we have arrived at them, through our free exercise of public reason” 
(James, 2013a: p. 262). 
3.3. Islamic Finance as a Social Practice: 
 
In his argument for considering international trade as a social practice, James 
(2012) puts forward four conditions according to which a social practice can be 
identified. A social practice needs 1) to be coordinated over time, 2) its 
coordination to be based on “generally if not universally understood behavioural 
expectations” (2012: p. 39), 3) expectations to be governed, and 4) expectations to 
be organized according to a shared purpose. In the rest of this section I will 
illustrate each of these conditions in the context of Islamic finance practice. 
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First, according to James, a social practice needs to be organized among 
several participants over time. This condition distinguishes between a social 
practice and other practices that happen intermittently in different points in time 
such as brushing teeth (James, 2012: pp. 38-39). Within this context, the 
evolution and development of Islamic finance represent a good example of how a 
social practice is coordinated over time. As will be elaborated in the next chapter, 
Islamic finance developed over 1400 years, with institutions being formed to 
regulate long term financial commitments, including long term investments, 
project finance, etc., and where participants organize their long term financial 
practices, including entrepreneurial projects, project management, etc. It is also 
coordinated as an established alternative to the conventional financial system. 
Thus, Islamic finance practice is not established to meet a short term objective but 
it is an ongoing practice that is established and maintained over a long period. 
The second condition, as put by James, is for the practice to be based on 
generally understood behaviour expectations (James, 2012: pp. 38-39). Within the 
same context, practices and institutions of Islamic finance are in most cases well 
defined and accepted. There is a general understanding that the practice is 
governed by Islamic teachings, and as will be clearer in the next chapter, 
impermissible financial practices are unambiguously identified in Islam. This is 
not to say that practices do not include variations between regions and countries, 
or variations of interpretations between scholars. However, variations and 
differences are all integrated within the overall understanding and acceptance of 
the Islamic law that governs the practice. For example, charging interest is clearly 
accepted as a prohibited practice due to the numerous and unambiguous ways it 
is declared to be so. There are variations in specifying which practices are to be 
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considered interest bearing, and how to design contracts that can avoid interest 
based transactions. Overall, however, there is a clear and well defined practice 
that is easily distinguishable from other financial practices.  
Islamic finance institutions are designed to provide Islamic-based services 
and individuals are expected to affirm these rules and maintain them. Participants 
of Islamic finance practice share the same basic understanding of the purpose of 
the practice. Participants are aware that they adhere to Islamic finance practices 
that serve specific economic, moral and religious purposes. These purposes will 
be explained in detail in the next chapter, but what is important to note here, is 
that participants clearly understand what they are participating in. Due to the 
clearly identified rules of Islamic finance practice, participants are aware of what 
it entails and what it is trying to avoid.  
The third condition of a relevant social practice is for expectations to be 
governed by sets of rules (James, 2012: pp. 38-39). In other words, the 
expectation that Islamic finance practice is to be governed by Islamic teaching 
needs rules to govern and maintain it. Indeed, Islamic finance entails regulatory 
practices such as the integration of Shariah boards and Shariah units into the 
institutions. As will be explained in more detail in chapter IV, these regulatory 
boards and units include Islamic scholars who assess the adherence of the practice 
with the Islamic teachings. In other words, there is an ongoing assessment of the 
practice to guarantee its consistency with behavioural expectations. Moreover, 
the behaviour expectations of the individual participants are clearly organized by 
specific rules that govern them. 
Finally, a social practice also needs to organize behavioural expectations 
based on a shared purpose (James, 2012: pp. 38-39). The fundamental purpose of 
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Islamic finance practice is the provision of financial services that are Islamic in 
substance. In other words, it is offering financial services that abide by Islamic 
teaching as codified in Shariah law. In the next chapter I will present the fixed 
points and the background information that will serve as important sources for 
the interpretation of the practice, as well as Islamic finance practice as my site of 
justice and as the practice of inquiry.  
Based on the above, it should be clear that Islamic finance is a social 
practice that is appropriate for an application of the practice-dependence 
approach. It is a well established and well defined practice that came into being 
by deliberate actions by the participants. In the next chapter, I will work to show 
that that Islamic finance as a social practice is a salient site of distributive justice: 
it significantly affects the distribution of burdens and benefits among its 




The practice-dependence approach, although a relatively new approach in 
political theory, has gained popularity among new generations of political 
theorists. Practice theorists attempt to address criticism of practice independent 
approaches as being too abstract and detached from reality by giving more 
authority and relevance to the contexts in which principles are to operate. 
Accordingly, they construct principles of justice from the interpretation of actual 
practices that such principles govern. As was discussed, there are several variants 
within the approach. Cultural conventionalists put the most emphasis on the 
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cultural context in which principles operate, and accordingly require cultural 
understandings to play a decisive role in constructing principles of justice. 
Institutionalists place more emphasis on the relational network that is created 
based on the institutional structure of the practice. A functionalist PDA identifies 
a practice independent global scope of justice, yet identifies the relevant practice to 
which principles will apply.  
It comes as no surprise that PDA faces a number of important objections 
and criticism from cosmopolitans and proponents of practice-independent 
theorizing. It is criticised for limiting the scope of justice to the scope of the 
practice. This, however, is considered an invalid criticism by PDA theorists, who 
argue that in the same way global and domestic practices differ, principles of 
justice also differ. PDA is also criticised for its limited critical potential, as 
practice principles are not capable of critically assessing the point and purpose of 
the practice. Yet again, this criticism is taking practice theories out of their 
intended context, as they only aim to construct principles that can justifiably 
govern, assess and guide the practice. Practice theories do not aim to critically 
assess the purpose of the practice. Finally, PDA is also criticised for the possible 
indeterminacy of interpretation. An objection that faces most theorizing 
approaches that use interpretation is that there could be a lack of agreement with 
regards the interpretation of the practice. However, it is argued by practice 
theorists that an interpretation that is accepted by the participants and that 
illustrates the connection between the reasons participants have to take part in the 
practice and the point and purpose of the practice is a comprehensive and 
generally acceptable interpretation.  
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Following the discussion of objections, I examined how interpretation is 
used in PDA through presenting Dworkin’s constructive interpretation account, 
which remains the most prominent approach. Constructive interpretation in this 
respect relies on identifying the practice, its point and purpose and the viewpoint 
of the participants regarding the practice. The practice theorist then interprets the 
relationship between all elements in order to come up with the most apt principles 
to guide the practice and to make it more just.  
I then discussed constructive interpretation, following James in presenting 
it as a five-step process focused the social purpose of the principles, the sources of 
the interpretive account, the interpretive basis or the constructive interpretation 
account, the representation of different moral views, and finally the reason for 
accepting the principles constructed. I presented James’s practice-dependence 
reading of Rawls’s work to highlight how Rawls presented a constructivist 
account that uses constructive interpretation. 
Finally, I demonstrated how Islamic finance can be viewed as a practice 
which is appropriately analysed within the practice-dependence approach. Islamic 
finance is a practice that was developed over a long time and with long term 
commitments. It operates with the expectation that institutions are to abide by 
Islamic teachings and participants are to affirm Islamic rules and maintain them. 
Accordingly, behavioural expectations are governed by Shariah boards and units 
that aim to ensure that the practice remains committed to its reliance on Islamic 
teachings. And finally, all these conditions are tied up with a shared purpose that 
is maintained even when contradictory objectives exist. 
Accordingly, Islamic finance practice should be regarded as a social 
practice that is salient for constructing principles of justice. The next chapter will 
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make the case for Islamic finance as a salient site for distributive justice first by 
detailing its philosophical and historical background, then by presenting the 
actual rules of Islamic finance practice as they have evolved. The chapter will 
provide fundamental data for my later interpretation of the practice, to be 
presented in chapter V, and according to which I will construct principles of 





Chapter IV: Islamic Finance 
as Site of  Distributive Justice 
 
 
What is the robbing a bank compared to the founding of a new bank?  
BERTOLT BRECHT, The Threepenny Opera (see Hinton, 1990: 28-29) 
 
 
The conceptual analysis I presented in Chapter II spoke to the vast and wide 
ranging literature on the notion of distributive justice, what it entails, its principles 
and issues it needs to address. However, in spite of this powerful and extensive 
literature, little has been written on the role of Islamic finance practices in the 
distribution of benefits and burdens among persons. This absence of the Islamic 
tradition marks a significant and increasingly evident gap in the literature, given 
the suitability for the practice to be investigated as a site of distributive justice. 
Islamic finance practices are widely promoted as an ethical alternative to the 
conventional financial system. They are based on a highly systematic code of 
teachings that prohibit a number of acts of financial misconduct and promote 
alternative ethical financial products. Islamic finance, as discussed in the previous 
chapter, is a long-term social practice based on a generally understood 
expectation of behaviour. In other words, it is expected that the institutions 
providing Islamic financial services are to abide to the Islamic teachings which, as 
will be detailed in this chapter, are clearly stated in Islamic sources and 
participants are to affirm these rules and support them. Accordingly, these 
expectations are governed by rules such as the establishment of Shariah boards 
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and are organised according to the purpose of providing Shariah compliant 
services.  
This chapter is concerned to show in full detail why Islamic finance should 
be seen as an appropriate site of distributive justice: It is a practice that is capable 
of being just or unjust and is regulated and governed by principles of justice. 
Overall, the practice has a profound impact on the lives of the participants, the 
relationships among them and the way wealth is distributed between them.  
The analysis is presented in five sections. In the first section, I define the 
practice and explain what is meant when we say that Shariah law is governing it. 
I will follow this by providing two important sources and background 
information for interpreting the practice. In the second section, I examine the 
philosophical background governing Islamic finance and the tenets according to 
which the right course of action in the practice is identified. The third section 
gives a detailed account of the historical development of the practice over the past 
1400 years. Both the philosophical axioms and the historical evolution of the 
practice are fundamental for my constructivist account, as they serve as fixed 
points and background material for the interpretation of the practice. In the fourth 
section I present the practices, the prohibitions and the tools used. Finally in the 
last section I tie the discussion together and reinforce why Islamic finance is 
appropriately seen as a site of distributive justice.  
4.1. Defining Islamic Finance Practice  
 
Defining Islamic finance and what it entails as a practice is not as easy a task as it 
may seem. Such a definition can vary between a very narrow characterization of  
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‘interest-free banking’ and much broader ones encompassing all financial 
operations conducted by Muslims (Warde, 2000: p. 5). Due to the nature and 
structure of Islamic finance, no definition will satisfactorily include all aspects. Its 
institutional structure is not limited to Islamic banks but includes a wide range of 
financial institutions such as Islamic insurance companies and even Islamic 
products that are introduced by conventional banks and financial institutions such 
as Citigroup and HSBC. It would be even insufficient to use self-identification as 
a criterion for labelling Islamic finance institutions, because some institutions rely 
in their operations and transactions on Islamic principles yet are reluctant to 
explicitly refer to the Islamic nature of their services. Examples of such 
institutions include the Special Finance houses in Turkey, which conduct interest 
free financial transactions yet due to tensions between Islamic finance and 
Turkey’s secular identity do not represent themselves as Islamic financial 
institutions. Hence, almost any definition will find its exceptions (Warde, 2000: p. 
5-6).  
However, for the purpose of my project, I will rely on Gait and 
Worthington’s description of Islamic finance as those financial services that are 
conducted in a way, and with the purpose of, complying with the tenets of 
Islamic law or Shariah (2007: p. 1). According to this definition, Islamic finance 
is essentially designed according to the rules and principles of the Shariah law, 
and “all the values, norms and rules structuring Islamic commercial and financial 
ethics are encapsulated into the Shariah” (Alchaar et al. 2009: p. 5).  
Accordingly, a good starting point to understand what Islamic finance 
means, is to understand what Shariah law is. Shariah is understood to be the 
Islamic law and framework that regulates the Muslim’s worship practices and 
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day-to-day relationships. It is deduced from four main sources. The first is the 
‘Qur’an’, the sacred book of Islam, which is accepted by devout Muslims as the 
true word of God, revealed to Prophet Muhammad in fragmented verses over 23 
years. It is argued that the gradual revelation aimed at allowing those verses 
which are concerned with the change of habits and norms enough time to enter 
into practice (Wilson and El-Ashker, 2005: p. 34). A crucial example of such a 
gradual change is the prohibition of interest, which was imposed on Muslims 
over several years, on which more below. 
The second source of the Shariah law is the ‘Sunnah’, or the lessons 
learned from the life of the prophet through his sayings, acts and tacit approvals. 
These are carried forward in the forms of ‘hadeeth’ or the accounts reporting them 
(Alchaar et al. 2009: p. 7). In order to avoid any confusion between God’s words 
(Qur’an) and the prophet’s sayings (hadeeth), the prophet demanded the reporting 
of his words to be done verbally and not in writing. However, in the 8th Century 
the first attempt to document the Sunnah (Wilson and El-Ashker, 2005: p. 36) 
resulted in six books that are named according to the compilers of the texts.  
- Sahih Al Bukhari by Imam Al Bukhari (810-870) 
- Sahih Muslim: Sunnah of the Sayings and Doings of Prophet 
Muhammad by Imam Muslim (875) 
- Sunan Abi Dawood by Imam Abu Dawood (888) 
- Al Jami’: Sunan Al Tirmizi by Imam Al Tirmizi (892) 
- Sunan Ibn Majah by Imam Ibn Majah (886)  
- Sunan Al Nasa’i by Imam Al Nasa’i (915) (Wilson and El-
Ashker, 2005: pp. 26-36) 
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The third source of the Shariah law is ‘Ijtihad’, or the interpretation of the 
scholars. As societies developed, situations and issues that required religious 
rulings changed. “To respond to the changing needs of Muslim societies, Muslim 
jurists and scholars have relied on the well-established process of innovation, 
ijtihad. This process is based not only on the Qur’an and religious tradition 
(sunna), but also on reason, deduction, and prioritization” (United States Institute 
of Peace, 2004: p. 2). If insufficient indications are gathered from the Qur’an and 
Sunnah, scholars use analogy (qiyas) to deduce rulings (Alchaar et al. 2009: p. 7). 
The tradition of Ijtihad started during the life of Prophet Muhammad when 
he approved the use of reasoning to come to a ruling on matters that have no 
clear ruling in the Qur’an and Sunnah. According to Wilson and El-Ashker “the 
general understanding of the Qur’anic verses and their purpose and the 
interpretation of the Ahadeeth (plural of hadeeth) and their intention, the spirit of 
the law as we may say, should be used to guide the jurists in arriving at the 
required rule” (2005: p. 35). Yet, a pivotal issue here is, who has the right to 
perform ijtihad? According to the special report Ijtihad: Reinterpreting Islamic 
Principles for the Twenty-First Century, published by the United States Institute of 
Peace, the right of ijtihad  
belongs to an individual who is a recognized expert in 
jurisprudence and who is qualified to derive Islamic law from 
original sources. This requires wide expertise and many years 
of studying jurisprudence, the fundamentals of jurisprudence, 
hadiths, the biographies of hadith narrators, commentary on 
the Qur’an, Arabic grammar and eloquence, and logic. 
Additionally, in this era, knowledge of philosophy, economics, 
and sociology is increasingly necessary. A mujtahid should 
also display qualities such as piety and moral integrity (2004: 
p. 4). 
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Finally, Shariah law also relies on consensus (Ijmaa), or agreement 
between scholars. The influential role of consensus is more evident in secular 
issues since worship and ritual matters are explicitly stated in the Qur’an and 
Sunnah. Consensus played an important role during the caliphate period; the era 
following the death of the prophet during which the four righteous caliphs 
succeeded him in leading the Islamic state (632-660). During this era the rulings 
of the consensus served as reference for jurists. However, it became weaker with 
the end of the caliphate period and the beginning of the Umayyad dynasty (661-
750), when common consensus between politically divided Muslims became 
difficult (Wilson and El-Ashker, 2005: p. 36). 
Now that we understand Islamic finance as the financial practices that 
comply with and serve the purpose of the Shariah law, it is important to 
understand the objectives and philosophical arguments behind Islamic finance 
and the tenets and philosophical principles that are incorporated in the Shariah 
law and govern the Islamic finance system. This conceptualization of the Islamic 
tenets and philosophical axioms shall play a key role in the interpretation of 
Islamic finance practices that I will present in the next chapter. As I explained in 
the last chapter, interpretation is an important source of a practice-dependent 
constructivist approach. Thus, a clear illustration of this philosophical 
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4.2.  Philosophical Background and Axioms 
 
Principles governing any economic system are ideologically and philosophically 
based. Many economists such as Schumpeter and Heilbroner see modern 
economics as being preceded by what is called a vision or an ideology. Ideology 
in this context refers to “the systems of thought and belief by which [individuals 
and groups] explain…how their social system operates and what principles it 
exemplifies” (Heilbroner, 1985: p. 107; Gilpin and Gilpin, 1987: p. 25). Liberal 
economics and contemporary ‘conventional’ finance, for example, reflect the 
European civilization and are immersed in the Western worldview (Haneef and 
Furqani, 2009: p. 175). Liberal economies are, thus, committed to free markets, 
individual equality and liberty. 
Islamic economics places Islam at the centre of its ethical values. It is an 
ideologically founded system that is rooted in Shariah law and is concerned with 
maintaining economic pursuit in line with Islamic ethics. Therefore, for the 
Islamic economic system to be clearly understood it needs to be contextualized 
within the framework of the Islamic order, which provides it with its objectives, 
axioms and principles, and with values according to which economic interactions 
within the society can be evaluated. Clearly then, “(t)he ethical norms of Islam 
are fully integrated within the Islamic economic system and its economic motives, 
as these are not voluntary actions but ontologically part of the revealed 
knowledge, and therefore its dogmatic nature makes it necessary for them to be 
followed” (Asutay, 2007: p. 4).  
Syed Naqvi, former director of the Pakistan Institute of Development 
Economics, and one of the first scholars to contribute to the design of an Islamic 
Chapter IV: Islamic Finance as Site of Distributive Justice 
    
140 
 
economic system, offers a persuasive argument that the Islamic philosophy 
revolves around the idea and concept of the ‘right’. The first step in the Islamic 
philosophy, according to Naqvi, is always to identify what is ‘right’. After we 
identify the ‘right’, the most appropriate, practical and profitable course of action 
is to be worked out. Within this context, Naqvi and a number of leading Islamic 
economists7 have identified the foundational or philosophical axioms that are 
derived from the Islamic worldview and constitute the moral paradigm that 
guides the behaviour of economic agents and institutions. These axioms are 
spelled out to guide the process of identification of the right (Naqvi, 1997: pp. 3-4).  
Asutay has developed a useful list of these axioms, as follows (2007: pp. 5-
6):  
1. Unity (Tawheed): It is the cornerstone concept for any system to be Islamic in 
nature. Unity, or the belief in God (Allah), is based on the understanding and 
acceptance of Allah as the sole creator as well as owner of the entire universe. 
Hence a system based on this axiom (1) can only include economic and 
financial practices that abide to the creator’s ethical code and (2) cannot, and 
should not, be based on ideas of other non-Islamic (non-unity based) systems 
(Naqvi, 1997: p. 4). Accordingly, practices like interest rates, gambling, 
traditional insurance,.etc., cannot fit within a system based on unity. 
2. Equilibrium (Al-Adl Wal Ihsan): Islam is not a religion that is limited only to 
human spirituality and man’s relation with God. Islam should always be 
accepted as a comprehensive way of life. Therefore, any aspect of the 
economic system should not be considered in isolation from the political and 
                                                     
7 Ahmad (1980, 1994, 2003), Chapra (1992, 2000), El-Ghazali (1994), Siddiqui (1981) 
and Sirageldin (1995) 
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social systems. Naqvi refers to this as the ‘Equilibrium’ or promoting social 
harmony and maintaining just balance in the basic structure of the society on 
all levels (1997: p. 4). 
3. Accountability and Social Responsibility (Fard): Individuals are not only 
responsible and accountable for what they do, but also for how they do it. 
Accordingly, control of economic activity does not rely entirely on the 
government intervention and enforcement. Conscience and individual 
responsibility also play a major role in the regulation of economic activities. 
Special attention is given to social responsibility and making the right choices 
especially towards the least privileged (Naqvi, 1997: p. 4). 
4. Trusteeship: Individuals in Islam are God’s trustees on earth and their main 
task is to fulfil the responsibility bestowed upon them by God. Within this 
context their lives are considered ‘Amanah’, or something tangible that 
someone entrusts to another in good faith for safekeeping and to be returned 
as and when required in exactly the same condition (Hasan, 1988: pp. 41-42). 
This notion is very relevant to the idea of unity, and that God is the sole 
owner. Hence, it gives a new and different meaning to the economic concept 
of ownership and emphasises the idea of free will as it allows maximum 
space for economic and social activity within the framework of responsibility 
and accountability (Naqvi, 1997: p. 4). It is considered a very difficult 
responsibility because it is granted simultaneously with free will. Within this 
context, the obligations that are imposed on the individual due to this 
trusteeship are related to God, fellow humans and oneself (Hasan, 1988: p. 
42). 
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5. Free Will (Ikhtiar): Individuals within the Islamic tradition and the 
understanding of the Islamic system possess free will. This free will is not 
restricted yet it is guided by the ethical norms and guidelines of the tradition 
(Asutay, 2007: p. 5; Naqvi, 1994: p. 31). This is relevant to the idea of 
trusteeship and how accountability is combined with the free-will of the 
individual. 
6. Divine arrangements (Rububiyyah): This refers to God’s arrangements that 
are divine in nature and perfection oriented (Ahmad 1979:p. 12; Asutay, 
2007: p. 6). 
7. Growth toward perfection (Tazkiyah): This refers to individual development 
and improvement towards perfection. This is to be achieved through 
purification (Ahmad, 1994: p. 20; Asutay, 2007: p. 6). 
8. Objectives of Shariah (Maqasid Al Shariah): These are the five areas that 
guarantee the well being of all human beings. Shariah identifies and is based 
on five main and unalienable individual rights that should be granted to every 
human being. Accordingly Islamic economic principles are to be directed 
towards the achievement of these objectives. These are the foundation of the 
good life based on Islamic Shariah law, namely, protection of religion, life, 
reason, progeny, and property/wealth (Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2011: p. 96). 
 
The importance of these axioms again lies in identifying the ‘right’ which 
is to guide deliberation on courses of action consistent with Shariah, and Islam 
more generally. Consequently, these axioms are of utmost importance for this 
thesis, as they provide us with fixed points about the background of the practice. 
If these axioms are to guide our reasoning for deciding the ‘right’, then they 
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should also guide our reasoning for constructing principles from the practices. 
The role these axioms play in the Islamic context are very similar to what Rawls 
refers to as considered moral convictions. Rawls explains that a reflective 
equilibrium is a process through which one can assess if the chosen principles 
would match the “considered convictions of justice” (1999: p. 17). Accordingly, 
we start with our convictions as provisional fixed points from which we aim to 
derive an interpretation and identify principles that can accommodate these 
convictions. If  
these principles match our considered convictions of justice, 
then so far well and good. But presumably there will be 
discrepancies. In this case we have a choice. We can either 
modify the account of the initial situation or we can revise our 
existing judgments, for even the judgments we take 
provisionally as fixed points are liable to revision (Rawls, 
1999: p. 18). 
 
It is important to note here that these axioms, although agreed on by most 
scholars, are not set in stone. If discrepancies are revealed from a reflective 
equilibrium process between the practice, the philosophical axioms and the 
principles, then we are to either revise the principles according to the axioms, or 
we are to revise our understanding of the philosophical axioms that guide our 
understanding of the right. 
4.3. Historical Background and Evolution 
 
The philosophical axioms explained in the previous section alongside the 
historical development of the practice are pivotal sources for our constructivist 
approach to theorizing Islamic finance practices. It is a well known fact that a 
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financial rule such as the prohibition of interest is not unique to the Islamic 
tradition. The charge of interest is condemned and prohibited in most religions. 
However, what is remarkable about Islamic finance practice is how it continued 
to develop, evolve and even proliferate for longer than fourteen hundred years 
after the revelation of Islam. Accordingly, I will illustrate the distinctiveness of 
the historical development of the practice in this section.  
Although the philosophical tenets governing Islamic finance stem from the 
Islamic religion and worldview, such an influence of religion on financial 
practices is a phenomenon that is not limited to Islam. The prohibition of interest, 
for example, one of the fundamental principles of all religiously founded financial 
systems, was imposed in Judaism and Christianity before the emergence of Islam. 
According to Frierson, interest is an ancient practice that even preceded the 
appearance of money as it was imposed on crops and grains and was evident in 
many ancient civilizations and cultures, like the code of Hamurabi, the Sumerian 
documents and the Mesopotamian practices. The charge of interest, or ‘neshek’ in 
Hebrew, is condemned in the Old Testament and accordingly Jewish law 
abolished the charge of interest between Jews (although it remained permissible 
on credits to Gentiles) (Frierson, 1969: p. 114). 
This ban on interest was also imposed in Christianity as biblical passages 
condemned it with no distinction between interest and usury, or unlawfully high 
interest rates (Chapra, 2005: 1). The church adopted a reproving position towards 
interest, and this position strengthened gradually until a canon of the prohibition 
was passed in 325 A.D. It is important to note here that the economic conditions 
of the Roman Empire at that time helped in the enforcement of the ban 
universally. As the economy was declining and the loans were shifting from 
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commercial to subsistence purposes (Frierson, 1969: pp. 115-119), the moral 
justification for banning interest became stronger and more evident.  
However, the Christian position towards the ban of interest changed with 
the transformation of economic and political conditions. As the European 
economy started to prosper, commercial and economic growth created 
investment opportunities that required the charge of interest (Hassan and Lewis, 
2007: p. 78). Hence, as the temptation grew, the prohibition of interest was 
reinterpreted by the Church especially through the writings and theories of St. 
Augustine. This new and more lenient stance towards the charge of interest was 
also linked to the dominant role played by the church in the economy. This 
domination of the church continued until the 16th century when resentment 
towards the ‘inquisition’ and the alliance between the church and the corrupt 
state resulted in a Protestant movement led by Martin Luther and later further 
developed by the work of Calvin. Consequently, the Church ban on interest 
became gradually less stringent (Frierson, 1969: p. 124). Interest was permitted at 
a rate that would not jeopardize the moral obligation towards the needy and poor 
(Hassan and Lewis, 2007: p. 78). 
Two centuries later, this Protestant movement was followed by the 
Enlightenment, which attacked religion in general in favour of secularism. Calls 
for the separation of church and state became more prevalent, as did the 
acceptance of secularism as the source of answers to individual and social 
behaviours and needs. However, this shift from religion towards secularism that 
took place in Europe did not happen in the East. Accordingly, the financial 
systems in the West and the East evolved differently.  
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The prohibition of interest (riba) in Islam started with simple disapproval 
of the pre-Islamic practices that imposed interest. Then it was prohibited 
explicitly in several verses that were revealed to the prophet over several years. 
The first time the prohibition was explicitly stated in the Qur’an was in year 625 
AD and the final time it was expressed was in the year 632 AD (Ayub: 2007, p. 
44). The following are example verses that include a clear prohibition of interest 
(Qur’an Explorer: 
Those who take riba (usury or interest) will not stand but as 
stands the one whom the demon has driven crazy by his touch. 
That is because they have said: “Sale is but like riba.’’, while 
Allah has permitted sale, and prohibited riba. So, whoever 
receives an advice from his Lord and desists (from indulging 
in riba), then what has passed is allowed for him, and his 
matter is up to Allah. As for the ones who revert back, those 
are the people of Fire. There they will remain forever. 
(275) Allah destroys riba and nourishes charities, and Allah 
does not like any sinful disbeliever. (276)Surely those who 
believe and do good deeds, and establish Salah (prayer) and 
pay Zakah will have their reward with their Lord, and there is 
no fear for them, nor shall they grieve. (277) O you who 
believe, fear Allah and give up what still remains of riba, if 
you are believers. (278) But if you do not (give it up), then 
listen to the declaration of war from Allah and His Messenger. 
However, If you repent, yours is your principal. Neither 
wrong, nor be wronged. (279) If there is one in misery, then 
(the creditor should allow) deferment till (his) ease, and that 
you forgo it as alms is much better for you, if you really know. 
(280) (Qur’an 2:275-280) 
 
From the above verses it is clear that interest, in all its forms and rates, is 
unambiguously and explicitly prohibited in the first source of Shariah. Therefore, 
there is no dispute between Muslims who want to abide to the Islamic law, about 
the prohibition of the practice. Differences, however, are in the interpretation of 
the scholars about ‘what constitutes riba and what not’ (Ayub, 2007: p. 44).    
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However, Islamic finance practice is not limited to the prohibition of 
interest. An Islamic financial system started in the 7th and 8th centuries with the 
emergence of Islam. It started with a process to correct the pre-Islamic practices 
to comply with the Islamic rules.  In other words, pre-Islamic practices, 
institutions and transactions were examined, and those features that 
corresponded with Islamic doctrine were accepted, while those that conflicted 
with the Islamic rules were condemned and changed. This was accompanied by 
the development of Islamic finance tools that were based on the actions of the 
prophet, who as a businessman and a merchant was the first to use Islamic 
finance tools such as Mudarabah, or partnership (Gait and Worthington, 2007: p. 
5), on which more in the next section.  
An important pre-Islamic financial practice that was discouraged by the 
prophet and became fundamental for the development of the Islamic financial 
system was the reliance on barter. Prophetic hadeeths, or the teachings of the 
prophet noted above,  encouraged monetization over barter (Cizakca, 2013: pp. 8-
9) in several incidents. For example, when a man brought the prophet dates as a 
gift from Khaybar city, the prophet asked if all dates in Khaybar were of this high 
quality. The man explained that there are different qualities and that people trade 
one sa’ (a weight unit) for two or two sa’s for three. The prophet replied: ‘Do not 
do that. Sell the assorted ones for dirhams and then buy the good ones for 
dirhams’ (Cizakca, 2013: pp. 8-9). 
This movement from barter to money served as a fundamental step in the 
emergence of Islamic international trade, which was complemented with the 
establishment of law and financial instruments. It is historically evident that 
concepts such as partnership, bills of exchange, letters of credit, etc. that were 
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invented in the Muslim world were adopted by the West through international 
trade. Moreover, international trade resulted in the concentration of a vast 
amount of wealth in the hands of the Muslims (Cizakca, 2011: pp. 8-9). 
However, the concentration of wealth in the Muslim world prompted 
attacks from both the Crusades of the West and the Mongols of the East, which 
led to new systems of centralisation and militarization of the Muslim world. 
Consequently, trade became increasingly monopolized by the government 
between the 11th and 16th Century in an attempt to prioritize territorial 
independence through state control over market oriented financial systems. This 
continued during the time of the Ottoman empire and resulted in a system that 
Çizakça referred to as a ‘the proto-quasi-socialist system’ (2011: pp. xxi-xxvi). 
It is argued that Islamic finance practices remained unchanged until the 
mid of the 20th Century, when most of the Muslim countries fell under colonial 
occupation of the West. As subjects of colonization, Muslim countries were 
alienated from their “old traditions, values and cultural heritage” (Iqbal and 
Mirakhor, 2011). Consequently, the established Islamic financial system was 
replaced by the conventional capitalist system, which functioned in the Muslim 
world until the second half of the 20th century (Gait and Worthington, 2007: p. 6). 
It is worth noting, though, that a number of sporadic attempts to condemn 
interest bearing financial practices and to highlight areas of conventional financial 
practices that do not adhere to Shariah law took place in a few countries such as 
Egypt and India. However, it was only after independence and the end of 
colonization that peoples of the Muslim countries attempted to search for their 
identity and aimed to instil their Islamic values into their financial and economic 
lives once again (Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2011). 
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Accordingly, the development of Islamic economics and finance as we 
know it today started with a wave that was more of a response of the Muslim 
people to the challenges created by the domination of the West. Similar to 
Keynesian economics that was developed to correspond to the Great Depression, 
and the Marxian economics corresponding to problems arising from mass 
industrialization, Islamic economics were revived in response to the political and 
economic circumstances of the Muslim world after decades of colonization 
(Zaman, 2008: p. 19).  Islamic thought in general was shaped in the 20th Century 
by the need for liberation from colonization, which challenged Muslim scholars 
to establish Islamic socio-political and economic systems that could offer 
Muslims a better alternative to the dominant Western systems. For example, 
founders of Islamic economics agreed that the purpose of an Islamic economic 
system is to promote justice and equality (Zaman, 2008: p. 24), something that 
seemed lacking in the conventional system. 
Nevertheless, the detailed articulation of the financial system as we 
witness it today did not take place until the second wave, which started during the 
1970s. The historical circumstances and events during this wave are divided by 
Ibrahim Warde into three phases of evolution. The first phase (1971 – 1991) or the 
early years is when the Muslim, Arab and Middle Eastern countries developed a 
distinctive position amidst the politics of the cold war. Egypt’s Nasser founded 
the Pan-Arabism and non-alignment movements with other third world countries. 
However, the Saudi King Faisal, challenged these movements through his 
adoption of a Pan-Islamism stance, according to which he launched the Muslim 
World League. He used his control over Muslim pilgrimage to strengthen ties 
with Muslim leaders, and he reinforced his power on Muslim countries outside 
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the Middle East by extending large aid sums to non-Arab Islamic countries. 
Consequently, in 1970, the year Nasser died, the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference, which brought together 44 countries and paved the way for serious 
consideration of the idea of an Islamic finance model, was established (Warde, 
2012: pp. 72-82). 
This phase found the region in a paradoxical situation that Kahf succinctly 
summarized in the title of his book chapter the New Alliance of Wealth and Shariah 
Scholarship (2004). The 1973 oil crisis and the emergence of the OPEC left the 
region with vast amount of wealth and political power. After the oil embargo of 
1973 the oil prices increased by 400%, which created a huge foreign reserves 
(Saeed, 1996: p. 11). This fast accumulation of oil profits and petro-dollars in the 
Middle East offered an incentive to create investment opportunities (Iqbal and 
Mirakhor, 2011).  However, due to the underdeveloped economic system in the 
Muslim world and the advancement of its counterpart in the West a vast amount 
of Muslim money was invested in the capital markets of America and Europe, 
which did not correspond to the Shariah requirements. Moreover, the seizure of 
$8 billion in Iranian assets in 1979 by the United States, and subsequent similar 
threats strengthened the demand for strong Shariah compliant financial system in 
the Muslim world. Within this context, the first International conference on 
Islamic economics took place in Mecca in 1976 (Zaman, 2008: pp. 27-28). The 
conference provided Muslim economists with the first opportunity in recent 
history to “address themselves to the problems of Islamising economics including 
an effort to elucidate the basic concepts of Islamic economics and deliberating 
upon ways and means of implementing them in the contemporary world” 
(Ahmad, 1980: p. xviii).  
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It is worth noting that some experiments in Islamic finance took place in 
the 1960s, including the establishment of Mit Ghamr Local Savings Bank in 
Egypt in 1963 by Dr. Ahmad Al Najjar, and the Pilgrims Savings Corporation in 
Malaysis during the same year. However, it is actually the establishment of Nasir 
Social Bank in Egypt in 1971 that is considered a milestone in the evolution of 
Islamic finance, as it was the first state-owned, interest-free bank. This was 
followed in 1975 by the establishment of the Dubai Islamic Bank in UAE (Iqbal 
and Mirakhor, 2011). 
This period also witnessed important national steps for the establishment 
of Islamic financial systems. Pakistan (1979), Iran and Sudan (1983) all 
announced the complete Islamization of their financial sector and the abolition of 
the conventional financial system. In other words, they transformed their 
financial sector to adhere to Shariah law by abolishing interest-bearing 
conventional products and substituting them with non-interest-bearing financial 
practices and other Islamic financial products and practices (Henry and Wilson, 
2004: p. 6).  
However, the actual performance of the Islamic finance sector was 
generally disappointing until the second phase (1991 – 2001) (Warde, 2012: p. 81). 
As Warde explains, Islamic finance and banking witnessed a qualitative shift as 
the global economy started to enter the age of globalization. Islamic finance was 
affected by the global trend of deregulation of finance, and practitioners, in 
aiming to design more products and attract more people, started to replicate 
conventional finance. In the early years of the establishment of the sector, the 
paradigm, upon which the sector was based, mainly revolved around the idea of 
abolition of interest and its substitution with the concept of profit and loss 
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sharing. 8  However, with the global shift in International finance towards 
deregulation and globalization, Islamic finance took a more pragmatic shape that 
in many ways replicated the conventional system in a way that looks Islamic in 
form although may not contribute to the goals of Islamic finance. In other words, 
Islamic finance became more concerned with the legal form of the products like 
the prohibition of interest, while giving relatively little attention to the objectives 
of the Shariah law and the socio-economic and moral reasons for the prohibition. 
“This new phase can be defined by its pragmatism, diversity, multi-polarity and 
convergence with conventional finance” (Warde, 2012: p. 81). It also included a 
new form of ijtihad (the source of Shariah that requires modern interpretations) to 
suit the new trend of decentralisation and diversion. This paved the way for 
conventional financial institutions to get involved in the Islamic financial sector, 
as represented in products introduced by HSBC and Citibank and later the 
creation of the Dow Jones Islamic Market Index in the late 1990s (Warde, 2012: 
pp. 80-83). 
However, with the 2001 terrorist attack on New York’s World Trade 
Center and other sites in the United States, the development of Islamic finance 
entered what has been called the post-911 phase (2001-present). The attack subjected 
Islamic finance to intense suspicion of terrorism funding. Surprisingly, though, 
this attack on Islam in general, and on Islamic finance in particular, created a 
counter-effect of greater religiosity that resulted in more demand for Islamic 
finance products. Moreover, the minds behind the sector worked harder on 
mainstreaming and rationalizing it, leading to stronger standardization and 
                                                     
8 In very basic terms, depositors and investors need to share both the profit and loss of the 
investment. Hence, no fixed interest rate can be guaranteed. The actual concept will be explained 
in more details in the coming section about the practices of the sector. 
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international coordination. As a matter of fact, the actual freezing of the assets 
belonging to Saudi and other Arab Muslims for fear of terrorism funding led to 
the movements of much of these assets outside of the US and Europe, mainly to 
Malaysia, which had developed a reputation for strong economic development. 
This asset movement accompanied a shift in the Arab Muslim tourism to 
Malaysia as a substitute to the US and Europe, and both created stronger 
cooperation between the Arab Middle East and Malaysia, a leading country in 
Islamic finance (Warde, 2012: pp. 85-88). 
This cooperation between both regions is an important issue in the 
historical development of Islamic finance practice, due to the differences between 
the Arab and Malaysian model of Islamic finance. The Arab model, as in the 
countries of the Gulf Cooperation Countries GCC, is mainly based on the oil 
revenue and aims for the management of the related wealth. Due to the 
differences between the conditions of the Arab countries, the model is fragmented 
and decentralized. Thus, the way the system evolved clearly depended on the 
decisions and ijtihad of different Shariah Boards in different circumstances. The 
Malaysian model, on the other hand, is development oriented and aims at 
generating finance. This objective was mainly embedded in the political 
circumstances of Malaysia, presented in the policies of Mahatir Mohammed, 
prime minister from 1981-2003, aiming at promoting the Muslim Malay majority. 
Islamic finance thus adopted a modernising and pluralising version of Islam, 
which allowed for a wide range of innovation and industrialising and productive 
growth. Shariah boards were encouraged to test the boundaries of Shariah law, 
leading Malaysia to be central to Islamic finance innovation (Warde, 2012: p.86).  
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The immediate question that arises from the above historical account of 
Islamic finance is regarding the reasons that made fundamental issues like the 
prohibition of interest still an integral part of Islamic finance, while only very 
devout orthodox Christians avoid such practices in the conventional financial 
system. There are a few differences that led to this outcome and are worth bearing 
in mind for the interpretation of the practice. First, the injunctions in the Qur’an 
are outspoken and clear, unlike the more subtle references in both the Old and 
New Testaments (Hassan and Lewis, 2007: p. 66). Second, the Qur’an is a fixed 
point of reference particularly with regards to clear and outspoken commands 
(Hassan and Lewis, 2007: p. 66). Third, Islam in general promotes and favours 
trade, and this is clearly stated in the Qur’an and in most cases directly linked to 
interest. Hence, the alternative in the Qur’an is stated, while in the Christian 
tradition, trade, although not prohibited, is not promoted as an alternative 
economic activity (Hassan and Lewis, 2007: p. 66). Fourth, the prohibition of 
interest in the Qur’an was imposed gradually and, thus, was repeated during 
different economic circumstances. As we shall see in the coming section, it was 
not only prohibited to prevent exploitation of the poor but also to create a more 
just financial and economic system where risk is shared. Hence, the moral 
obligation related to the charge of interest is not limited to specific circumstances. 
Finally, within the Islamic order, are the tools for adaptation. Development and 
rulings within Islam rely on three main principles: local custom (urf), public 
interest (maslaha) and necessity (daroura). According to these principles, and more, 
the Shariah can adapt to cultural and societal progression and evolution without 
the jeopardizing of the Shariah law (Warde, 2012: p. 30). 
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Accordingly, these differences clearly highlight how Islamic finance as a 
site of distributive justice is different, not only from the conventional system, but 
also from other religiously based financial systems. Islamic finance clearly entails 
rules that aim at just distributions. However, what is more distinguishable about 
Islamic finance, is that its practices continue to adhere to these principles due to 
the actual nature of the entire Islamic order, economic system and worldview. 
4.4. The Practice 
 
Now that I have highlighted the philosophical and historical fixed points that are 
crucial sources for interpreting Islamic finance practice, I will focus in this section 
on the actual practices that need to be examined. My primary objective is to 
identify the practices that are relevant to the distribution of wealth, and thus 
demonstrate why these practices should be viewed as a suitable site for the 
development of a theory of distributive justice.  
It is worth noting here that Islamic finance offers financial services and 
products in the same way conventional financial institutions do, yet with different 
rules to guide the transactions, distribution and relationships. Accordingly, 
Islamic finance practices include retail banking services (e.g., current accounts, 
credit cards, deposit and investment accounts, mortgage products, personal loans, 
insurance) and business and corporate financing (e.g., trade finance, project 
finance). However, all products and services need to be designed in accordance 
with the rules of Shariah law. In other words, and referring again to the definition 
of Islamic finance, they need to be conducted in a way, and with the purpose of, 
complying with the tenets of Islamic law or Shariah.  
Chapter IV: Islamic Finance as Site of Distributive Justice 
    
156 
 
4.4.1. Islamic Finance as a ‘Prohibition-Driven Finance’ System: 
  
Islamic financial institutions, as explained by El-Gamal, perform all transactions, 
contracts and operations that are part of conventional finance and banking, but 
according to Shariah. Such prohibitions are imposed in Shariah for ethical 
reasons and to promote socio-economic objectives. In these cases, alternative 
Shariah-compliant practices are designed to conform to Islamic jurisprudence. 
Thus, El-Gamal envisions a picture of both modern conventional finance and 
Islamic jurisprudence as the parents of Islamic finance. (2006: p. 8). Islamic 
jurisprudence here, it could be argued, is infusing ethical and moral practices into 
the modern financial system to achieve the socio-economic objectives articulated 
in and deduced from Shariah law. Consequently, El Gamal considers it a 
‘prohibition-driven’ financial practice (2006: p. 8). Although the prohibition of 
interest is the main characteristic with which Islamic finance practice is 
associated, it is worth noting that the Shariah law also prohibits gambling, 
unnecessary uncertainty and hoarding. These impermissible practices will be 
explained now in detail. 
1. Prohibition of Interest 
Riba is usually translated as interest, yet the actual literal meaning of the Arabic 
word is “excess”. Hence, any excess over the original capital is banned by 
Shariah, even if the parties are in agreement about it. The only excess amount 
permitted in Islam is that linked to the performance of real asset and the risk 
associated with it (profit). This rule of prohibition is ‘absolute and unqualified’ in 
Shariah law (Alchaar et al. 2009: pp. 27-30).   
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There seems to be confusion about the rationale behind the prohibition of 
interest. It is frequently linked to the idea of exploitation of the poor who borrow 
money to meet their needs. This is generally the moral justification used to 
prohibit interest, as was explained earlier, in religiously driven financial practices. 
However, as explained by Chapra (2006), historically, interest was prohibited 
gradually, and the prohibition was emphasised most strongly during the later 
phase of the prophet’s life. During this time, the treasury (baitul mal) was 
responsible for fulfilling the basic needs of the poor, and accordingly, the poor 
were not typically forced to borrow with interest for their subsistence. Contrary to 
some common beliefs, it was the rich and large-scale merchants and traders who 
engaged in interest-based loans at that time. Since the trading conditions during 
these early times allowed them to conduct only few business trips every year, they 
collected large sums of finance for each trip to maximize their trade and profit. 
Consequently, they borrowed loans with high rates of interest. The moral conflict 
that resulted from this practice is that in case of trade loss, merchants were to be 
responsible for all the related consequences. No losses were borne by the 
financiers, as they demanded their money and the large premium regardless of the 
outcome of the business. This dynamic was the sources of the prohibition, and of 
the development of the practice of sharing risk, loss and profit between the 
financiers and borrowers (Chapra, 2006: p. 3).  
Types of Riba 
Although the prohibition of interest is clearly mentioned in the Qur’an (the 
primary source of Shariah) four times, the actual meaning of the term is not 
clarified in the verses. Therefore, scholars have identified two kinds of riba:  
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 Riba Al Naseyah 
This form of riba is the equivalent to the interest paid on loans in the form of 
excess to the principal. Naseyah in this context means to postpone or defer. Thus, 
the form of borrowing that is prohibited here is to borrow at present and to repay 
the loan at a later time with an excess or premium. It is prohibited regardless of 
the amount of the loan, the amount of the premium or how the premium is 
calculated (percentage, fixed amount, etc) (Chapra, 2006: pp. 2-5). 
 Riba Al Fadl 
Riba al Fadl, on the other hand, is the excess resulting from the exchange or sale 
of goods where the value of goods offered by one party is excess to the value of 
goods offered by the other party (Alchaar et al. 2009: pp. 27-30). The prophet 
indicated at least four examples of Riba Al Fadl. According to Chapra, although 
they should not be considered as comprehensive, they provide us with a good 
understanding of the nature of this prohibited practice. 
- Exploitation through unfair means, even if the trade transaction is 
allowed or valid (e.g., cheating a new entrant into the market to 
maximize profit). Extra money earned through exploitation is a 
form of riba.  
- Rewards for making a recommendation in favour of a person. 
Money-motivated recommendation is a form of riba, because it 
might give benefit to someone who is unworthy and deprive 
someone who is more deserving. 
- Barter exchanges can result in riba, for example exchanging the 
same commodity with different quantities based on quality. 
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Therefore, barter is discouraged in Islam, and monetized 
transactions are encouraged instead. It is worth noting that barter 
riba may not seem to be very relevant to contemporary societies, 
but it leads us to the next form, which is a crucial and relevant 
practice. 
- Exchanges in the same commodity should be of same quantity, 
weight and quality, and should be effective and on the spot. This is 
very relevant to contemporary foreign exchange markets, where 
money is exchanged for money (Chapra, 2006: pp. 6-7).  
Overall, it is clear that Islamic finance and related economic exchange 
practices are guided by firm and detailed prohibitions on action. The principles of 
equity, equality and efficiency which underlie these operational principles are 
discussed in detail in the next chapter.  Here, I will look next at some prohibitions 
which are broadly related to finance and exchange, and rest on some of the same 
underlying principles. 
 
2. Prohibition of Maysir (Gambling) and Gharar (Unnecessary 
uncertainty)  
The prohibition of Gambling is explicitly stated in the Qur’an in a number of 
verses such as:  
O you who believe! Wine, gambling, altars and divining 
arrows are filth, made up by Satan. Therefore, refrain from it, 
so that you may be successful. (90) Satan wishes only to plant 
enmity and malice between you through wine and gambling, 
and to prevent you from the remembrance of Allah and from 
Salah. Would you, then, abstain? (91) (Qur’an 5:90-91) 
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Uncertainty, on the other hand, was not explicitly mentioned in the 
Qur’an. The prohibition is only explicit in the Sunnah (the prophet’s account of 
deeds and sayings). There, the prophet condemned unnecessary uncertainty 
according to the following hadeeth: “’The Messenger of God forbade the sale of 
the pebble [believed to be the sale of an object chosen or determined by the 
throwing of a pebble] and the sale of gharar’ or uncertainty (Muslim)” (Vogel, 
2010: p.43). 
In financial terms, gambling and uncertainty exist in cases when the 
liability of one party of a transaction is uncertain or contingent on uncertain 
event; e.g., if the price is unknown, or if the outcome of a transaction is uncertain 
to one of the parties. The ban on uncertainty in this respect is similar to the 
protection of consumers is modern securities laws. The objective of the 
prohibition is to avoid a zero-sum exchange from taking place, which usually 
happens in the case of uncertain outcome (Venardos and Abdul Rashid, 2010: pp. 
150-151). 
In Islamic finance, uncertainty refers to concluding contracts that entail 
absolute risk or uncertainty about the outcome of the contract, the quality and 
specification of the subject matter, or the rights and obligations of the different 
parties of the contract. Other forms of uncertainty are created in the case of 
insufficient relevant information or inaccuracy of the available relevant 
information. Examples of such practices that include uncertainty and gambling 
and are prevented in Islamic finance are speculative trade, short-selling, and 
trading in unidentified items. Further, transactions that involve asymmetric 
information between investors and promoters of the investment are impermissible 
in Islamic finance (Ayub, 2007: p. 75). 
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Experts, however, distinguish between productive speculation and 
excessive and unnecessary risk (Venardos and Abdul Rashid, 2010: p. 118). 
Impermissible risk in this sense is that which leads to practices relying and 
conditioned on uncertain events and circumstances. This clarification is crucial 
especially for the permissibility of stock market practices and transactions. It is 
agreed that risk and unnecessary uncertainty are not present in the stock market 
speculation because ‘each party is clear to the quantity, specification, price, time 
and place of delivery of the object’ (Timm, 2004: p. 20). 
To better clarify the difference between accepted and impermissible 
uncertainties and risk, permissible practices need to fulfil a few conditions: 
- Goods or services are in existence 
- Specifications of the goods and services are known 
- Parties have control to ensure that transactions will take place 
- In case of future transaction agreements, the date must be certain 
(Venardos and Abdul Rashid, 2010: p. 150) 
 
3. Prohibition of Hoarding 
The promotion of spending and the condemnation of misery are fundamental 
factors for the Islamic approach to money and wealth. The word ‘spend’ appears 
53 times in the Qur’an (Alserhan, 2015: p. 31), and the condemnation of misery is 
explicit in several verses, for example: 
Those who withhold in miserliness what Allah has given them 
out of His grace should not take it as good for them. Instead, 
it is bad for them. They shall be forced, on the Doomsday, to 
put on what they withheld, as iron-collars round their necks. 
To Allah belongs the inheritance of the heavens and the earth. 
Allah is All-Aware of what you do. (Qu’ran 3:180) 
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Consequently, the impermissibility of hoarding is clearly connected to the 
prohibition of interest and the obligation of Zakah, or tax on income and wealth, 
discussed below. Money in this context will not generate profit and will decrease 
in value and amount if remained idle. Thus, it will only create profit when used 
for productive investment. Such a system leads to continuous redistribution of 
wealth. It is the practical implementation of the Qur’an verse: “Let it ]money[ not 
just make a circuit of the wealthy among you (59:7)” (Housby, 2011: 19). 
 
The above mentioned prohibitions --interest, gambling, unnecessary 
uncertainty and hoarding-- are of paramount importance in Islamic finance 
practice. First, they are fundamental for any practice to be Shariah compliant. 
Second, these prohibitions combined alter our understanding of the concept of 
money in Islamic finance. Money, within this context, is no more than a medium 
of exchange. It should not, and cannot, raise excess money by being lent out or 
put idle in a bank. Moreover, it represents purchasing power, and Muslims are 
encouraged to use it to purchase goods and services. They are discouraged from 
keeping money idle (Ahmad and Hassan, 2006: pp. 72-74). Third, this 
understanding of the concept of money has a direct impact on wealth distribution. 
Within the Islamic context, there will not be a desire to hoard money, as it does 
not represent any value in itself. Hence, profit will only be created when money is 
used for productive investment (Housby, 2011: p. 19).  Thus, the creation of 
wealth is directly linked to real economic activity, primarily investment and 
commerce. A continuous circulation of wealth through investments that leads to 
the well being of the community as a whole is the aim of the practice (Iqbal and 
Mirakhor, 2011: p. 42).  
Chapter IV: Islamic Finance as Site of Distributive Justice 
    
163 
 
4.4.2. Financing Practices 
 
Islamic finance is distinguished by profit and loss sharing practices according to 
which banks offer their financial services based on risk sharing agreements (Saeed, 
1996: p. 51). I will present these practices in particular detail, as they play a major 
role in changing the relationship among participants of the practice. They create 
special forms of interactions among participants and create interdependence 
among them.  
1. Mudarabah (Silent Partnership) 
Mudarabah is a financing contract between the bank or any investor (Rab Al Mal) 
and a client/entrepreneur (Mudarib) where the former finances the latter to 
conduct a specific transaction or trade. Thus, the financier provides capital, while 
the borrower or client invests time and labour in managing the specific 
transaction (Saeed, 1996: pp. 51-55).  
To clarify, the objective of the Mudarabah is to establish a partnership 
between capital and labour by requiring that the outcome of the venture, either 
profit or loss, is shared between them. If the business or the venture results in 
profit, it will be shared between the investor and the client according to a pre-
agreed proportion. The profit may be shared according to specific percentages or 
ratios, but not according to fixed amounts. The agreement about how to share the 
profit usually depends on issues such as the anticipated profitability, the expertise 
of the client, etc. The rationale behind sharing profit is that it represents a reward 
for risking the capital on the part of the investor, and a reward for the time and 
work (management) of the client (Saeed, 1996: pp. 51-55). 
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On the other hand, in the case of loss, the practice requires the investor to 
bear it alone. On the surface it may seem that the parties are not actually sharing 
the loss. However, the rationale in this context is that each party needs to bear the 
loss according to what each contributed to the venture. The investor who 
provides the capital loses money, while the client who manages the venture will 
bear the loss of not being rewarded for labour (Saeed: pp. 51-55). 
In practice, Mudarabah is used by Islamic banks mainly for short-term 
commercial purposes and, since it is a risk sharing technique, it is not permissible 
for the investor to require money guarantees. However, banks tend to require 
extra guarantees regarding the performance of the client. Such guarantees can be 
provided either by the client or by a third party. Accordingly, if it could be proven 
that the client did not abide by the terms or misused the goods or funds, the client 
rather than the investor would be responsible for the loss (Saeed, 1996: p. 56). 
It is worth noting here that Islamic banks in some cases use Mudarabah 
contracts for collecting funds from depositors. Then, the bank uses the funds to 
finance different Mudarabah contracts with clients. Such a process is called two-
tier Mudarabah. In this structure the bank acts as the Mudarib when it collects the 
funds from depositors, and acts as investor when funding the client/entrepreneurs 
(Alchaar et al. 2009). 
2. Musharakah (Full Partnership) 
Musharakah is considered a practice that can bring capital and labour together 
mainly for socially beneficial production of goods and services. In Musharakah 
the parties enter into a contract as equal partners who agree on the terms and 
conditions without any of them dictating the terms independently. Partners 
Chapter IV: Islamic Finance as Site of Distributive Justice 
    
165 
 
contribute to the capital, yet not necessarily with equal amounts, and the 
management of the venture is shared by all partners, though one partner can be 
delegated to carry out the primary management responsibilities. Moreover, the 
partnership can be terminated by any party at any time by notifying the other 
partners (Saeed, 1996: p. 62).  
Since Musharakah is another form of profit and loss sharing, there are 
regulative rules for sharing the outcome of the venture. Profit is shared according 
to a pre-agreed percentage or proportion (again it is impermissible to share 
according to a fixed amount) yet the shares do not have to match the ratio of the 
contribution in the capital. On the other hand, in the case of loss, the partners 
need to share it in a way that reflects their capital contribution ratios. It is 
impermissible to bear a ratio of the loss that is more or less than the capital ratio. 
The client may, however, be liable for the loss in case of proven misuse or 
mismanagement (Saeed, 1996: p. 62). 
Although Mudarabah and Msharakah are considered the twin pillars of 
Islamic finance practice, they constitute a small percentage of Islamic finance 
practice, and other tools are more frequently used by Islamic banks. According to 
Ariff, if Islamic finance practice was limited to both tools (Mudarabah and 
Musharakah) it would resemble a form of a contemporary merchants or venture 
capital firm (1988: pp. 51-52).  
3. Murabaha (Cost-plus sale) 
Murabaha is a third profit and loss sharing practice that takes the form of a sales 
contract. In Murabaha, the buyer knows the actual price for which the seller 
originally bought the item, and agrees to pay the price plus a premium at a 
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deferred date. This premium can be identified either as an amount or as a 
percentage. So, in practice, the entrepreneur asks the capital owner to buy a 
specific item for an agreed price, and in turn the capital owner sells it back to the 
entrepreneur for that price plus premium. The payment is typically deferred in 
this practice (El-Gamal, 2006: p. 14). 
Thus, Murabaha is regarded as a “synthesised loan” or debt, but four main 
differences from conventional loans make this practice permissible in Islamic 
finance practice (Alchaar et al. 2009): 
- Ownership of the item is transferred from the original owner to the 
bank or seller 
- The deferred payment date can be extended without any increase in 
amount or penalties.  
- If payment is late, a third party or collection agency can recover the 
cost. 
- It is not permissible to state discounts or early payments, but it is 
acceptable for the bank to volunteer to give discounts during the 
term of the contract. 
 
4. Ijara (Rent): 
Ijara is a contract of sale, not of the actual object but of its usufruct, or right of 
usage (El-Gamal, 2006: p. 37). It is a bilateral contract in which the usufruct is 
sold for a period of time for a consideration, typically money. The main 
difference that distinguishes ijara from the conventional leasing contracts is the 
idea of reciprocal risk. In ijara, as explained by Karim, “both parties [lessor and 
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lessee] need to be exposed to reciprocal risk...it [the contract] must permit the 
possibility for reciprocal loss” (2010: pp. 61-62). While the lessee is responsible to 
keep the item in good and leasable shape, the lessor is responsible for 
maintenance and accidental damage (Karim, 2010: p. 62). 
5. Salam and Istisnaa: 
These two practices, although not widely used (El-Gamal, 2006: pp. 81-82) are 
very important for the objective of this research due to their high level of 
practicality and for provision of financial inclusion opportunities to those who are 
less fortunate in their working conditions. They are two exceptions of the rule of 
impermissibility of a sale of a non existing object. 
Through contemporary ijtihad, analogy (qiyas), and preference (istihsan), 
these two practices have been allowed based on the prophet’s approval of a sale 
transaction where the price was paid in full and the objects were well defined yet 
delivered at a later date (El-Gamal, 2006: p. 82). 
Within this context, Salam is a sale transaction where the price is paid in 
full but the object delivered at a later date. This practice, however, is subject to a 
number of preconditions, including the free availability of similar items in the 
market, the specification of the exact quality and quantity without ambiguity, as 
well as the date and place of delivery. It was a practice used especially in 
agriculture in the prophet’s era, and it has been expanded to commerce, pre-
export and working capital finance (Alchaar et al. 2009). 
Istisnaa, on the other hand, is a sales contract that requires the 
manufacturing of the object. To avoid unnecessary uncertainty, the object needs 
to be a fungible asset and defined in detail. Thus, this practice allows for a good 
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deal of negotiation between both parties. Payments can be in a lump sum in 
advance, or in instalments according to the progression and development of the 
project. This practice is common for project financing and pre-export finance 
(Alchaar et al. 2009). 
In sum, the above profit and loss sharing tools illustrate how Islamic 
finance aims to establish a Shariah-compliant practice that avoids interest, 
gambling and uncertainties. In most instances it attempts to create partnership 
between capital and labour and to increase the available financing opportunities 
for entrepreneurs and for those who usually face obstacles in financing their 
projects due to the nature of their work. Consequently, mandates to engage in 
profit and loss sharing in particular have a direct and deep impact on the structure 
of the system, how it operates, the relationships between the different participants, 
and the opportunities and prospects of participants who come from different 
backgrounds. The next section examines the role of Shariah boards in Islamic 
finance practice.  
4.4.3. Regulatory Practices (Shariah Boards and Shariah Units): 
 
To ensure that tools and transactions operating within Islamic financial 
institutions remain Shariah compliant, Shariah boards must be established in 
every institution and usually consist of at least three Islamic jurists or scholars 
that are appointed by the Institution. They are considered independent bodies 
that are internal to the institution and are part of the governance structure of the 
Islamic financial institution. Members of the Shariah boards submit regular 
reports to the institution that include their assessment of the adherence of the 
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products and practices to the Shariah law. According to Grais and Pellegrini, 
their assessment entails five main tasks: 
- Certification of permissible financial instruments through the 
issuance of fatwa (Islamic opinion) 
- Verification of the compliance of transactions with the board’s 
fatwa 
- Calculation of Zakah 
- Purification or disposition of non-Shariah compliant earnings 
- Advice on the institution’s income and expenses distribution (2006: 
p. 17) 
Zakah and compliant earnings are discussed below. 
In addition to the Shariah boards, Shariah internal governance also 
includes Shariah review units. These are either independent from other 
departments of the institutions or are integral of the Internal Audit Control 
Department. Reviewers in this unit work on ensuring the compliance of 
transactions with the decisions of the Shariah Boards (Grais and Pellegrini, 2006: 
pp. 18-19). 
We can note also that, among a number of issues related to the function 
and role of the Shariah boards has been the concern that differences in Boards 
relating to various institutions/banks makes consensus on products and practices 
quite difficult and leaves the sector fragmented. This concern has given rise to 
what Warde calls ‘group ijtihad’, orthe creation of ijtihad and Shariah 
international bodies, and the emergence of international conferences taking up 
Shariah matters in Islamic finance and banking (Warde, 2012: p. 236). 
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The next section offers detail on sharia-compliant insurance and related 
economic and social development practices.  
4.4.4. Economic and Social Development Practices: 
 
1. Takaful (Islamic Insurance) 
Conventional insurance is an impermissible practice by consensus of the scholars 
as it entails the three primary prohibitions of Islamic finance: interest, gambling 
and uncertainty. Insurance contracts are in essence based on the idea of risk 
transfer and the exchange of uncertainty for certainty. They are based on lack of 
transparency as to how the premiums will be distributed between management 
expenses, claims payments and returns. Moreover, the practice also includes a 
clear form of gambling in the form of speculative risk, as insurers are speculating 
to profit from the risk imposed by uncontrollable conditions and events. 
Moreover, conventional insurance is an interest-based practice (Kassim, 2013: pp. 
24-25). Consequently, Takaful was constructed and introduced as an alternative 
practice that is Shariah compliant.  
Takaful operates as an agreement between a number of people to 
guarantee each other in the face of future risks, disasters and misfortunate events. 
Thus, it is based on the idea of mutual cooperation, conditioned by two factors. 
First, it is a voluntary commitment (tabarru). Accordingly, each policyholder is 
volunteering to pay a contribution to the fund to use for assistance to any of the 
participants. Second, it is based on risk sharing and mutual protection (Iqbal, 
2005). Therefore, it avoids impermissible practices by operating two separate sets 
of assets and accounts, one for shareholders and the other for policyholders. Each 
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set of assets retains its own investment risks. The policyholders fund is managed 
by the Takaful provider under the name Takaful Operator. The fund fed by the 
policyholders through their contributions covers the claims. In case of profit, 
meaning a situation where funds cover all claims and an excess remains, the 
profit can be shared by the policyholders or used to lower contributions in the 
future (Asutay, 2012). However, in the case of loss, the shareholders will support 
the fund with interest-free loans until losses are covered and loans are repaid to 
shareholders (Alchaar et al. 2009). 
2. Zakah 
Weber argues that the concept of charity or giving from the rich to the poor is one 
of the many examples of social virtues that were incorporated into religious ethics. 
In early agricultural economies the noble status was measured based on charity 
and generosity as well as the amount of wealth. It is from this idea that the 
concept of taxation was incorporated into religions, -- in Islam as the concept of 
Zakah (Weber, 1963: p. 212).  
It is worth noting, however, that the concept of Zakah in Islamic 
economics is not identical to charity. Charity, illustrated in the wealthy giving to 
the poor out of generosity, is presented in ‘sadaqah’, which is not regulated with 
respect to its amount or time. Therefore, it is different from Zakah, which 
corresponds to the idea of taxes that are payable annually and are fixed according 
to amount of wealth and income. The amount of Zakah is explicitly specified in 
the Qur’an and Sunnah, and the entire practice is regulated in Islamic finance. Al 
Qaradawi, Chairman of the International Union of Muslim Scholars, explains in 
his two volume comprehensive book on Zakah that it refers to “the determined 
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share of wealth prescribed by God to be distributed among deserving categories” 
(Al Qaradawi and Monzir, 2000: p. xxxix). 
As one of the five pillars of Islam9, Zakah is one of the fundamental 
practices of Islamic finance. Although, it is mainly considered a matter of 
personal conduct, especially if the government does not take on the responsibility 
of collecting and distributing Zakah funds, Islamic banks need to create Zakah 
funds and are involved in the collection and distribution of Zakah, as discussed 
below. It is also an integral practice for the achievement of socio-economic 
objectives.  
According to Al Qaradawi and Kahf, Zakah is obligatory on sane adults 
based on the following conditions: 
 Ownership: The taxable items are under the ownership of the Zakah 
payer. Thus, public properties, endowments (awqaf) and non-
accessible items (such as obligatory retirement funds) are not subject 
to Zakah (Al Qaradawi and Kahf, 2000: pp. 55-56). 
 Growth: Taxable items need to be either growing or to be subject to 
growing e.g., money and precious metals (growth through exchange), 
animals, agricultural products. Exceptions are items that are kept for 
personal and family use such as jewellery not kept for saving purposes 
(Al Qaradawi and Kahf, 2000: p. 59).  
 Nisab: It is the minimum amount required for the item to be subject 
to Zakah. Below the nisab, no Zakah is required, and only when 
acquisition exceeds the nisab, is a Zakah due (Al Qaradawi and Kahf, 
                                                     
9 These five pillars are 1. Say shahada to declare Islam. 2. Pray five times a day. 3. Paying 
Zakah. 4.Fast the month of Ramadan. 5. Perform pilgrimage. 
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2000: p. 64).10 Nisab on wealth is the equivalent of 85g value of gold 
(Abdul Rahman, 2007: p. 92). 
 Excess over basic needs: After exceeding the nisab, the Zakah should 
not be collected until the basic needs of the person and his/her 
extended family are met. These needs according to many scholars 
include biological, social and religious needs (Al Qaradawi and Kahf: 
2000: p. 65).  
 Subtraction of debt due: Zakah is calculated after the subtraction of 
any due debts (Al Qaradawi and Kahf, 2000: p. 68). 
 Duration: Once Zakah has been paid for an item, no more Zakah 
needs to be paid until one year has elapsed (Al Qaradawi and Kahf, 
2000: p.71). 
 Amount: Zakah on money needs to be the equivalent of one fortieth 
or 2.5% of the amount. It can be paid in cash or in similarly fungible 
items (animals, crops, etc.) (Al Qaradawi, 2000 and Kahf: p. 125). 
Zakah funds are to be paid to eight identified categories: the poor, the 
needy, workers on the administration of Zakah, those who have recently 
embraced Islam, to liberate slaves, helping people in debt, in the way of Allah 
(activities that please God) and and to the wayfarers. The first two categories (the 
poor and the needy) are the main two recipients of Zakah and they are entitled to 
be paid enough until they meet their basic needs and reach subsistence (Al 
Qaradawi and Kahf, 2000: p. 3-4). Significant for the overall argument of the 
thesis is that Zakah cannot be paid to a person who is capable of working and 
                                                     
10  Based on price of gold in the UK on 31.7.2016 Nisab is almost £2790 
(http://goldprice.org/gold-price-uk.html) 
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earning money but decides not to work (Al Qaradaw and Kahfi, 2000: p. 9), or a 
person who is totally and entirely devoted to worship and does not work (Al 
Qaradawi and Kahf, 2000: p. 10). The socio-economic role of Zakah in the 
distribution of wealth, poverty alleviation and sufficiency will be illustrated in 
detail in the interpretation of Islamic finance practice in the next chapter. 
3. Purification 
It is acknowledged by Islamic financial institutions that adhering to Shariah law 
principles is imperative for the performance and development of the sector. 
Failure to do so will not only result in financial risk but may also lead to a 
complete breaking of trust and confidence of investors and depositors alike. An 
example of such a failure in conformity with Shariah took place by Dubai Islamic 
Bank in 1998 when an official of the bank failed “to conform to the ethical term 
of advancing financing” (Ali, Hussain and Dusuki. 2013: p. 108). This ethical 
failure resulted in a loss of $50 million followed by a run on its deposits of $138 
million (7% of bank’s total deposits) in just one day (Ali, Hussain and Dusuki. 
2013: p. 108). 
To avoid such cases of mistrust and lack of confidence, scholars allowed 
partially non-halal earnings, meaning earnings coming from activities that are 
prohibited in Islam such as gambling, alcohol, interest-bearing transactions, etc. 
to be purified to make sure that the final net profit and earnings are totally 
Shariah compliant (Ali, Hussain and Dusuki. 2013: p. 108). According to the 
purification process, investments can still be made in stocks of companies that 
deal with tolerable (minimal) amount in impermissible transactions such as those 
involving interest, alcohol, etc, under the condition that these earnings will be 
purified. This purification process takes place by giving out to designated charities 
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the same percentage of the income as the percentage of non halal activity. For 
example, if an Islamic bank invests in stocks of a company that accepts 5% 
interest-related income, the bank needs to purify its income of this investment by 
giving out 5% of the dividends payments to designated charities. This process can 
be done either by the manager of the fund or by notifying the investors of the ratio 
necessary for purification (Ariff and Iqbal 2011). 
4.5. Why a Site of Distributive Justice? 
 
Thus far I have presented Islamic finance practice (or as defined earlier, financial 
services that are conducted in a way, and with the purpose of, complying with the 
tenets of Islamic law), the philosophical tenets guiding it and its evolution to the 
present day. Now I want to offer more systematically the reasons why this 
practice should be seen as an appropriate site of distributive justice, by explaining 
the role it plays in guiding the distribution of burden and benefits between 
participants.  
I have explained in earlier chapters how Rawls identified the basic 
structure as a site of justice due to its profound impact on the lives of the 
participants. As a site of justice, the basic structure directly affects the lives of its 
participants, their goals, relationships and character. “The basic structure is the 
primary subject of justice because its effects are so profound and present from the 
start” (Rawls, 1999: p. 7). Islamic finance practice can be seen to have a similarly 
far-reaching impact on its participants’ lives.  
As discussed, Islamic finance practice shapes relationships within a society 
in ways distinct from a conventional financial system and related practices. 
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Unequal access to finance, excessive risk, gambling and lack of transparency, to 
name but a few, are prominent features of the conventional system Such practices 
typically result in more power accruing to wealth owners, and less negotiating 
power for small producers and novice entrepreneurs. Islamic finance practice 
aims to avoid such social and economic inequalities, and accordingly it is 
designed to create a different kind of network of relationships among its 
participants. Adhering to the rules and practices of Islamic finance creates unique 
relationships between capital owners and entrepreneurs. Practices of profit and 
loss sharing, and accordingly risk sharing, are designed to equalize the balance of 
power between participants, allowing for a more equal relationship where capital 
owners are not necessarily in a stronger position to impose their rules. The 
practice also is designed to encourage entrepreneurship, innovation and hard 
work. An entrepreneur who has the skills and talent yet lacks funding does not in 
principle enter the venture in a weaker position than the capital provider, as both 
participants are regarded as partners and are to share the profit, loss and risk of 
the venture. 
The practice also offers financial opportunities to those who are affected 
by the conditions of their work, through salam and istisnaa. Farmers and small 
manufacturers who require finance before they can produce crops or 
manufactured products are to be accommodated within the economy and offered 
opportunities that otherwise would not have been present. This is fundamental 
for how less privileged individuals perceive their prospects for the future 
(Classesnsen and Perotti, 2007: p. 755). According to recent evidence presented 
by Classensen and Perotti, unequal access to finance can hinder entrepreneurial 
activities in the society, while more financial opportunities can improve economic 
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and social levels of equality in the form of better health, education and gender 
equality (2007: 755). Thus, providing more opportunities to less privileged 
participants creates a more egalitarian society where individuals can achieve 
without being hindered by their financial or occupational circumstances.  
Moreover, Islamic finance practices and institutions play a significant role 
in shaping social and distributive circumstances. The practice is fundamentally 
informed by social and distributive objectives, and it vigorously incorporates 
them into Islamic financial institutions through the application of principles such 
as purification, Zakah, etc. Hence, the idea of wealth distribution is integrated in 
the system and the practice aims at achieving it in a fair and just way. The 
practice is also designed to prevent the concentration of wealth in the hands of the 
rich and aims at a better circulation of money in the society, and it achieves this 
through the prohibition of interest and hoarding. It thereby indirectly encourages 
investment and development.  
Furthermore, the practice has a strong impact on the opportunity sets of 
the least advantaged. In a society that promotes social and distributive justice and 
regards it as a due share, a more equal relationship is achieved between the 
different participants. The practice specifies a due share for the poor and needy of 
the wealth of the rich in the principle of Zakah.  Even the poorest and most needy 
are granted their due shares in the economy. Their financial rights are not to be 
jeopardized or considered as a charitable almsgiving but as rights. Accordingly, 
social justice is to be guaranteed through compulsory practices that in their turn 
are to guarantee the distribution of wealth. 
Furthermore, Islamic finance practices have a direct impact or influence 
on the character of the participants. The practice arranges relations among 
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participants by offering more opportunities to less-established producers and 
farmers, empowering entrepreneurs and encouraging entrepreneurial skills, 
encouraging participants to work and avoid being idle. Accordingly, the practice 
appears to instil a work spirit in its participants. It is favouring work, innovation, 
initiative, etc. This in essence is a reflection of the Islamic conception of the 
individual, which I will address in the next chapter alongside a constructive 
interpretation of the practice. 
Overall, Islamic finance is fundamentally structured to shape connections 
and relations in the society in which it operates. It affects the lives of its citizens, 
their structures of opportunity and relations of reciprocity, and ultimately the way 
they perceive their futures and set their own aims and aspirations. Hence, the 
distribution of benefits and burdens within the society is directly linked to the 
operation of Islamic finance practices, making it a clear site of distributive justice. 
4.6. Conclusion 
 
Islamic finance is a value-laden practice that relies in it rules of conduct on the 
teachings as could be found in Shariah law. It is structured according to Islamic 
philosophical axioms which reflect the essence of the Islamic traditions and 
include concepts such as free will, accountability and responsibility of the 
individual, and the individual’s trusteeship over the earth. All these axioms show 
how embedded Islamic finance practices are in moral economy and how integral 
a just distributive system is in this context. Accordingly, they shape how the 
practice is designed and entail within them the meaning and purpose of the 
practice, something I will expand on in the next chapter. 
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In this chapter, I have identified the practices of Islamic finance which 
serve to shape distributions of burdens and benefits within society, thus making it 
appropriate to view Islamic finance as a site of distributive justice.  After 
establishing the longstanding and evolutionary character of the practice, I 
discussed how principles and practices within it shape relationships between the 
participants as well as the distribution of wealth and financial opportunities in a 
society. Islamic finance is laden with social and distributional rules that have 
direct impact on the lives of the individuals and their opportunities to realize their 
own aspirations. Finally, the practice also clearly indicated the rules for 
distribution of burdens and responsibilities. It emphasised the importance of a just 
distribution of burdens between participants, in a way that does not give any 
participant undeserved advantage due to status or wealth. Thus, the practice is 
clearly guided by principles of justice and is a salient site for distributive justice. 
Accordingly, I will present my interpretation of the practice in the next chapter, 
where I will examine the point and purpose of the practice and the viewpoint of 





Chapter V: Interpretation of  
Islamic Finance Practice 
 
 
Theory-the seeing of patterns, showing the 
forest as well as the trees.  
 
--Adrienne Rich (2003: p. 449) 
 
  
Thus far, I have provided an overview of the practice-based constructivist 
approach to justice. As I have shown, a practice-based approach involves three 
steps or elements. First, a practice theorist needs to identify a social practice that 
was established for a certain common purpose and identify the set of rules that 
shape it. Second, the point and purpose of the practice needs to be identified and 
the reasons of the participants to affirm the rules and participate in the practice 
need to be understood and reconstructed. Finally, the practice theorist constructs 
the principles that govern the practice and cohere with the previously identified 
objectives of the practice and reasons of the participants. The constructed 
principles are the result of a general understanding and interpretation of the 
practice that takes into consideration the practice as a whole as well as all the 
parts that constitute it.  
In the previous chapter, I took the first of these steps by establishing that 
Islamic finance serves as site of distributive justice because of its profound impact 
on the lives of the participants. It plays a direct and significant role in shaping 
network of relationships and dependence between its participants. In this chapter 




I will take the second and third steps. First, I will offer an interpretation of 
Islamic finance practice for the purpose of identifying principles of justice that 
govern it.  This is followed by a construction of the principles that appear to 
cohere with all the background data previously identified, i.e. the rules, structure 
and procedure of the practice, its point and purpose and the reasons of the 
participants for taking part in it. Doing this will demonstrate that Islamic finance 
practice is a social practice that is governed by principles of justice that clearly 
reflect the point and purpose of the practice and the reasons participants have for 
taking part in it. 
The chapter is structured as follows. In the first section, I present both 
elements of a comprehensive interpretation of the practice: the point and purpose 
of the practices and the viewpoint of its participants. In the second section, I 
construct principles of distributive justice from the practices of Islamic finance. 
The aim is to offer an interpretation that considers Islamic finance as a whole 
entity that achieves the point and purpose of the practice and takes into account 
the constituent parts that work together towards accomplishing this goal.  
5.1. Requirement of a Comprehensive Interpretation: 
 
As explained in previous chapters, the practice-dependence approach is 
distinguished by the priority it gives to existing social practices as constitutive of 
principles of justice. Rather than developing unconstrained moral principles to 
govern practices, it identifies and focuses on the existing social practices and 
offers the conception of justice that governs them as understood from the 
interpretation of these practices. Thus, this approach starts with the identification 
of a practice, followed by an interpretation of its normative purposes as can be 




understood from the point of view of the participants, and it ends with the 
identification of the principles that regulate “the pursuit of the purpose of the 
specific practice in question” (Banai, Ronzoni and Schemmel, 2011: p. 50). 
In the previous chapters I went through the individuation stage of a 
practice-dependence approach, during which I identified the practices of Islamic 
finance and explained my reasons for considering them salient for interpretation. 
This section will be concerned with the second step: the interpretation. This stage 
involves “an interpretation of the normative purpose of that practice, from the 
point of view of those participating in it” (Banai, Ronzoni and Schemmel, 2011: p. 
50). The importance of this stage is in proving that the rules governing the 
practice are as a matter of fact serving a purpose that the participants value. It 
exemplifies a relational view, in the sense that the participants who take part in 
the practice do so because they understand it as a rule-governed practice. 
 Accordingly, the interpretation presented in this section aims to clarify the 
relationship between the actual practice, the point and purpose of the practice and 
the subjective beliefs of the participants. According to El-Kholi, only an account 
that can take the relationship between these three factors seriously can claim to 
provide the best interpretation possible of the practice (2013: p. 13). 
5.1.1. The point and purpose of Islamic finance  
 
As mentioned, the goal of the interpretive stage is to determine the normative 
purpose of the chosen practice and how it relates to the viewpoint of the 
participants (Banai, Ronzoni and Schemmel, 2011: p. 50) and their subjective 
individual beliefs (El Kholi, 2013b: p. 13). Consequently, to set out an accurate 




interpretive account of a practice, a practice theorist needs to determine the 
purpose of the practice and the goals it intends to achieve. This should be 
accompanied by a reconstruction of the affirmation of the participants to the basic 
rules governing the practice, which answers why participants agree to take part in 
the practice to achieve the determined goal (Sangiovanni, 2008: p. 12).  
Such an interpretive approach to moral theorizing has recently seen 
heightened interest in political philosophy. This is particularly evident in the 
recurrent attempts to attach such an interpretive dimension to Rawls’s account of 
justice as I illustrated in chapter III. James (2005, 2013) refers to Rawls’s 
interpretation of social and political practice as a preliminary step to the original 
position, which again is the hypothetical contract account that Rawls introduces 
to allow rational actors to identify the best principles of justice. This 
interpretation is evident in Rawls’s recognition of the purpose of liberal 
democratic societies and identification of their participants (El Kholi, 2013b: p. 
21). As Sangiovanni explains, Rawls’s justice as fairness is in essence constructed 
from the conception of the individual as free and equal and the conception of the 
society as a fair system of social cooperation, and both conceptions are particular 
to liberal-constitutional democracies (2008: p. 14).    
Similarly, Islamic financial practices are appropriately interpreted within 
an overall understanding of the Islamic tradition. They are practices that are 
based on the teachings of Islam as can be found in both the Qur’an and Sunnah11. 
The basic rules that govern Islamic financial system as a whole are mainly 
derived from what Muslims believe are the words of God and the deeds of their 
                                                     
11 The Sunnah (explained in detail in chapter IV) is the teachings of the prophet either 
through sayings that are written in Ahadeeth or through his deeds that were reported through the 
companions.  




prophet. Consequently, objectives of Islamic finance practices appear to be 
twofold. First, they are to provide individuals with Shariah compliant practices. 
Second, they are to achieve the social and distributive objectives of the Shariah 
law and the Islamic tradition whilst being financially profitable and worthwhile. 
In the rest of this section I will illustrate both objectives, in service of reinforcing 
the point and purpose of Islamic finance. 
Islamic financial practices again are conducted with the purpose of 
complying with the tenets of Islamic law or Shariah (Gait and Worthington, 
2007: p. 1).  Participants of the practice acknowledge the prohibition of interest, 
gambling, hoarding, unnecessary risk and uncertainty in financial transactions as 
stated in Shariah law, and accordingly avoid taking part in conventional financial 
transactions that do not follow the Shariah law and are convinced they ought to 
participate in a different form of financial practices. Islamic financial institutions 
and practices are designed to provide financial products and services to 
individuals wishing to abide by their religious beliefs and to Shariah law (Farook, 
2007: p. 34). They are to provide Muslims with a Shariah compliant alternative to 
a conventional financial system that involves prohibited practices. In essence, this 
is the first and foremost purpose of Islamic financial institutions. 
However, the provision of an alternative financial system that is Shariah 
compliant should not be regarded as the only purpose for the establishment of 
Islamic financial institutions. They are also responsible for the fulfilment of social 
and distributive obligations in accordance with Islamic teachings. Social and 
distributive obligations become ‘fard kifayah’ or a collective rather than an 
individual responsibility (Farook, 2007: p. 34) once the concerned institutions are 
established and capable of fulfilling them (Jaffer, 2004: p. 14).  In other words, the 




obligation of social and distributive justice for the community at large shifts from 
the individual to the relevant and responsible institutions, in this case the relevant 
Islamic financial institutions and practice. Accordingly, Islamic financial 
institutions, through the different financial transactions and practices, have a role 
to play in the allocation of resources and distribution of wealth and are expected 
to promote and facilitate the observance of social and distributive obligations. As 
Farook says:  
IFI (Islamic Financial Institutions) and any other representative 
Islamic institution that is performing a fard kifayah, for that 
matter, have a special duty of social responsibility. This social 
responsibility is an extension of the social responsibility of 
every Muslim, but it is a responsibility that Muslims do not 
have the capacity to perform individually (2007: p. 35). 
 
These distributive obligations are highlighted in most Islamic finance 
literature as the paramount goal of the practices (Legrenzi and Momani, 2011: p. 
81). Islamic banks are expected to take the social consequences of their practices 
very seriously when determining their activities, as they are required to balance 
between their social and ethical objectives on one hand and their economic and 
material targets on the other. Accordingly, all their activities, decisions and 
practices are to serve the community as a whole and to play a role in social 
mutual guarantees in their communities at large (Dusuki and Dar, 2007: p. 396). 
In order to realize these objectives, these institutions need to combine efforts to 
achieve justice and fairness within the community with their efforts to maximize 
financial and economic output. Their ultimate goal is, thus, a balance between 
profit maximization and social considerations.  
It is considered unjust for Islamic banks if they are unable to 
provide sufficient returns to the depositors as well as the 




shareholders who entrusted their money to Islamic banks. 
Likewise, Islamic banks are prohibited from making excessive 
profits at the expense of their customers or the local 
community at large (Dusuki and Dar, 2007: p. 256). 
  
It is the role of the practice to achieve these paramount social and 
distributive roles alongside economic profits that are channelled to the 
participants. Thus, justice in an Islamic context lies in achieving the balance 
between financial profits and social obligations. Financial profits are in fact 
encouraged for distributive reasons. Islamic finance practices aim to provide more 
financial opportunities to participants and sharing the profit allows for a better 
distribution of wealth. This will be explained in depth in the next section on the 
interpretation of the practice. 
What is worth noting here is that the socio-economic objectives that these 
institutions are expected to fulfil on behalf of the Muslim community at large are 
to be achieved through two channels. The first is through channelling resources 
from wealth holders to deficit-producing and consuming units within the society. 
In other words, Islamic financial institutions are to design their practices in a way 
that redistributes money from the wealth holders to the more disadvantaged and 
poorer segments of the society. To this end, practices such as Islamic taxation of 
wealth or ‘Zakah’, and profit and loss sharing contracts are performed. Further, 
these institutions are not only concerned with redistribution but also with 
production and generation of wealth. Practices such as Istisnaa and Salam that 
create partnerships between borrowers and financiers and facilitate access to 
finance to farmers and manufacturers, are designed to achieve these objectives 
(Amin et al., 2011: pp. 23-25). The actual role of these practices in creating a just 
distributive scheme will be discussed in more details in the next section. 




The fulfilment of social duties requires that financial issues that can have 
adverse social impact, such as debt, are dealt with differently in an Islamic 
finance system. To serve the overall purposes of the practice, adverse conditions 
have to be addressed in a way that does not risk violating Islamic norms or edicts 
such as the prohibition of interest, yet which also promote the social and 
distributive role assumed by the institution and the practice. For example, in the 
case of inability to pay back debt, in the conventional financial system, the 
borrower will often get into more debt in an attempt to meet the repayment 
requirements. The lender is not expected to support the borrower and has the 
right to claim repayment of the debt when it is due regardless of the financial 
situation of the borrower. However, in an Islamic financial system, the relation 
between both parties is expected to operate differently, and the resolutions used to 
overcome the hardship experienced by the borrower are different. The lender will 
be expected to either clear the debt and convert it into charity or to extend the 
term of the debt to give the debtor leeway for paying it off (Amin et al., 2011: p. 
24). This is clearly stated in the Qur’an chapter II verse 280: “if the debtor is in a 
difficulty, grant him time till it is easy for him to repay. But if ye remit it by way of charity. 
That is best for you If ye only knew” (Amin et al., 2011: p. 24). 
Crucial for this chapter’s discussion is the fact that socio-economic 
purposes of Islamic financial institutions and practices are naturally embedded. 
They are integrated through Shariah in the entire system, its institutions, tools 
and mechanisms. Islamic finance as a social practice is value laden and as could 
be seen is neither intended for financial benefits only, nor is it solely for the 
provision of products and services that are Shariah compliant. The entire 
institution is intended to serve values and objectives that are beneficial for the 




community at large, while providing both the individual and the society with 
financial returns and increase in productivity. 
For an interpretation to be comprehensive and acceptable as the correct 
interpretation of the practice, it needs to combine between the point and purpose 
of the practice and how the participants actually view the practice. Accordingly, I 
will present the participants viewpoint of Islamic finance next. 
5.1.2. Viewpoint of the participants: 
 
The practice-dependence approach relies on the “accounts of specific social 
practices that are governed by rules and which serve a purpose that their 
participants value” (Banai, Ronzoni, and Schemmel, 2011: p. 51). Accordingly, a 
comprehensive interpretation of the practice needs to explain why participants 
actually choose to take part in the practice and why they arrange their daily lives 
in the way they do in order to participate in it. To this end, “the interpreter 
assumes the point of view of the participants in order to reconstruct what reasons 
they might have for affirming its basic rules, procedures and standards” 
(Sangiovanni, 2008: p. 12).  
James argues that affirmation of the participants to the point and purpose 
of the practice is of profound importance for the stability of the practice. He 
explains that “actual endorsement by the participants will presumably help 
stabilize the practice against shocks and crises” (2013: p. 44). Moreover, the view 
point of the participants and their affirmation of the point and purpose of the 
practice are crucial for evaluating how just or unjust a practice is. “[T]he fact that 
some agents are made worse off by some aspects of the practice is not per se an 




injustice, as long as the practice has a purpose that people can value and this 
purpose is endorsed and upheld by its participants” (Banai, Ronzoni, and 
Schemmel, 2011: p. 51). Thus, it is clear that the viewpoint of the participants and 
their reasons for endorsing the practice are crucial for the interpretation of the 
practice. 
Accordingly, I will provide an account of the participants’ reasons for 
taking part in Islamic finance practice in the rest of this section. Following 
Rawls’s constructivist account, which is based on a conception of the individual 
as free, equal, reasonable and rational, I will start with an explanation of what an 
Islamic conception of the person entails, as this conception influences the 
participants’ viewpoint of the practice.  
a) An Islamic Conception of the Individual 
I explained earlier that the philosophical and foundational axioms that 
govern the Islamic tradition constitute the moral paradigm of the Islamic system. 
Accordingly, I will present an Islamic conception of the individual as can be 
understood from the moral axioms, particularly free will, accountability, 
trusteeship and growth towards perfection (tazkiyah). 
Free will 
From an Islamic perspective, the individual is God’s best creation and is to be 
accorded “status as a moral agent invested with free will and able to make choices 
between good and evil, right and wrong” (Brumberg and Shahata, 2009: p. 145). 
Thus, people have a complete freedom of choice, and it is their responsibility to 
choose between alternatives to pursue the kind of life they wish for themselves 
(Bouhdiba and Dawa  li bi , 1998: p. 48). Their freedom of choice reaches the 




highest level in choosing between belief and non-belief. It is their fundamental 
right to choose, and no individual is to be compelled into adopting a faith she is 
not willing to adopt. This is clearly stated in the chapter II of the Qur’an, verse 
256 ‘Let there be no compulsion in religion: Truth stands out clear from Error’ 
(Bouhdiba and Dawa  li bi , 1998: p. 68). If individuals “do not accept God’s 
message, it is their choice, their responsibility” (Brumberg and Shehata, 2009: p. 
144).  
 According to such an understanding of human freedom, an individual’s 
free will is not, and should not be, restricted, yet it is to be guided by Shariah and 
the moral, ethical and religious considerations of Islam. Since the concept of free 
will in Islam is combined with a guidance of the Shariah teachings, socio-
economic activities performed by the individual are not merely random acts that 
mainly rely on personal altruistic choices. They are also the result of socio-
economic purposes of Shariah by which the individual chooses to abide (Haneef 
and Furqani, 2009: p. 56). 
Consequently, if persons are envisioned as possessing free will, then 
regulating financial and economic activities according to Islamic teachings should 
aim to support the individual’s free choice to abide by Shariah. Individuals in the 
Islamic tradition are free to choose whether to abide by the Islamic rules and 
orders or not. Individuals are, therefore, expected to decide freely to abide by the 
Shariah considerations and accordingly to participate in Islamic finance practices 
instead of conventional financial practices that contradict Islamic teachings.    
 
  




Accountability and Trusteeship 
Alongside the free will of the individual comes responsibility. Individuals are 
responsible for their actions as well as for consequences that result from actions 
they inspire in others (Bouhdiba and Dawa  li bi , 1998: pp. 76-77). Accordingly, “it 
is a cardinal principle of Islam that everyone is accountable for his acts and the 
accountability is individual, both in rituals and in socio-economic contracts” 
(Ayub, 2007: p. 22). This accountability requires the individual to justify actions, 
and to accept responsibility for decisions as well as their results (Iqbal and 
Mirakhor, 2011).  
Free will and accountability are closely related to, and flow  from, the idea 
of trusteeship, that everything is owned by God and the individual is benefitting 
from God’s creation only as a trustee and not as the original owner. With such a 
concept embedded in the Islamic tradition, the individual abides by Shariah 
guidelines as they are imposed by the owner. The relation between God and the 
individual in this sense resembles a contract, and the trustee is to abide by the 
rules stated in the contract. Hence, an individual participates in Islamic finance 
activities in order to follow the rules that were set by the original owner. 
Growth towards perfection  
As God’s trustees on earth, individuals are expected to aspire to reach perfection. 
They are expected to work hard to improve themselves and enhance their status, 
both materially and spiritually. As explained by Asutay, this axiom “directs the 
individual towards self-development, which leads to economic and social 
development…In other words, this principle refers to growing in harmony in 
every aspect of life” (2007: p. 8). Accordingly, growth towards perfection is not 




limited to the individual’s relation with God. Ahmad, for example who is a 
prominent academic in Islamic economics, emphasises the connection between 
growth towards perfection, or tazkiyah, and self purification: “the result of 
tazkiyah is…prosperity in this world and hereafter” (Ahmad,1994: 20, Ul Hasan, 
2010: p. 224). Hence, the individual has a continuous need to grow and prosper. 
This axiom highlights the importance of work in the Islamic tradition. 
Islam puts a particularly strong emphasis on the value of work and willingness of 
individuals to work to support themselves. Work is the accepted path towards the 
acquisition of wealth. The concept of ‘earning’ is mentioned numerous times in 
the Qur’an, indicating the importance of effort and work. It “is the sign of 
humanization of wealth” (Bouhdiba and Dawa  li bi , 1998: p. 263). Accordingly, 
individuals who reach the age of adulthood are obliged to earn a living, and “the 
example of great scholars having pursued two parallel careers, one for gain in the 
form of manual work and the other scientific, without thought of profit, is not 
rare” (Bouhdiba and Dawa  li bi , 1998: p. 220). 
Moreover, work and earning in the Islamic tradition are highly regarded, 
so that they are considered to increase the status of the individual in the eyes of 
God. Bouhdiba and Dawa  li bi have compiled a number of hadeeths that reflect 
this value; 
‘Work and toil, the sweat of one’s brow, strenuousness, 
initiative and enterprise are positive values.’ 
 
‘He who acquires his pittance and does not beg it, God will 
not make him suffer on the day of the Last Judgement’  
 
‘Nothing is as pleasing to God as a man who feeds himself by 
the labour of his hands.’  





‘God hates the man who acts neither for this world nor for the 
next.’  
 
Or again: ‘For a man to load faggots of wood on his back is 
much better for him than to beg from those who give or those 
who refuse.’ (1998:  p. 263) 
 
Consequently, to construe an Islamic conception of the individual from 
the aforementioned axioms, the Islamic individual is viewed as a free and 
responsible trustee who strives towards perfection. To be God’s trustee on earth, 
an individual needs to be free to choose how to live, and accountable for her 
choices. Simultaneously, she needs to be hard working in her attempt to pursue 
perfection and achieve growth. Accordingly, Islamic finance practices are 
designed to serve and cater for this conception of the individual: one who is free, 
accountable, and working hard to achieve tazkiyah, or perfection. The practices 
operate to encourage and promote these qualities. 
b) A Reconstruction of Participants’ Viewpoint 
Before setting out the Islamic conception of the individual I explained that 
understanding the participants’ point of view is an integral part of the 
individuation stage, in which the theorist identifies a practice as a form of social 
cooperation. The articulation of the participants’ viewpoint is fundamental to 
understand their reasons for adopting the practice and participating in it. This 
facilitates the construction of principles that can guide the collective conduct as 
identified (James, 2013b: p. 45). Hence, it is important to illustrate why 
participants take part in Islamic finance practice that aims, as explained earlier, to 
1) provide Shariah compliant financial services to Muslim individuals who seek 
to abide by their religious obligations, and 2) carry out the collective social and 




distributive obligations as specified in Islamic teachings alongside financial 
profitability.  
Humayon Dar, a leading Islamic finance advisor, practitioner and 
academic, explains that once Islamic finance grows to reach a certain proportion 
of the market (according to Dar around 10%) Muslims tend to choose Islamic 
banking even if it is slightly more expensive than conventional financial products. 
Once participants are aware and confident of the authenticity of the Shariah in 
the available products, they do not give much attention to the profitability of the 
activity (2013). In support of this argument, many studies examining the attitude 
of Muslims towards Islamic financial practices reveal religiosity as an important 
factor for selecting Islamic banks. The role of religiosity in choosing to participate 
in Islamic finance practices was evident in countries such as Kuwait and Bahrain 
in Metwally’s (1996) study, in Singapore, where 22.6% of customers chose 
Islamic banking only for religious reasons (Gerrard and Cunningam, 1997), and 
in Klang Valley in Malaysia, where religiosity affected the intentions of the 
participants to undertake Islamic home finance (Loo, 2010). Hence, most studies 
showed a clear positive relation between religiosity and religious obligations and 
the actual level of participation in Islamic finance practices.  
The ‘religiosity’ of Muslim participants in Islamic finance practices can be 
interpreted as an understanding of their free will. Muslims understand that they 
are free to choose between the conventional and Islamic financial systems. This is 
evident in the fact that they only transfer to Islamic financial practices once they 
are confident in their authenticity. According to their perception of trusteeship, 
responsibility and accountability as bestowed on them, they choose to abide to 
the rules of God as the sole owner and participate in a practice that is Shariah 




compliant and that performs the social and distributive obligations on their behalf. 
They are generally aware of the objectives of the practice and affirm them. 
However, it is important to note that Islamic finance is in fact also popular 
among non-Muslims from all faiths. It has been reported that non-Muslim 
customers of HSBC Amanah (HSBC’s Islamic finance window) in Malaysia has 
reached 63%, while non-Muslim customers make up half of the OCBC Al-Amin 
Bank in Malaysia (Venardos, 2012: p. xxii); 66% of Dubai International Financial 
Centre sukuk investments and 92% of Kazanah (Government of Malaysia's 
strategic investment fund) sukuk come from Europe (Al- Amine, 2012: pp. 9-11). 
It should come as no surprise that non-Muslims do not participate in the 
practice for its Shariah compliance; i.e. they are not choosing to participate in 
Islamic finance for Islamic religious reasons, for they have no reason to accept or 
believe the authority of Islamic teachings and sources. In spite of that, they 
understand and accept that Islamic finance practices derive their rules from the 
Islamic teachings, and are to remain compliant to its objectives.  
Accordingly, reasons for non-Muslims to participate in Islamic financial 
practices vary, and their attitude towards it is shaped by different factors such as 
patronage, economic profitability and ethical reasons. Unfortunately, however, 
the literature about their perception of Islamic finance is still limited. Vicary 
Abdullah and Chee argue that Islamic finance provides non-Muslims with viable 
alternatives that entail economically rewarding principles (2010). Non Muslims 
show interest in Islamic home financing schemes as opposed to conventional 
interest bearing mortgages (Thomas, Cox and Kraty, 2005: p. 224), and even non-
Muslim corporations enter the Islamic finance world as they manage to identify 




the benefits they will gain from the equity-based financial products of Islamic 
banks and institutions (Askari, Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2009).  
This should be understood in the same sense as we understand Rawls’s 
overlapping consensus of reasonable doctrines. In societies with political 
pluralism, Rawls explain, justice as fairness becomes reasonable when it wins 
support “by addressing each citizen's reason…within its own framework” (1993: 
p. 143). This idea of appealing to and addressing different comprehensive 
doctrines of justice results in an overlapping consensus consisting “of all the 
reasonable opposing religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines likely to persist 
over generations and to gain a sizable body of adherents in a more or less just 
constitutional regime” (Rawls, 1993: p. 15). Thus, in the context of Islamic 
finance, participants take part and support the practice for reasons relevant to 
their own comprehensive doctrine. As will be explained in the interpretation of 
the practice in the rest of this chapter, Islamic finance is guided by a sufficiency 
constrained luck egalitarian conception of justice. The support the practice 
receives by the participation of non-Muslims is an implicit affirmation of their 
support of this conception of justice the practice aims to achieve12. 
It is clear from the few available studies about non-Muslims’ participation 
in Islamic financial practices, that the socio-economic objectives of the practices 
are appealing to them.  Islamic financial practices and institutions present a more 
socially responsible and ethical alternative to the conventional financial and 
banking system, which comes simultaneously with a change in the non-Muslim’s 
                                                     
12 It is important to note here that Islamic finance practices are voluntary and participants 
take part freely.  Accordingly, since it is not a compulsory practice “participants who disagree 
with the prevailing view about the point of this practice and its governing rules can easily opt out 
of it” (Valentini, 2011: 406). 




attitude towards ethical banking. As Alserhan notes in an analysis of British 
media accounts, Islamic financial practices increasingly are appealing to non-
Muslims as an ethically driven alternative to conventional finance and economic 
practices (2015: p. xii). 
It can be argued, then, that the way Islamic finance practice is structured 
and its socio-economic objectives addresses non-Muslims’ various reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines. The practice’s social and distributive objectives that 
come alongside financial profitability appear to be addressing their moral 
doctrines and their own ideas of justice. Thus, it is assumed that the practice’s 
point and purpose that addresses both social and economic objectives are quite 
appealing to the participants from other faiths.  
Although Islamic finance participants may have different comprehensive 
doctrines, Muslims and non-Muslims, their participation in the practice affirms 
that they reach the same conclusions on the moral suitability of Islamic finance. 
They do reach these conclusions through ethical decisions that relate and 
correspond to their own reasonable religious, philosophical and moral doctrines. 
Both Muslims and non-Muslim participants seem to affirm the objectives of 
Islamic finance practice for moral and ethical reasons. 
Muslim participants take part in it not only as an Islamic Shariah based 
alternative to the conventional financial system, but also as it achieves the 
Shariah social and distributive objectives that shift from the responsibility of the 
individual to the responsibility of the institution (set of Islamic financial 
institutions). Thus, it is clear that their viewpoint affirms the actual point and 
purpose of the practice. Participants expect to fulfil their religious obligations, 




meet their profitability aspirations and contribute towards socio-economic 
development.  
On the other hand, non-Muslim participants affirm the objectives of the 
practice and regard the practice as a financially viable and socially oriented 
alternative to conventional finance. Clearly, these expectations meet the point 
and purpose of the practice as an alternative to the conventional financial system 
that fulfils the collective socio-economic duties within the society. They choose to 
take part in Islamic practices that abide by Islamic teachings to benefit from 
financial profits, whilst acting in a socially responsible way. Thus, although they 
may not share the same Islamic worldview or participate for Islamic religious 
reasons, they still accept the objectives of the practice, whether it be the provision 
of Shariah compliant services, or profitability and social responsibility as 
understood consistent with Islam. Thus, they are attracted by the moral and 
ethical component of Islamic finance, albeit from their own non-Islamic 
perspective, worldview and moral prism.  
We can move now to the construction of principles of distributive justice 
from Islamic finance practices. This will involve extrapolating from the 
understanding of Islamic finance practices presented thus far specific principles 
that dictate how burdens and benefits ought to be distributed. The principles of 
justice that will be derived ultimately depend on the structure, form and purpose 
of the Islamic finance practices.  
 
 




5.2. Principles of Islamic finance distributive justice: 
 
First, to reinforce, Islamic finance practices aim to achieve two purposes. The first 
is to provide participants with a Shariah compliant alternative to conventional 
banking. The second is to provide a profitable and ethical alternative, where the 
latter is understood as fulfilling the society’s collective social and distributive 
obligations. Profitability is understood to be pursued in such a way that balances 
profit and social objectives. These objectives are harmonious with the participants’ 
viewpoint, which prompts them to participate in the practice to fulfil their 
religious as well as social duties on the part of the Muslims, and to engage in a 
profitable yet ethical alternative on the part of non-Muslim participants.  
The practice is designed to govern financial activities in societies in which 
individuals are viewed as equal, free, responsible and hard working. They are 
designed to complement a comprehensive system where individuals can practice 
and appreciate these qualities as well as achieve their distributive and social 
obligations as explained in the previous section. Moreover, Islamic finance places 
the fulfillment of basic needs at the core of the distributive and social obligations 
it intends to achieve. There is a clear duty to provide basic needs for the poor, 
needy, sick, disabled, old, unemployed, etc. Chaudhury, an eminent Islamic 
finance academic reports one important hadeeth of the prophet saying “The 
government is the guardian of anyone who has no other guardian;” and “If 
anyone spent a night in a town and he remained hungry till morning, the promise 
of God’s protection for that town came to an end” (Choudhury, 1999). 
Accordingly, I will argue that Islamic distributive justice is relying on two 
bedrock principles. These are Luck Egalitarianism and Sufficientarianism. That is, 




Islamic distributive justice represents a sufficiency-constrained luck egalitarian 
conception of justice (Casal, 2007: p. 322). In the rest of this chapter, I will 
elaborate on how a sufficiency-constrained Luck Egalitarian principle can be 
understood, and how it is manifest in Islamic finance practice. 
5.2.1. Luck Egalitarianism  
 
Luck egalitarianism has played a major role in debates on equality and 
distributive justice for the past several decades. According to a luck egalitarian 
account, the moral equality of individuals requires each person to be responsible 
for her choices, without being worse off due to any form of poor luck (Tan, 2012: 
p. 88). 
According to the luck egalitarian core intuition, it is unfair if 
some people are worse off or better off than others due to 
factors that lie outside their control, like their social 
background, their natural endowments, or other kinds of 
individual good or bad fortune. It then follows from this 
intuition that a principle of distributive justice demands that 
such factors be equalised (Schemmel, 2008: p. 54)  
 
Two main notions require our special attention; luck and responsibility. 
For luck egalitarians, moral equality requires that no person is to be advantaged 
or disadvantaged due to ‘bad brute luck’, i.e. bad luck befalling through no fault 
of her own, as when someone is injured by being struck randomly by lightning. 
Similarly, a person born with disability in a luck egalitarian system is said to have 
fundamental right not to be disadvantaged due to this disability. However, 
consider the case of someone who develops lung cancer during the course of their 
lifetime. This may simply be considered brute luck if it was a result of genetic 




factors. Yet “if he smoked cigarettes heavily then we may prefer to say that he 
took an unsuccessful gamble” (Dworkin, 2000: pp. 74-75). Accordingly, this 
person should be responsible for the consequences of this gamble. 
A second fundamental aspect of luck egalitarianism is that individuals be 
held responsible for the choices they make. So, for a distributive scheme to be just 
it needs to be luck-insensitive as explained, yet it also needs to be sensitive to 
people’s choices (Tan, 2012: p. 89). According to Vallentyne, “responsibility for 
choice is…the one in which the relevant outcome is simply the occurrence of the 
choice itself” (Vallentyne, 2008: p. 58). Consequently, for luck egalitarianism, 
brute luck is to be defined “as the absence of such responsibility” (Vallentyne, 
2008: p. 58).  
On the other hand, luck egalitarianism is particularly sensitive in 
situations where bad luck can be associated with choice and responsibility. 
Consider the case of a person who chooses to use all her money in making bets. 
The choices she makes turn out to be bad, and she loses all her money. For luck 
egalitarians, it is a case of option luck that Dworkin defines as “how deliberate 
and calculated gambles turn out – whether someone gains or loses through 
accepting an isolated risk he or she should have anticipated and might have 
declined” (2000: p. 73). The key concept at this point is the person’s responsibility 
for taking the risk to gamble. So, “option luck contrasts with "brute luck," and 
together these types of luck exhaust the logical space of how risks fall out” 
(Lippert-Rasmussen, 2001: p. 551).  
Risk is regularly associated with insurance, which is the classic form of 
risk management in debates on welfare and wealth production (Armstrong, 2005: 
p. 452). For example, individuals buy insurance policies to protect properties 




against brute luck such as fire or theft. The premium we pay is the amount we are 
willing to bear as a risk against possible brute luck (Guest, 2013: 192). Through 
buying insurance we use our choice and responsibility to transform brute luck 
into option luck. Dworkin famously implements the same concept in his equality 
of resources theory by suggesting a hypothetical insurance market that “provides 
us with a workable baseline from which to work out a premium” (Guest, 2013: p. 
192). This market allows individuals to take insurance from behind a veil of 
ignorance where they don’t have information about the talents they may possess 
or disabilities which may challenge them in life (Fleurbaey, 2008: p. 172). Crucial 
about the hypothetical insurance market is that 
it restores the link between choice (or, as Dworkin puts it, 
‘option luck’) and the ‘brute luck’…it at least partly brings 
these brute facts under the domain of human agency, by 
linking how we will be compensated for such brute luck with 
the option luck of our purchases of insurance cover” 
(Armstrong, 2005: p. 458). 
 
However, the distinction between brute luck and option luck is not quite 
so simple. In many situations, brute luck affects our free choices, and what might 
appear as option luck could be the result of brute luck. Consider the case of two 
individuals who face the risk of bankruptcy due to the volatility of the financial 
system and are offered opportunities to ensure against bankruptcy. The first 
person decides not to buy any insurance, while the second decides to take a policy. 
If the former faces bankruptcy due to a financial crisis that is of no fault of her 
own, would her being worse off considered brute or option luck?  
In the first instance it would seem like it is the case of option luck, as the 
person chose freely not to buy insurance. The answer to this question, however, is 




more complex than it appears. What if the person decided not to buy insurance 
because she could not afford to pay for it? In this case we start to realize a 
connection between brute luck and option luck. “Because it is unequal brute luck 
that narrows the range of options available to her, it would be inconsistent with 
the luck egalitarian approach to regard her “choice” not to insure as a matter of 
option luck and to deny assistance if she faces disastrous outcomes as a result of 
being uninsured” (Voigt, 2007: p. 396). 
Moreover, insurance in itself is an individual choice that entails risk. 
Individuals’ perception of risk complicates the relation between risk, option luck 
and responsibility further. In many instances this perception is flawed due to 
insufficient information, thinking incompetency with regards to probabilities 
calculation, etc. (Fleurbaey, 2008: p. 157). Many of these reasons for flawed 
misconceptions of risk are due to brute luck, and accordingly make the distinction 
between luck and choice difficult. Even so, the choice/luck distinction remains 
central to luck egalitarianism. To avoid brute luck from disadvantaging persons, 
luck egalitarians aim to either “counter the effects of luck on persons' opportunity 
for well-being (Arneson and, in a qualified way, Cohen)” or “mitigate the effects 
of luck on the social distribution of goods and resources among persons 
(Dworkin)” (Tan, 2008: p. 665).  
 
Luck Egalitarianism in Islamic Finance  
The distinction between luck and choice is in fact quite evident in the 
understanding of the Islamic conception of the individual, as well as in the 
established Islamic finance practice. Again, being held accountable for one’s 




action is a fundamental aspect of the Islamic moral  context.. A person is free to 
choose and accordingly is accountable for the consequences of his or her choices. 
An individual is free and accountable even when it comes to choosing which faith 
to adopt or whether or not to abide to the rules of Shariah. The individual is to be 
guided by the rules and boundaries set in Sharia, such as the prohibition of 
interest, gambling and uncertainty, yet each person is free to choose which 
economic actions to take, and is accordingly responsible for the consequences and 
accountable in front of God (and law) for these actions. Thus, Islamic axioms 
indicate the individual’s right to choose, responsibility of choice consequences, 
and accountability for choices and action. “Personal responsibility is the 
cornerstone of such accountability” (Ariff and Iqbal, 2011: p. 39). 
A luck egalitarian element is also evident in the importance the Islamic 
tradition imposes on work and growth towards perfection. Islam considers 
individuals to be self-motivated and genuinely interested in realizing their full 
potential. In other words, an individual deciding to participate in Islamic finance 
practices is willing to become an active member of the system and can neither be 
idle nor passive. Thus, participants are not to keep their money idle or become 
themselves physically idle by not working. This idea is crucial for the 
interpretation of some practices of Islamic finance and how they fit together 
within a sufficiency-constrained luck egalitarian conception. 
Accordingly, I argue that Islamic finance practice is luck egalitarian in 
character, especially as concern its practices of 1) mitigation and financial 
inclusion, 2) risk management,  and 3) partnership contracts. 
 




1. Mitigation and Financial Inclusion 
Mitigation in Islamic finance practice is concerned with the right of individuals to 
be compensated for social and natural circumstances that may have adverse 
impact on their lives. It works to check the impact of brute luck and adverse 
social and natural circumstances that disadvantage individuals. This is attained 
through financial inclusion and access to finance, i.e. the provision of financial 
services to the disadvantaged at affordable costs without discrimination based on 
their disadvantaged financial position. It aims to provide equal financial 
opportunities to the disadvantaged. The primary goal of this form of access to 
finance is reducing the levels of poverty and inequality.  
Access to finance as a way of mitigating bad brute luck is achieved 
through two measures: avoidance of collateral finance, and imposition of 
exceptional practices. First, to achieve mitigation through financial inclusion, 
Islamic finance practices do not rely on collateral finance, which is normally used 
by conventional financial institutions. Collateral finance is an asset-based form of 
financing small and medium enterprises. Collateral in this context is a 
requirement to secure the debt, and in most cases entrepreneurs need to use their 
personal assets as collateral to secure finance. As Mohieldin 13  et al. explain, 
financial inclusion is particularly problematic in the conventional financial sector, 
where the disadvantaged and poor are typically considered  ‘non-bankable’ as 
they do not possess adequate collateral to guarantee access to financing 
opportunities (2012: pp. 179-180). The dilemma with this practice lies in the fact 
                                                     
13 Mahmoud Mohieldin is the World Bank President’s Special Envoy on Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) and Financial Development, and served from 2010-12 as one of the 
Managing Directors of the World Bank Group. 




that debt finance is crucial mostly for small and medium enterprises, rather than 
bigger enterprises that are financially better off. “The pervasive requirement for 
collateral to secure debt finance indicates its fundamental importance in financing 
SMEs, as firms with tangible assets are less likely to be financially constrained” 
(Mac an Bhaird, 2010: p. 39). 
 By contrast, Islamic finance attempts to implement practices that 
guarantee a higher degree of financial inclusion.  
There is a growing realization that… the emphasis should be 
to expand the accessibility to finance and the financial services 
that can play a more positive role in eradicating poverty… 
Enhancing the access to and the equality of basic financial 
services such as availability of credit, mobilization of savings, 
insurance, and risk management can facilitate sustainable 
growth and productivity especially for small and medium 
enterprises (Mohieldin et al., 2012: pp. 179-180).  
 
Accordingly, Islamic finance practices aim to offer opportunities to 
finance without introducing measures that are biased against the less privileged. 
As Volker Nienhaus explains, when it comes to lending and financing projects, 
Islamic finance relies on the business plan and the potential of the entrepreneur. 
Instead of using collateral finance techniques, Islamic finance utilizes objective 
criteria which do not result in further burdens on the entrepreneur. Hence, the 
practice mitigates the effect of bad brute luck through altering the criteria of 
inclusion from collateral to business plan, or the potential profitability of the 
project (LSE-Harvard public lecture on Islamic Finance). 
Salam and Istisnaa are two other Islamic finance practices that are tailored 
to mitigate the effect of brute luck. As explained in the previous chapter, they are 
financial products and practices that promote the inclusion of the non-




entrepreneurial poor, as they are mainly present in agriculture, small 
manufacturing and pre-export finance. Both practices are considered as 
permissible exceptions to the prohibition on the sale of non existing items. Recall 
that in Islamic finance, a major rule of trade is the impermissibility of sale of 
objects that are non-existent. Such a form of sale is classified as a practice of 
uncertainty, because the liability of one party to the transaction is uncertain and 
contingent on uncertain events. Hence, in Salam (a sale transaction where the 
price is paid in full but the object delivered at a later date) and Istisnaa (a sales 
contract that requires the manufacturing of the object) gharar is present in the 
form of risk and uncertainty about the outcome of the contract and the quality 
and specifications of the subject matter.  
Under normal circumstances, the presence of such forms of uncertainty or 
risk is impermissible in Islamic finance practice, but due to the unfavourable 
conditions of some professions, such forms of uncertainty are allowed in order to 
mitigate the brute luck workers in these professions need to endure. In most case, 
individuals working in small agricultural projects or participating in small 
manufacturing contracts do not have excess budget to finance their small projects, 
whether they are farming of small pieces of land or manufacturing of specific 
items. Hence, their brute luck of being poor and belonging to these professions 
means they will need financial assistance before they can deliver their products.  
2. Risk Management Measures 
Brute bad luck may also exist in the form of financial and economic risk. 
Individuals can face two kinds of risk that can economically disadvantage them. 
First are risks resulting from external and economic circumstances of the society, 
which expose the economy to uncertainty and result in economic shocks. This 




can be particularly harmful to poorer individuals, who have fewer resources to 
withstand such shocks. The second kind of risk facing individuals arises from 
personal circumstances such as severe illness, bankruptcy, etc. Such events 
typically have dramatic downward effects on income and consumption (Iqbal and 
Mirakhor, 2013: pp. 186-187).  
To mitigate the effects of bad luck that occur due to exposure to risk, 
Islamic finance entails two levels of risk management. First, Islamic finance 
entails preventive measures through the prohibition of unnecessary risk and 
uncertainty. Second, the practice includes insurance measures based on a fair 
distribution (sharing) of risk between participants.  
Preventive measures in Islamic finance practices aim to minimize the level 
of unnecessary risk, uncertainty and gambling in the financial market as a whole. 
Uncertainty in this context includes any form of hazard that arises due to lack of 
clarity or insufficient information regarding the subject matter of the contract or 
the price of the items.  
Gharar means hazard, chance, stake or risk (khatar). 
Khatar/gharar is found if the liability of any of the parties to a 
contract is uncertain or contingent; delivery of one of the 
exchange items is not in the control of any party or the 
payment from one side is uncertain (Ayub, 2007: p. 58). 
 
Prohibition of excessive risk and uncertainty does not only decrease the 
chances of brute bad luck from affecting individuals, but it also minimises the 
risk-associated cognitive pressure that can affect our decision making. There is 
evidence that the prohibition of risk and uncertainty “reduces the burden on 
human cognitive capacity, particularly in the process of decision making under 
uncertainty” (Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2011: p. 186). As explained by Mani et al., 




albeit within the context of poverty, “the human cognitive system has limited 
capacity. Preoccupations with pressing…concerns leave fewer cognitive resources 
available to guide choice and actions” (2013: p. 980). Accordingly, lifting 
uncertainties regarding the consequences of choices, further develops the idea of 
option luck and a person’s responsibility for the choices made. To be precise, 
Islamic finance practice attempts to put people in a clear mindset before it holds 
them responsible for the choices they make. This would be important in 
addressing the issues noted above with clearly distinguishing between choice and 
luck in certain contexts, as when individuals make choices under duress.  
It is worth noting here, though, that only unnecessary forms of uncertainty 
is prohibited, because it is impossible to fully avoid uncertainty in the financial 
market. Accordingly, Islamic finance offers risk management measures for the 
remaining acceptable level of risk in the form of risk sharing tools and insurance. 
In the conventional financial system, financial institutions transfer the risk to the 
borrower and “internalize the gains of the operations as has happened in the 
global financial crisis 2007-2009” (Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2013: p. 188). The debt 
needs to be repaid with a fixed interest regardless of the outcome of the business.  
By contrast, Islamic finance operates in a way that ensures that the 
remaining level of risk and uncertainty is shared between participants. Sharing of 
profit and loss through partnership contracts decreases the amount of risk to 
which each individual is exposed. Consider the case of a small entrepreneur who 
(due to financial inclusion and accessibility of financial services) is financed by an 
Islamic bank. In the case of profit, the practice mandates that both partners share 
it according to specific percentages or ratios but not fixed amounts. It represents a 
reward for risking the capital on the part of the investor, and as a reward for the 




time and work (management) of the client (Saeed, 1996: pp. 51-55). In the case of 
loss, however, unlike in conventional finance where the entrepreneur will have to 
bear all the loss14, the financier will need to bear part of the risk. The investor 
loses part or all of their money, while the client will bear the loss of not being 
rewarded for their labour.  
Thus, the rationale is that both partners freely decided to enter into the 
business, and thereby they transform the loss of the business into option luck that 
results from their choices over which they are responsible. It is fundamental to 
note here that if the loss of the business is proven to be due to misconduct or 
mismanagement of the entrepreneur, the financier will not be liable to any loss 
(Saeed, 1996: p. 56). This also is a luck egalitarian idea of responsibility over 
one’s actions and choices. Individual choices not only transform brute luck into 
option luck, but also transform the liability associated with option luck.  
A subsequent step to the prevention of excessive risk by prohibition of 
uncertainty is managing the effects of the remaining permissible risk of the 
financial market. This is attained in Islamic finance by providing Islamic 
insurance services in the form of Takaful, as explained in the previous chapter. 
Takaful is a form of insurance that operates as a mutual cooperation tool that 
brings participants together to guarantee each other against risk and natural 
misfortunes. It is another clear example of how a luck egalitarian principle 
appears to be guiding Islamic finance practice. As in conventional insurance, 
participants have the opportunity to insure against brute luck and to transform it 
                                                     
14 Bearing in mind that small entrepreneurs find it very difficult to have access to finance 
opportunities in the first place. 




into option luck. However, Takaful operates differently than mainstream 
insurance, particularly because of the profit and loss sharing contract. 
Takaful is based on profit and loss sharing according to which the risk 
associated with insurance is shared between the stakeholders as well as the banks, 
thereby transforming brute luck into option luck to all participants. In this way, 
the insurance system is not based on profiting from the bad luck of the buyer, but 
rather on cooperation among a number of people who volunteer to share the 
consequences of bad luck that could befall any of them. This results in two 
distinctive outcomes. First, the insurance provider does not profit from the 
decision of the buyer to insure, but rather all parties share the loss or profit of the 
investment of the takaful fund. Second, insurance buyers share the risk, profit and 
loss among them as a reflection of their responsibility for choosing to insure. 
3. Choice and Responsibility 
A third tool that demonstrates how Islamic finance practice is governed by a luck 
egalitarian principle is how responsibility over one’s choices is a fundamental 
feature thereof. As illustrated in the example of insurance, Islamic finance places 
special emphasis on the idea of choice and responsibility, by distinguishing 
between option and brute luck. This is further evident in the profit and loss 
sharing practice where the borrower bears the burden of the loss and the financier 
is rewarded with a percentage interest regardless of the outcome of the business. 
Such a practice does not directly reflect the choices taken by each party and rather 
rewards the financier, for owning money, and puts the burden on the borrower 
alone. Moreover, this practice evidently does not let the disadvantage experienced 
by the borrower be reflected in the outcome of the transaction. In other words, it 
does not let the borrower be disadvantaged because of the initial state of poverty. 




Lack of money in Islamic finance practice is mitigated through putting a part of 
the burden of loss on the financier. It is also safe to say that the financier in this 
respect bears part of the loss as a form of mitigation for the brute good luck of 
money acquisition. In other words, the practice aims to prevent the financier from 
benefitting from option luck. 
Another third example of the centrality of choice and responsibility to 
Islamic finance practice is found in Zakah, or the annual compulsory tax imposed 
on wealth that exceeds the minimum level of subsistence. Zakah’s main recipients 
are described in the Qur’an, and the two main categories are the poor and the 
needy. It is, thus, mainly imposed as a tool for redistribution of wealth and to 
mitigate poverty. However, an exception to the rules of Zakah is the poor person 
who chooses not to work in spite of being capable of doing so. Such a person who 
falls below the subsistence level or becomes incapable of fulfilling her basic needs 
due to her choice will not qualify to receive Zakah money. Thus, it is clear that 
being disadvantaged due to bad choices should not be treated as luck but rather as 
choice. This example clearly highlights the distinction in Islamic finance practices 
between bad brute luck, as in the case of the poor and needy due to unfortunate 
circumstances; and choice, as in the case of those who are poor due to a bad 
choice such as unwillingness to work.  
5.2.2.  Sufficiency and Social Floor  
 
Islamic finance practice, however, is not a classic luck egalitarian system. A 
conception of sufficiency also plays an important role. As Fleubaey explains, 
theories of equal opportunities are challenged for being too harsh by not 




specifying a threshold for the inequalities accepted on the basis of responsibility, 
and “one could argue in favour of guaranteeing everyone a minimum threshold 
of subsistence independently of past responsible decisions that may have caused 
the situation” (2008: p. 153). In the final section of this chapter I will illustrate in 
details how Islamic finance practice is operated by a sufficiency principle 
alongside a luck egalitarian one, but first I will briefly explain sufficientarianism 
followed by an Islamic understanding of the sufficiency principle. 
Sufficiency principles reflect an approach to distributive justice where 
‘having enough’ and not falling beyond a certain threshold are seen as the most 
important factors in deciding on distributive schemes (Casal, 2007: p. 297). 
According to Phillips, instead of asking ‘equality of what’, the sufficiency 
principle questions what is needed for a person to lead a decent life. For the 
sufficiency argument “[A]ll human beings, by virtue simply of their humanity, 
would be regarded as entitled to what is necessary to a decent quality of life, and 
the needs of the poorest would then take priority in the distribution of social 
resources” (1999: p. 60). For Frankfurt, one of the pioneers of the approach:  
Economic equality is not, as such, of particular moral 
importance. With respect to the distribution of economic 
assets, what is important from the point of view of morality is 
not that everyone should have the same but that each should 
have enough. If everyone had enough, it would be of no moral 
consequence whether some had more than others (1987: p. 21) 
 
Accordingly, sufficientarianism consists of a positive and a negative thesis. 
The positive thesis emphasises the importance of helping people to live above a 
specific threshold and free from deprivation. Thus, a just distributive scheme 
needs to target individuals below the threshold to achieve the maximum level of 




sufficiency within the society. The negative thesis refuses to associate any 
importance or relevance to other distributive requirements once sufficiency is 
secured (Casal, 297-298). In many instances it completely neglects the importance 
of other principles of distributive principles such as egalitarian or prioritarian 
conceptions. Hence, once ‘enough’ is secured to all, no priority should be given to 
any distributive principle, and all distributive schemes will be equally good 
regardless of the advantage they produce. An example of this version of 
sufficientarianism is Frankfurts’s threshold set at the level of contentment. 
Frankfurt explains that having enough is relevant to “meeting a standard rather 
than to reaching a limit. To say that a person has enough money means that he is 
content, or that it is reasonable for him to be content, with having no more 
money than he has” (1987: p. 37). Thus, in such an understanding of sufficiency, 
what matters is that all individuals reach the level of contentment regardless of 
how the burdens and benefits are distributed within the society after contentment 
is attained (Shields, 2012: p. 104).  
 
Sufficiency in Islamic Finance 
I will note that the principle found in Islam is in fact not a strictly sufficientarian 
principle. The Islamic understanding of sufficiency relies on the positive thesis 
about the importance of having enough, yet it does not reject the importance of 
equality once sufficiency is achieved. In other words, the Islamic principle 
suggested is rather a hybrid of sufficiency and equality, as discussed below.   
To understand the philosophical ground for the sufficiency principle in 
Islamic finance, it is useful to place poverty within the overall framework of 




Islamic distributive justice. Poverty in Islam is not to be seen as a test from God, 
who created sufficient provision to fulfill all creatures’ basic needs. This idea can 
be deduced from many versus of the Qur’an. For example: 
“There is no moving creature on earth but its sustenance dependeth on 
Allah. He knoweth the time and place of its definite abode and its 
temporary deposit: All is in a clear Record.” (11:6) 
To clarify, according to the trusteeship axiom, God as the sole owner of 
everything has created enough provision for everyone and everything, yet the 
behavior and decisions of people as the trustees of God on earth can create 
poverty. Poverty is not the result of scarcity of resources but the result of people’s 
bad management and misconduct. 
In line with this understanding, Islamic finance practice operates to ensure 
that each person below a certain threshold is entitled to sufficiency and is 
supported to reach the agreed upon level – as long as they are willing to work as 
possible to contribute to their own support. It aims to attain sufficiency through 
redeeming the rights of the less able in the wealth and income of the more 
advantageous of the society. It does not treat the benefits assigned to the poor as a 
form of charity, but rather as rights and due share that are paid by the wealthy as 
a form of obligation.  
It is important to note here that the concepts of sufficiency and needs 
fulfillment are flexible in the Islamic context. This flexibility is evident in how 
diverse the concept of basic needs can be in Islamic terms, as it is mostly 
dependent on the standards prevailing in the society. “Its scope and standard in a 
particular society would have to be spelled out from time to time in accordance 




with the level of economic development reached” (Hasan, 1988: p. 40). 
According to the Qur’an, as well as hadeeth, human basic needs are food, water, 
shelter, health and clothing. The prophet, as mentioned in hadeeth, said 
Whoever ends his day with security at home, splendid health and 
enough food is a person who obtained all that he needs in life.  
 
However, other needs can be added to this basic list according to the 
availability of financial resources and the social conditions of the society.15 This 
according to a fatwa (qualified scholar’s religious opinion) that states that the 
poor are to be given what they need to fulfill their basic needs for a whole year 
since the Zakah is paid annually. To fulfill basic needs the poor are to be paid 
sufficient funds for their food, clothes and shelter and any other necessity 
according to the poor’s condition without extravagance or misery. The poor 
include those who don’t have money or income and no guardian including 
orphans, widows and divorcees, the elderly, the ill and disabled, low income 
people, students, unemployed, families of prisoners, families of lost and hostages 
(Weiss, 2002: p. 21).  
Within this context, every person is entitled to basic needs and if they 
cannot afford any of their basic needs it becomes the duty of the community to 
provide them. According to Ahmad (2010: p. 43), the fulfillment of basic needs 
can be actually considered the most important principle of Islamic distributive 
justice.  
                                                     
15 This is available in a fatwa delivered by the First Symposium of Zakah Contemporary 
Issues, Cairo 25 October 1988( http://zakat.al-islam.com/Loader.aspx?pageid=422 ).  




When interpreted in the light of Islamic finance practice, sufficiency 
appears to be achieved through the role of Zakah. As explained in the previous 
chapter, Zakah, i.e. a mandatory obligation on all Muslim adults to give out 
portions of their holdings (2.5% annually in the case of money) to the needy and 
the poor, is considered the main instrument of “redemption of rights and 
repayment of obligation” (Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2013: p. 188). Four aspects of the 
Zakah practice reflect the importance of sufficiency and needs fulfilment: 
1. Zakah as a pillar of Islam: Zakah is one of the five pillars of Islam or one of 
the cornerstones of Islam, without which Islam will be incomplete.16 This 
illustrates how important it is, and how it constitutes a priority in the 
Islamic tradition. A Muslim’s faith is incomplete if any of the pillars are 
not met. Accordingly, the payment of Zakah is that important so as 
without which the faith is incomplete. 
 
2. Obligation: Zakah is imposed on the wealth of Muslim adults that exceeds 
the sufficiency minimum. Muslims who cannot fulfil their needs or those 
of their families are not obligated to pay Zakah. Thus, sufficiency of basic 
needs of oneself and one’s extended family precedes the payment of Zakah. 
 
3. Recipients: The poor and needy are the main recipients of Zakah to fulfil 
their basic needs. So, the main objective of Zakah is redistribution of 
wealth towards needs fulfilment and sufficiency. 
 
                                                     
16 These five pillars are 1. Say shahada to declare Islam. 2. Pray five times a day (without 
prayer a Muslim is considered an infidel). 3. Paying Zakah. 4.Fast the month of Ramadan. 5. 
Perform pilgrimage.  




4. Applicability: Islamic banks are to pay Zakah on behalf of their investors. 
They, thus, become the collector and distributors of Zakah funds. This 
indicates the importance of Zakah, and how Islamic financial institutions 
play a major role in the distribution of Zakah funds for the investment 
money they are in hold of. 
 Accordingly, Islamic finance practice aims in the first instance at 
achieving sufficiency for all participants, again within the work-willingness 
constraints specified above. It is primarily concerned with helping those 
individuals within the society that fall below the sufficiency threshold to have 
enough and achieve sufficiency. Overall, two characteristics distinguish how 
sufficiency is to operate in Islamic finance: capability and priority. 
As we have seen, central to the sufficiency conception in Islamic finance 
practice is that it differentiates between the capable poor and the non-capable 
poor with regards to the instruments and tools used to provide for them. The non-
capable poor is a category that includes those disadvantaged individuals who are 
faced with natural circumstances and hardships affecting their abilities to achieve 
subsistence and sufficiency. This category includes those with disabilities, the 
elderly, etc. From an Islamic distributive justice perspective, such disadvantaged 
individuals are entitled to assistance to suffice for their average life expectancy, 
and in case of exceeding this age they are entitled to assistance on an annual basis. 
This can be achieved by providing capital investment whose return will suffice for 
them. The administrator of Zakah buys the investment (property, land, assets, 
etc.) in the recipient’s name and prevents them from disposing of it (Al Qaradawi 
and Kahf, 2000: pp. 7-9).  




The capable poor include those individuals who are disadvantaged by 
social and financial hardship  but not by natural circumstances which would 
prevent them from being able to maintain their own subsistence. Within this 
understanding of this category, individuals are to be helped to achieve sufficiency 
and to overcome their hardship according to the requirement of their profession, 
talent, skills or abilities. In other words, there is no lower or upper limit to the 
amount or type of assistance they are entitled to. These individuals are rather 
helped to achieve a sufficient subsistence from their own effort or work. 
Fishermen, for example are to be assisted with tools and training to enhance the 
output of their work. A jeweller will be assisted in a similar way, though the 
assistance necessary could mean a larger financial contribution. The essential 
point is that sufficiency is not an amount that individuals are entitled to, but 
rather financial and professional assistance that brings individuals to the level of 
sufficiency through their own work and according to their own professions, skills 
or talents (El Qaradwi and Kahf, 2011: pp. 10-11). Relevant to this category is 
again the conception of the individual discussed earlier: the individual is expected 
to be keen to work, and earning through one’s work is considered to increase an 
individual’s value. 
Individuals who chose voluntarily not to work are seen as not motivated 
to achieve their full potential (growth towards perfection or tazkiyah), and to 
prefer to be inactive or passive members in the system and not eligible for 
assistance.. Hence, they are not considered as actual participants in the society 
and the practice. Also we can note again that capable individuals who decide to 
be full-time worshippers are not eligible recipients of Zakah (El Qaradawi and 
Kahf, 2011: p. 10). This is in line with the conception of the individual as 




explained in earlier section in this chapter which regards work as a very 
important issue. Even the prophet himself, who was the role model for Muslims 
when it comes to worshipping and rituals, was at the same time a very successful 
merchant and businessman. Moreover, Muslim scholars throughout Islamic 
history used to pursue dual careers; they had a job to earn for their subsistence as 
they pursued religious knowledge (Bouhdiba and Dawa  li bi , 1998: p. 220).  
The second characteristic of the Islamic conception of sufficiency is its 
priority over other conceptions of justice. It is crucial to clarify that sufficiency is 
to function as a choice insensitive principle. In other words, individuals are 
entitled to assistance to achieve sufficiency regardless of the initial reasons for 
their hardship or their fall below the sufficiency threshold. Accordingly, an 
individual who makes bad work-related choices, although within the rules of 
Shariah, and consequently falls below the sufficiency threshold is entitled to 
assistance to achieve sufficiency. Also, students and ‘knowledge seekers’ are 
considered eligible recipients of Zakah funds (Qaradawi 2011: p. 11). Students 
who are not capable of maintaining subsistence while studying are entitled to 
receive Zakah funds until they finish their education, which is to place them in a 
better position for their competition in the market.  
5.2.3. Islamic understanding of a Sufficiency-constrained Luck 
Egalitarian Principle 
 
There is no doubt that the importance attached to the idea of sufficiency is not far 
from the idea of equality of individuals. This idea was previously highlighted by 
Phillips, who argues that the importance of sufficiency and needs fulfillment is 
not so distinct from equality, since needs fulfilment in an egalitarian society 




requires much less than needs fulfillment in a non-egalitarian society (1999: p. 63). 
Accordingly, Islamic distributive justice calls on sufficiency and needs fulfilment 
simultaneously, as it holds choice and responsibility as imperative factors in 
achieving equality. Individuals are entitled to sufficiency while being 
simultaneously responsible for their choices. Therefore, Islamic distributive 
justice relies on a sufficiency principle in addition to luck egalitarianism. 
Sufficiency in the Islamic context is not a standalone principle, but it supports 
luck egalitarianism and operates to prevent it from resulting in severe 
disadvantages due to choice sensitivity. 
In her significant article Why Sufficiency Is Not Enough, Paula Casal 
suggests the reconsideration of the negative thesis of the sufficiency principle “so 
that it merely denies that equality and priority should stand unaccompanied by 
sufficiency” (2007: p. 318). She provides a persuasive account of how sufficiency 
is to supplement equality and priority rather than to be considered as a standalone 
principle to replace them.  One of her aims is to ‘temper’ luck egalitarianism, in 
part to respond to objections about the possible harshness of an approach which 
simply holds individuals to account for their own bad choices, however far that 
may cause them to fall (see Voigt, 2007).  
Although proponents defend luck egalitarianism against the harshness 
objection, what is most relevant to this thesis is that Casal questions whether 
there should be a threshold below which inequalities due to individual choices 
should not be acceptable. In other words, in a society where individuals enjoy 
equal opportunities, individual choices for which they are to be responsible may 
leave some individuals far worse off than others and below the level of having 
enough. She, thus, questions if there should be a limit on the level of 




disadvantage that individuals are to bear due to their responsibility for their 
choices (2007: p. 322). She suggests that, 
Instead of proposing its wholesale rejection, however, it may 
be preferable merely to supplement luck egalitarianism with a 
sufficiency principle that tempers its concern for choice and 
responsibility. We might then favour a form of sufficiency-
constrained luck egalitarianism, which allows that some 
inequalities in outcome may arise justly but denies that 
individuals’ having less than enough is ever justifiable by 
appeal to voluntary choice (2007: p. 322). 
Islamic distributive justice again offers a variant of such an approach. To 
illustrate, let us consider an individual who chooses to finance the business plan 
of an entrepreneur within the Islamic finance practice. According to the luck 
egalitarian principle and the importance associated with responsibility and 
accountability, this financier is free to choose her financial actions, and 
accordingly will either share the profit or will bear part of the loss of the business 
as explained in the partnership practice. However, if the loss takes her below the 
sufficiency level, she is entitled to support that brings her back above the 
threshold, even though it was her free willed financial choices that resulted in her 
falling below the threshold in the first place. Hence, it is clear that choice and 
responsibility are imperative until an individual falls below a certain threshold 
after which sufficiency is the imperative factor for justice. 
What is also worth reinforcing is how the practice is differentiating 
between various examples of the capable poor. The way the practice is 
distinguishing between them makes clear how sufficiency is functioning alongside 
luck egalitarianism. As explained earlier, a poor individual is entitled to 
sufficiency from the resources provided by Zakah. However, the practice is 
clearly taking the choices of each poor individual very seriously. An incapable 
impoverished person, who is deprived of a free choice to overcome poverty, is 




unconditionally entitled to Zakah assistance to maintain sufficiency. On the other 
hand, a capable poor person who is in control of her own decision is rewarded 
according to the decision she makes. If she decides to work to help herself to 
come out of insufficiency and poverty, she is entitled to Zakah, and if she is above 
the threshold she is entitled to exceptional practices that can mitigate the effect of 
her hardship. Unlike in a straight forward luck egalitarianism, she is not held fully 
responsible for the consequences of her bad choices, as long as she demonstrates a 
willingness to work to overcome those consequences. On the other hand, a 
capable poor person who decides not to work and to remain poor is not entitled 
to Zakah fund even when she is below the sufficiency level. This person is 
obviously not a full participant of the practice of Islamic finance. While the 
individual is envisioned as aiming for perfection, and the practice is designed to 
govern a society of individuals that enjoy this quality, a person who decides not 
to work and not to provide for herself does not typically fit in the Islamic 
conception of the individual. Hence, such a case is an exception to the sufficiency 
principle. 
 
It is of remarkable importance to find the characteristics of the Islamic 
conception of distributive justice presented and explained in the western debate 
on distributive justice. This seconds my argument that the interpretation of 
Islamic distributive justice is of salient importance not only to CPT proponents, 
but also to political theorists who are concerned with the notion of distributive 
justice in general. It is clear that in this exercise the debate on distributive justice 
can find insights not only about which principles of justice are to guide Islamic 
finance practice, but also how principles that were debated in the Western context 




were simultaneously operating in non-western traditions. It may be even safe to 
claim that they were operating in Islamic finance practices decades before. 
5.3. Conclusion: 
 
In this chapter, I have worked to reinforce ways in which Islamic finance practice 
can be seen as a site of justice that operates according to principles of justice. It is 
value laden, due to its reliance on Shariah law, which aims to infuse moral and 
ethical considerations and objectives into the practice. Moreover, it is designed 
and established according to the participants’ aims to engage in a profitable and 
ethical Shariah compliant practice. Muslim participants, in this context, are 
envisioned as free and accountable trustees, who work hard to grow towards 
perfection.  
The point and purpose of the practice revolves around two main objectives. 
First, the practice is presented as a Shariah compliant alternative to the 
conventional financial system. In other words, it is providing financial services 
and transactions that abide to the Shariah rules. Accordingly, Muslim 
participants, once confident in the authenticity of the practice, take part as they 
affirm this objective and aim to participate in financial practices that reflect their 
beliefs. The second objective is for the practice to be both profitable and ethical. 
Islamic finance is not only established to provide Shariah compliant products and 
services to practicing Muslims, but it also has socio-economic and distributive 
objectives to fulfil. It is evident that the reliance on the foundational and 
philosophical axioms, as explained in the previous chapter, makes the socio-
economic objectives embedded in the practices. Islamic finance practices serve 




socio-economic goals by merely abiding to the guiding rules and procedures. 
Prohibitions in this context are actually imposed with just distribution as a 
paramount goal. Accordingly, the point and purpose of the practice regards 
distributive justice with high importance.  
Accordingly, the chapter has offered an interpretation that has taken into 
account 1) the point and purpose of the practice, 2) the reasons for the 
participants to endorse the practice, 3) the conception of the individual, and 4) the 
philosophical axioms that shape Islamic understanding of the right course of 
action. The conclusion to be drawn is that the practice is guided by a sufficiency-
constrained luck egalitarian principle of distributive justice. The practice entails 
an egalitarian stance towards the moral equality of people, and takes issues of 
choice and responsibility seriously. Yet, simultaneously, it takes the importance 
of sufficiency also seriously and utilizes it to tamper the responsibility-sensitive 
inequality that is accepted by luck egalitarianism and can leave individuals below 
sufficiency levels. Thus, Islamic distributive justice gives emphasis to sufficiency 
for all participants. It also seeks to mitigate the effect of brute luck on 
disadvantaged individuals. This requires the establishment of a financial market 
that promotes equal opportunity and financial inclusion. This is achieved by 
guaranteeing access to financial services to the less advantaged. 
 This concludes the interpretation of Islamic finance as a practice and 
the development of an Islamic distributive justice approach. In the next chapter, I 
will consider ways in which actual Islamic finance practice often falls short of the 
principles of distributive justice which guide it, and ways in which a systematic 
rendering of those principles can serve to highlight injustices and guide reforms. 
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Chapter VI: Implications 
 
 
All theories are legitimate, no matter.  
What matters is what you do with them. 
--Jorge Luis Borges 
 
This chapter discusses the practical implications of my theory and the evaluative 
and action guiding roles of the principles. In the first section I explicate why 
practice-dependence principles should act as evaluative and action guiding 
principles and should not to be limited to descriptive roles. In the second section I 
illustrate the evaluative and action guiding implications of the sufficiency-
constrained luck egalitarian principle on actual Islamic finance practice. I start by 
highlighting how the current status quo in areas where Islamic finance prevails 
does not fully reflect the sharia-guided aims or desired outcome of the practice. I 
follow this by an assessment of the practice for fulfilment of sufficiency 
obligations, luck insensitivity and mitigation, and I use the principles to inform 
possible reforms of practice.  
6.1. The Role of Practice-dependence Principles 
 
The practical aim of moral theories is to provide us with a ‘decision procedure’ to 
direct our moral reasoning and to help us evaluate what is right or wrong 
(Timmons, 2002: p. 3). They do that by formulating sets of principles that when 
applied ‘conscientiously and intelligently’ can help us arrive to our moral 
judgements (Rawls, 1999: p. 41). These principles are important for us “because 
we need guidance” and because they provide us with a ‘critical perspective’ 




according to which we can make decisions regarding problems (Sangiovanni, 
2013: pp. 4-5). They are, therefore, not to be envisioned as mere normative and 
indirect conception of what justice is or how it ought to be, but they are also to 
serve two practical roles: evaluation and action guidance (North, 2016: p. 15). 
Principles of justice set out the conditions according to which institutions and 
practices can be evaluated as either just or unjust, and they guide our decisions 
with regards to designing and restructuring our institutions and practices.  
The evaluative and action-guiding utility of practice-dependence principles, 
however, is questioned by some, due to their emphasis on existing arrangements 
in their formulation. Some theorists argue that practice-dependence principles of 
justice give too much weight to the status quo and therefore can play only a 
descriptive role. Meckled-Garcia, for example, although a proponent of the 
distinctiveness of the practice-dependence methodology, argues that practice-
dependence principles cannot be justified to participants with reference to any 
moral value, and that 
practice-dependence accounts constrain the content of 
normative principles for regulating certain practices by 
reference to observable facts about those practices… it is a 
sociological interpretive description… whilst moral concepts 
may be used to describe the organising function of the practice, 
the choice of description is not itself evaluative in the sense of 
employing moral principles of the kind that are to be applied 
to regulating the practice (2013: p. 99). 
 
Similar to Meckled-Garcia, most ideal-theory theorists, who believe moral 
principles should be indifferent to existing practice, label practice-dependence 
principles as merely descriptive of the existing arrangements. They believe that 
“constraining the content of justice by whatever social and political arrangements 




we happen to share gives undue normative weight to what is, at best, merely the 
product of arbitrary historical contingency or, at worst, the result of past injustice 
itself” (cf. Sangiovanni, 2008: 1) and conclude that practice-dependence 
principles should remain descriptive of the existing arrangements, practices and 
institutions and are not to serve any other practical roles.  
 
Normative Roles of Practice-dependence Principles 
Practice-dependence theorists answer such criticisms in part by reference to the 
construction of Rawls’s national and international theories of justice from 
‘characterised social practices’ (James, 2013b: p. 45). They argue that practice-
dependent principles are capable of both evaluative and action guidance roles. 
Gledhill, for example, explains that “an adequate conception of justice ought to 
provide a framework that can orientate how we think about, act within and 
reform our social practice”, and accordingly, practice-dependent theories “can 
reinforce, undermine or reform the constitutive features of the practice” (2013: pp. 
66-69). Similarly, Valentini argues that in spite of the heavy reliance on the 
interpretation of existing arrangements, practice-dependence principles are 
capable of criticising, reforming and even abolishing the practice they interpret. 
“In short, this methodology has the virtue of acknowledging the plurality of 
values and practices contained within our moral universe without a-critically 
endorsing the status quo” (2011: p. 405).  
Practice evaluation can take different forms. First and foremost, a theorist 
will want to assess whether the practice functions in accordance with its 
objectives or not. And if it does  whether it is achieving its point and purpose in 




the best way possible or could be more efficient or more just. The evaluation of a 
practice may also extend to asking whether the practice as it stands is justifiable. 
Such an extended evaluation will examine whether or not the practice is 
contributing to a specified good, or set of goods and ask whether it could be 
justified to non-adherents. Such an understanding of the evaluative role of the 
principles emphasises the importance of practice-dependence principles. As 
Sangiovanni explains,  
social interpretation of practices—in which we try to 
understand the point and purpose of a practice by seeking to 
characterise its underlying or motivating value or goodness 
(should it have any) —are central aspects of any political 
theory that aims to evaluate the existing practices from the 
point of view of higher-level values and principles (2015: p. 
18).  
 
Consequently, practice-dependent principles embody the best standard 
against which a practice can be understood and evaluated. In so doing, a principle, 
or set of principles, as well as explaining a practice ‘also performs the first of its 
practical roles because it can function as a moral standard that can be used to 
evaluate political institutions” (North, 2016: p. 16). Accordingly, practice-
dependent principles should not be seen as limited to a purely descriptive role, in 
which they describe arrangements and identify the just way to distribute benefits 
and burdens in the society, but they also serve as moral standards that help us 
assess and evaluate existing practices.  
Further to the evaluative role of the principles, and in spite of the negative 
response of some idealists who argue that a theory of justice is more suited for 
idealized societies and are therefore not capable of guiding actions in a non-ideal 
realm, justice principles are also to play an action guiding role (North, 2016: p. 




10). If a principle can assess and evaluate whether a practice and/or institution is 
just or unjust, then it is capable of assisting us to “decide what to do in matters 
relating to the design of those institutions because those verdicts identify which of 
the actions available to citizens are permissible and impermissible” (North, 2016: 
p. 15). 
Again, since practice-dependent theorizing is the most sensitive to the 
context in which the principles are to operate, it derives principles that are 
capable of informing the practice when they are not in full coherence with their 
objectives. James explains that while practice-dependence theories are indeed 
highly sensitive to the arrangements and the context in which the practice are 
taking place, they “would at least ideally provide some general guidance about 
how to proceed” (2013, p. 45). In other words, as the principles reflect the actual 
point and purpose of the practice, they entail the capacity to provide a 
prescription to correct any unjust aspects of the practice as it is actually 
operationalized within institutions, etc.. They are the best tool to be used to guide 
the practice towards becoming more just and in line with its point and purpose. 
The principles derived from a practice-dependence approach are expected to 
guide the practice when injustices occur and to act “as constraints on those 
practices in which we are already engaged” (Ibsen, 2013: p. 81).  
Accordingly, if the practical roles of principles of justice are to evaluate the 
practice and to guide our decisions in designing and reforming existing 
arrangements, then it is necessary to examine these roles of a sufficiency 
constrained luck egalitarian principle on Islamic finance practice. In the next 
section I will offer an illustration of an ideal sufficiency constrained luck 
egalitarian practice, followed by a reality check of the current situation in Islamic 




regions where Islamic finance practices operate. This will be followed by a 
pragmatic evaluation with regard to sufficiency obligations, luck insensitivity and 
financial inclusion. As practices can include injustices that distance them from 
their original objectives, an assessment of these practices in relation to the moral 
principles is important to pursue. Such an assessment can shed light on those 
parts of the practice that have become unjust and what is required to guide them 
to conformity with their objectives. 
6.2. Implication of a Sufficiency-constrained luck egalitarian 
Principle 
 
In the previous chapter I argued that Islamic finance is regulated by two 
principles: a sufficiency principle and a luck egalitarian principle, with the former 
constraining the latter. If principles of justice are evaluative and action-guiding, as 
well as descriptive, this means that existing Islamic finance practices can be 
assessed according to the standards set by those principles and, where they fall 
short, should be reformed in line with the recommendations of those principles. 
Ultimately, Islamic finance, whatever else it does, must ensure that the 
distribution of wealth is such that a) all have sufficiency within willingness-to-
work constraints, and b) inequalities are the result of choices that individuals 
make, not the brute luck they may suffer.  
Of paramount importance for a scheme of distributive justice operating 
according to a sufficiency-constrained luck egalitarian principle again is to 
achieve sufficiency and needs fulfilment for all. Individuals are entitled to support 
to maintain subsistence above a poverty threshold, and no individual, with the 
exception of those who refuse to work for their own support, is to be left below 




the established or agreed on sufficiency/poverty threshold,. It is a fundamental 
obligation to abolish insufficiency that may result not only from brute luck but 
also from free choices of individuals or option luck.  
After the sufficiency obligation is met, a luck egalitarian principle operates 
to ensure that persons are held accountable for their option luck without being 
disadvantaged due to brute luck. To mitigate the impact of brute luck, 
disadvantaged individuals who suffer from brute financial luck need to be offered 
access to financial opportunities. These financial opportunities need to be 
accessible to individuals who suffer brute luck in a way that allows them to 
participate financially alongside other individuals who are not affected by brute 
luck, without being burdened with financial disadvantages.  
Further, individuals are to be held responsible for their financial choices, 
and this should be enforced throughout the different stages of the financial 
practice. Financially advantaged individuals, such as capital owners and big 
investors, are to be held accountable for their financial choices as much as 
disadvantaged individuals who are being offered financial opportunities to 
mitigate the effect of brute luck. In other words, financial inclusion and financial 
opportunities for the financially disadvantaged need to go hand in hand with 
equal sharing of responsibility that holds every financial party responsible.  
 
A Reality Check: 
While there is some ambiguity associated with sufficiency and its variation 
according to the standards of living in different societies, a failure to achieve 
sufficiency in countries where Islamic finance practices operate is widely evident. 




A reality check of the conditions of justice in the Muslim world shows that the 
execution of Islamic finance practice often does not reflect the intended point and 
purpose of the practice or its guiding principles. Although the sufficiency-
constrained luck egalitarian principle is expected to achieve financial justice in the 
form of extreme poverty alleviation and equality in financial participation 
between persons irrespective of their luck, in reality there is widespread and 
severe poverty in Muslim countries. World Bank reports indicate that 70 million 
of the world’s poor, who live on less than the equivalent of US $2 a day, and 20 
million of the world’s extremely poor, who live on less than $1.25 a day, reside in 
the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region (Mohseni-Cheraghlou, 2013), 
which ironically includes the Gulf countries who are pioneers and leaders of 
Islamic finance. While governments of the Gulf area seem to be very secretive 
about their data, press releases and private estimates in Saudi Arabia for example 
suggest that between 2 and 4 million Saudis live below the national poverty line, 
which is $17 a day (Sullivan, 2013).  
What makes this reality even more startling is that inequality among 
countries of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) has witnessed two 
major surges in 1975 and 2000 that left some countries extremely poor in 
comparison to others (Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, 2012: 2). In fact, 
both years are important in the historical development of Islamic financial 
practices as was explained in chapter IV. The early stages of Islamic finance took 
place beginning in 1971, with the awakening of the Islamic movement and the 
establishment of the Organization of the Islamic Conference. At that time the 
idea of an Islamic finance model was inaugurated (Warde, 2012: pp. 72-82). This 
was followed by 1973 oil crisis that made oil prices rocket and allowed for an 




unprecedented flow of petrodollars into the Muslim world (Saeed, 1996: p. 11; 
Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2011). With such an inflow of money into the Muslim world, 
where Islamic finance was gaining momentum, better conditions and alleviation 
of poverty could have been expected. As for the turn of the millennium, there was 
a strong Islamic awakening accompanied by a high demand of Islamic financial 
products and a flow of Muslims’ money from American and European banks into 
the Muslim banks (Warde, 2012: p. 81). Hence, it seems that widening in 
disparity between Muslim countries worsened as more money flew into the 
Islamic financial sector, contrary to what is expected from the sector and the 
practice. 
It is appropriate to assess Islamic finance within these countries according 
to principles of sufficiency-constrained luck egalitarianism. If Islamic teaching 
takes poverty very seriously, and if Islamic finance practices are expected to take 
sufficiency as a first priority, then these objectives should be reflected in the 
financial status quo. We can ask, are the principles effectively and efficiently 
applied, and if not where can injustices be located and how can the salient 
principles of distributive justice guide actions to reform the practice?  
The answer to the above questions can be found in the evaluative and 
action guiding role of the principles.  Through putting the sufficiency constrained 
luck egalitarian principles in action, we can understand why the practice is not in 
line with its point and purpose and how it can be reformed to better achieve it. I 
will examine in the rest of this section the evaluative and action guiding roles of 
the principles with regards to 1) sufficiency obligations, 2) choice sensitivity and 
luck insensitivity, and 3) mitigation and financial inclusion.  
 




6.2.1. Sufficiency Obligations 
 
The sufficiency principle, which again is the priority principle of Islamic 
distributive justice, is concerned with the idea that every individual should have 
‘enough’. In an Islamic context sufficiency means persons are entitled to basic 
needs. These needs are to be fulfilled to those who fall below the sufficiency 
threshold, except persons who choose not to work to support themselves. In other 
words, below the sufficiency threshold the main concern of justice shifts from 
accountability and responsibility to sufficiency. Thus, Islamic finance practice can 
never be evaluated without giving full attention to sufficiency and whether it is 
maintained. Distributive justice principles are to point out if the practice does not 
achieve sufficiency and explain why not.  
Sufficiency is evidently a primary concern of Islamic finance practice as 
could be seen in the importance of Zakah in the Islamic philosophy. It is a 
practice that is prescribed to avoid the concentration of wealth by the rich and to 
combat poverty by redistribution of wealth from the rich to the poor. Ahmad 
notes that if in many countries, the worst-off 10% of the population have access to 
only 2% of the national income, and through the Zakah funds 2-3% of the 
national income can be redistributed to the poor,  then the redistributive effect 
could double their share (2010: p. 43). Moreover, Zakah contributes to the 
redistribution of wealth by encouraging investment to avoid diminishing capital, 
promoting productivity, economic growth, development and employment by 
exempting means of production from Zakah (Ahmad, 2010: pp. 51-52).   
Thus, with the importance of Zakah in the Islamic philosophy there is no 
wonder that it is an integral part within the Islamic finance practice. As a matter 




of fact, the practice is connected to Zakah funds and charities in several ways 
such as: 
1. Islamic banks allow for a small margin of profits resulting from 
investments made in stocks of companies that deal with tolerable, yet 
minimal, amount in impermissible transactions like interest, alcohol, etc, 
under the condition that these earnings will be purified by giving them out 
to charities. 
2. Penalties imposed on defaulting customers, as in the case of Mudarabah, 
are charged to avoid moral hazard, yet they are paid to charities and are 
not added to the bank’s budget. 
3. Islamic banks pay Zakah on behalf of clients who invest their money with 
them.  
4. There is a recent debate in Islamic finance literature on the possibility of 
Zakah payment by Islamic banks as business entities (Ismail, Tahirin and 
Ahmad, 2013). 
 
1. Evaluation of Zakah in Attaining Sufficiency 
In spite of the importance of Zakah and its expected role in achieving sufficiency, 
a serious drawback in practice is how Islamic financial institutions neglect the 
important role they can play in its collection and distribution. The minimal role 
played by Islamic banks and financial institutions is not due to lack of 
understanding of the philosophical axioms and social requirements of the practice. 
According to a research conducted by Sairally, Islamic finance practitioners have 
theoretical understanding of the sector that is in consistency with social 
responsibility as put forward in the literature of Islamic economics. They 




associate Islamic finance practices with the elimination of interest and financial 
efficiency as well as social and humanitarian objectives. As a matter of fact, they 
identified the socio-economic role attributed to Islamic finance institutions and 
considered it to be as important as the profit related objectives, albeit sometimes 
conflicting (2007: p. 298).  
However, the role they take to promote and achieve sufficiency is not up 
to what is expected. In most cases, where Zakah is integrated within the practice, 
Islamic financial institutions prefer to detach themselves from the actual 
distribution of the fund. They give out purification money, charity and Zakah to 
promote the image of Shariah compliance, yet they do not play any role in the 
distribution of this money or in supporting sufficiency in the society. For example, 
Lehner highlights the study of Haron and Hisham (2005) that assessed the 
socioeconomic performance of Malaysian Banks and revealed that the banks 
lacked a significant role in Zakah contribution (Lehner, 2016: p. 199).  
The minimal role of Islamic banks with regards to Zakah can be seen in 
light of the traditional understanding of Zakah administration in Islam. “It is the 
duty of the government to ensure the efficient administration of Zakah in an 
Islamic state. However, in places where the government is not Islamic, the 
Muslim community bears the burden of establishing functional organizations that 
will be responsible for its administration” (Adamu, Owoyemi and Cusairi, 2016: 
p. 116). Accordingly, the primary distributor of Zakah is the state (Chapra, 19), 
which “is required to guarantee a minimum level of living for those whose own 
earnings fall short of fulfilling their basic needs” (Kahf, 1991: p. 9). Governmental 
Zakah funds are, therefore, established in a few countries and Islamic banks are 
expected to pay Zakah to them. For example in Pakistan Islamic financial 




institutions pay their Zakah to the government that is responsible for the 
collection and distribution thereof (Kuran, 2004: p. 1).  
However, this understanding of the role of the state in the collection and 
distribution of Zakah should not undermine the role Islamic financial institutions 
need to play. Islamic banks and financial institutions, as explained earlier, due to 
their basic nature as a fundamental source for financial inclusion and financial 
opportunity provision, are expected to work with customers who are borderline 
Zakah fund eligible. Islamic practices are designed to mitigate brute luck, and 
Islamic banks are, therefore, continuously offering products, such as salam, 
istosnaa, etc. to disadvantaged individuals. Hence, limiting their role to paying 
Zakah money to the state is resulting in cases of injustices, particularly with 
regards to individual cases that are undetected as entitled to Zakah funds. 
On the other hand, in the absence of Islamic government Zakah funds, 
non-governmental charity agencies such as Islamic aid, Islamic relief, national 
zakat foundations, etc., are established to collect and distribute Zakah (also 
donation and charity). Some cases of collaboration between Islamic banks and 
these institutions are reported. For example, the collaboration between Al Rayan 
Bank (formerly known as Islamic Bank of Britain - IBB) and the National Zakat 
Foundation (NZF). According to Iqbal Nasim, Chief Executive of NZF, 
partnership between both institutions resulted in 
IBB customers have been offered Zakat seminars in branches, 
been given access to Zakat [Zakah] calculation guides and 
offered one-on-one Zakat consultancy services, all supplied by 
NZF. The bank has also facilitated the transfer of Zakat 
payments for customers who want to discharge their 
obligation from their IBB accounts (National Zakat Fund, 
2016). 
 




In spite of the importance of such collaborations between Islamic financial 
institutions and Zakah institutions, the role played is not vigorous enough to 
reflect the importance of Zakah as a pillar of Islam as well as an important 
principles of justice guiding the practice. The next section offers specific 
recommendations. 
2. Recommendations 
If Islamic finance practice is to come across to participants as genuinely and 
authentically Islamic, and is to correct the current separation from the Islamic 
substance, Islamic financial institutions need to take sufficiency obligations very 
seriously and need to be active players in the community’s combat against 
insufficiency. Therefore, for the role of Islamic financial institutions to be more 
coherent with the sufficiency principle, I suggest three important changes in the 
practice. 
First, institutions should conduct a detailed examination of all financing 
cases that entail an assessment of the financial situation of the client and whether 
they are illegible to Zakah fund due to insufficiency. Each case would go through 
a classification process to identify whether they are illegible to Zakah or are to be 
considered for Islamic financial services.  
It may be argued that Islamic financial institutions should be excused from 
such a requirement due to its complexity or administrative burden. However, this 
argument is challenged by Nasim, who explains that “including Zakat as an 
integral part of the industry’s framework requires more of a mental than a 
practical shift” (National Zakat Fund, 2016). Moreover, this specific role in the 
objectives and the obligations of Islamic financial inclusion is fundamental as it 




represents one of the primary requirements of Islamic distributive justice. 
Accordingly, it is recommended that Islamic financial institutions establish 
internal Zakah units to address this important obligation. These new units or 
departments could be a step towards better integration of sufficiency obligations 
within the practice. 
Second, Islamic financial institutions can strengthen their role in 
combating insufficiency through wider and more extensive liaising with Zakah 
institutions. This collaboration can address cases of individuals they identify as 
Zakah eligible, and can include other initiatives towards achieving sufficiency and 
managing Zakah. This argument is supported by Nasim, who explains that 
“engaging in positive partnerships with relevant Zakat institutions is the surest 
and easiest way of snowballing the revival in the adherence to Zakat” (National 
Zakat Fund, 2016).  
Third, Islamic banks can play their role more vigorously by paying 
business Zakah. As Abdul Rahman explains, the obligatory rules of Zakah on 
individuals should also be applied to Islamic banks as functioning businesses 
(2007: p. 92). There is a growing debate about the practicality of this requirement. 
The complexity of the financial activities makes it “difficult to relate the sources 
of funds to the applications of funds and to determine the relationship between 
them” (2007: p. 93). However, the importance of the sufficiency principle in 
guiding the practice places this issue as an important research priority for the 
development of Islamic finance practice.  
 




6.2.2. Luck Insensitivity and Choice Sensitivity 
 
As discussed, in a luck egalitarian context, the moral equality of individuals 
requires all  to be responsible for their choices irrespective of the consequences, 
without being worse off due to any form of involuntary poor luck (Tan, 2012: p. 
88). Thus, there should always be a clear distinction between luck and choice. 
Bad luck befalling a person through no fault of her own is considered ‘brute bad 
luck’, and should, therefore, have no impact on their lives, opportunities, choices, 
etc. On the other hand, they are to be responsible for the consequences of their 
own choices. So, for a distributive system to be just, in a luck egalitarian context, 
it needs to be “choice-sensitive but luck-insensitive” (Tan, 2012: p. 89). 
This distinction is apparent in the most important aspect of Islamic finance 
practice, namely the prohibition of interest. As explained in chapter IV, interest 
was prohibited in Islam both for equity in the case of the poor as well as for 
efficiency in the case of richer merchants who could lose their trade on long 
journeys and fall into debt as a result. However, when considering these 
conditions of prohibiting interest it becomes clear that it has a luck insensitivity 
objective to it. In the case of the poor it ensures luck insensitivity as it saves them 
from being victims of their own brute luck. They are not left as targets for greedy 
lenders who profit from the poor’s brute luck by imposing large interest on the 
loans they offer them. Meanwhile, in the case of the rich merchants who borrow 
money to finance their business trips, the prohibition of interest is also a means to 
ensure luck insensitivity and choice sensitivity. In cases of trade loss, merchants 
were to bear all the loss while the lenders were guaranteed their money as well as 




the premium/interest. Hence, there was no partnership and the risk was not fairly 
shared between both partners. 
In addition to the prohibition of interest, the prohibition of gambling and 
uncertainty also indicates the importance of luck insensitivity and choice 
sensitivity. As explained earlier, the impermissibility of uncertainty is similar to 
protection of consumers in modern securities laws. The objective of its 
prohibition is to avoid a zero-sum exchange from taking place, which usually 
happen in the case of uncertain outcome (Venardo and Abdul Rashid, 2010). This 
highlights that decisions and choices require prior knowledge and information in 
order for the individual to be accountable and responsible for the consequences. 
Moreover, the Islamic account of free will, responsibility and 
accountability is to be achieved in the Islamic finance practice through 
partnership agreements. As explained in previous chapters, such practices were 
originally designed to create a form of partnership between the borrower and the 
financier. According to this partnership, the risk of the business or the transaction 
is shared between both partners. In other words, both partners share the 
consequences of the transaction which reflect the consequence of their choices. 
The borrower is responsible for the choice to take part in the 
transaction/trade/business, and the financier is responsible for the choice to 
finance the project. This way the practice is designed to avoid any disadvantage 
caused by the initial state of poverty from affecting the borrower. Lack of money 
in Islamic finance practice is mitigated through putting a part of the burden of 
loss on the financier.  
The next section assesses some actual practices relating to these luck 
insensitive and choice sensitive dictates of Islamic distributive justice. 




1. Evaluation of Mudarabah in the light of Choice-Luck Distinction 
An important contract that was designed to attain a high level of choice 
sensitivity and brute luck insensitivity is Mudarabah. Again, Mudarabah is one 
form of the profit and loss sharing contracts that are used in Islamic finance. In a 
Mudarabah partnership one partner is solely the capital provider and is not 
allowed to interfere in the management of the investment. On the other hand, the 
other partner is solely responsible for the management and does not provide 
capital (there are also the ‘Mudarabah musharakah’ partnership in which the 
manager can be a partner in the capital). In the case of profit the partners will 
share it according to a previously agreed proportions or ratios. However, if loss is 
incurred, the capital provider will bear all of it.  
In Islamic finance literature this form of partnership, alongside 
musharakah in which all partners share in the invested capital, although not the 
most widely used tools, is considered one of the most just practices that the 
development and progression of Islamic finance should strive to expand. 
According to Khan and Mirakhor, Mudarabah “effectively places human capital 
on par with financial capital” (1994, p. 7). This is in fact a common perception of 
Mudarabah in Islamic finance literature and it is, therefore, regarded as a fairer 
financing technique. “Mudarabah and Misharakah are the two profit-sharing 
arrangements preferred under Islamic law” (Bellalah and Masood, 2013: p. 114). 
The practice is supposedly designed to be luck insensitive and choice 
sensitive. It is introduced and promoted as a tool that allows ultimate partnership 
between capital and entrepreneurial skills. This partnership alters the nature of 
the relationship between borrowers and lenders by requiring both parties to share 
the risk and be responsible for their choices to enter into the venture. Moreover, it 




should provide entrepreneurs who lack financial means with financial 
opportunities, thereby mitigating the effect of suffering brute luck. 
Although the practice is the best initiative to design a financing tool that is 
luck insensitive and choice sensitive, the practice faces a number of criticisms. 
Researchers point to a couple of important faults in Mudarabah, which result in 
its limited use in practice. First, the condition for bearing the loss solely by the 
investor has resulted in a reluctant investment environment. Investors became less 
enthusiastic about investing their capital using this particular financing tool, 
because it shifts all the risk to the investor (Febianto, 2012: p. 74; Greuning and 
Iqbal, 2008: p. 148). While the investor will bear all the loss, the manager, who 
was practically solely managing the business will not bear any loss. Second, 
Mudarabah results in a risk-return framework that stimulates an investment 
environment that associated high levels of return with higher levels of risk (Bacha, 
1997: p. 14). Thus, as risk levels increases, the potential profit increases. Consider 
partner A and B who want to enter into a Mudarabah partnership. A provides the 
capital while B is responsible for the management of the investment. Since both 
partners need to decide on the ratio of profit sharing, and as partner A is the only 
partner to bear the financial loss, partner A will demand a higher ratio as the level 
of risk increases. This is demanded as a compensation for the higher risk partner 
A needs to bear alone. Meanwhile, the managing partner will prefer high risk 
investments as they can increase their profit without having to bear any loss. 
The aforementioned criticism can be better understood when considered 
according to the Islamic distributive justice principles. The actual implementation 
resulted in brute luck having grave effects on the lives of the disadvantaged. First, 
reluctance from the side of the investors reduced financial opportunities and 




financial inclusion. Second, it created a risk-return environment according to 
which investors demand higher ratios of profit with higher levels of risk. Thus, 
the practice allowed for brute luck to disadvantage borrowers, who will have to 
accept higher levels of risk and less percentage of profits. The aspiration to luck 
insensitivity is not realized, as higher levels of risk resulted in higher ratios of 
profit to be channelled away from the disadvantaged and towards the finance 
provider.  
Hence, it may be safe to argue that the practice as it stands may be indeed 
Shariah compliant in form, yet in substance requires significant reform to achieve 
its objectives and to be in line with the principles. The practice as it stands 
requires more attention to be more luck insensitive. 
2. Recommendations for Mudarabah 
Mudarabah as a financing tool has resulted in two main limitations to the 
sufficiency-constrained luck egalitarian principle. First, the condition for the 
investor to solely bear any loss of the business resulted in fewer financial 
opportunities available to mitigate for brute luck. Consequently, more individuals 
continue to suffer due to their bad brute financial luck. Second, the investment 
environment saw conflicting preferences from lenders and borrowers, thereby 
allowing for an unfair distribution of risk and for brute luck to affect the 
entrepreneur’s decisions. Thus, the practice, which in essence is one of the most 
preferred financial tools in Islamic finance does not contribute to the ultimate 
investment environment as desired. It produces higher levels of profits that are 
channelled towards the investors, instead of the borrower who might be suffering 
forms of bad brute financial luck. Thus, instead of being luck insensitive, it can 
make individuals who are subject to brute luck to accept harsher conditions.  




It is clear that a very thin line separates Shariah compliance in form and 
Shariah compliance which is fully sensitive to underlying Islamic distributive 
justice principles. To be able to recommend changes for the practice to be more in 
coherence with the sufficiency-constrained luck egalitarian principle, we need to 
first point out what Mudarabah is intending to achieve and accordingly how to 
better achieve it. In light of a luck egalitarian principle, Mudarabah needs to 
achieve three main objectives, and to achieve them, it needs to address them in a 
different order, as follows:  
First, Mudarabah as a profit and loss sharing tool aims to establish an 
equal relationship between participants that can reflect a high level of sensitivity 
to choice without jeopardizing financial inclusion as a means to mitigate brute 
luck. To accomplish such a challenging task, Mudarabah needs to initially 
operate according to its current conditions. As it currently stands, Mudarabah is 
offering individuals suffering brute luck financial opportunities to allow for their 
financial inclusion. In other words, the practice is mitigating brute luck by 
allowing the borrower to be initially only a manager (not contributing to the fund), 
thus taking into consideration the brute luck of the borrower. However, 
Mudarabah should not continue to operate according to the same conditions over 
a long time, as this results in less availability of financial opportunities due to the 
unequal relationship between participants, which contradicts with its second 
objective. 
Second, Mudarabah needs to ensure a more equal relationship among 
participants to ensure choice sensitivity. To become more choice-sensitive 
Mudarabah needs to change its requirements gradually after the initial brute luck 
is mitigated. In other words, once brute luck is mitigated through financial 




inclusion and financial opportunities, the relationship needs to be equalized to 
allow for higher levels of choice sensitivity. This can be achieved through 
suggestions made by Islamic finance experts, such as Shaikh (2011), who 
suggested the inclusion of the borrower into a more active partnership by 
contributing to the capital. This way, both borrowers and financiers will be 
responsible for their decisions to take part in the business. Both parties will share 
the outcome of the business, whether it is profit or loss, and will accordingly 
share the risk associated with the business. This transformation of the relationship 
between participants will result in the achievement of the final objective of 
Mudarabah. 
Third, by equalizing the relationship between participants, Mudarabah 
ensures a consistent provision of financial opportunities. Financial opportunities 
are the main tool of Islamic finance practice to achieve mitigation and financial 
inclusion. Thus, Mudarabah needs to ensure that the rules guiding it do not deter 
investors thereby decreasing financial opportunities. This is achieved by the 
transformation of the relationship between the participants once initial brute luck 
is mitigated as explained in the previous paragraph. By requiring entrepreneurs to 
become partners in the practice and to share risk, capital providers are reassured 
about the consequences of their business and consequently more financial 
opportunities for financial mitigation are available. This way, borrowers are still 
encouraged to seek finance, as they will not be disadvantaged due to brute luck. 
The relationship between participants will be gradually equalized, and the 
practice will remain choice sensitive, as the borrower becomes a partner and 
shares the risk with the capital provider, and financial opportunities will not 
lessen as lenders will eventually share the risk with the borrower. 





6.2.3. Mitigation through Financial Inclusion  
 
Mitigation in a luck egalitarian society is concerned with the right of individuals 
to be compensated for social and natural circumstances that may have adverse 
impact on their lives. It works on reversing the impact of brute luck and adverse 
social and natural circumstances that disadvantage individuals within the society 
(Tan, 2008). In Islamic finance, mitigation is to be attained through financial 
inclusion and access to finance, i.e. the provision of financial services to the 
disadvantaged at affordable costs without discrimination based on their 
disadvantaged financial position. Accordingly, it aims at creating a financial 
system that provides equal financial opportunities to the disadvantaged. The 
primary goal of this form of access to finance is reducing the levels of poverty and 
inequality through mitigating the effects of the adverse circumstances facing the 
poor and disadvantaged and which prevent them from access to finance. 
As explained in chapters IV and V, practices like Salam and Istisnaa are 
two exceptions in the Islamic finance practice to the impermissibility of a sale of a 
non existing object. The reason for these exceptions is in essence to ensure that 
individuals are not suffering due to brute luck. Farmers and small manufacturers 
and other professions that require longer periods of time to deliver their products 
enjoy exceptions to the conditions of sale in order to mitigate for their brute luck. 
Thus, those disadvantaged individuals are offered finance in spite of their brute 
luck that could have otherwise prevented them from accessing these opportunities. 




As discussed, another central practice that aims at achieving mitigation 
and protection from brute luck is Islamic insurance or Takaful. Takaful functions 
as an agreement between a number of people to guarantee each other in the face 
of future risks, disasters and misfortunate events. It is a voluntary commitment 
and it is based on the risk sharing technique and mutual protection (Iqbal, 2005). 
Again, this practice highlights how mitigation of brute luck is an integral part of 
the Islamic finance practice. Yet mitigation should not be achieved on the 
expense of choice sensitivity. Thus, takaful relies on risk sharing techniques and 
mutual protection where in case of profit, that is the funds cover all claims and an 
excess remains, the profit can be shared by the policyholders or used to lower 
contributions in the future (Asutay, 2012). On the other hand, in the case of loss, 
the shareholders will fuel the fund by interest-free loans until losses are covered 
and loans are repaid to shareholders (Alchaar and Archer et al. 2009). 
1. Evaluation of Murabaha’s Role in Mitigating Brute Luck 
The main practice through which mitigation is to be attained is Murabaha, a debt 
finance transaction. As explained in Chapter IV, it is a sales contract according to 
which the lender buys an agreed product and the buyer, in this case the borrower, 
agrees to buy the item for the original price plus a premium on a deferred date. 
Thus, it is a form of a debt-based finance tool that is commonly used in Islamic 
finance. It is also one of the first tools that was designed is Islamic finance (El 
Gamal, 2006: 14). This cost plus profit sale contract needs to meet the following 
conditions in order to be Shariah compliant: 
- The item bought needs to be in the possession of the lender 




- Permissibility of an extension of the payment date without extra 
costs 
- In case of default a third party can recover the cost 
- In case of early payments discounts are not permissible (Alchaar et 
al, 2009) 
The Murabaha sales contract is quite a popular contract in Islamic finance 
as it presents the practice as a valid alternative to the conventional system. It is, 
therefore, particularly used in personal finances of vehicle and home purchase, 
yet it is also popular for business transactions in import and export. The actual 
scope of Murabaha business contracts as put forward by Bank Albilad, a Saudi 
joint stock company, is to finance the purchase of commodities and goods from 
the local markets, import and export transactions, fix assets such as machines and 
equipment, working capital such as the purchase of feedstock used for production, 
construction and installations materials, real estate and settlement of bank share 
interests (Bankalbilad.com, 2016). 
Although Murabaha is primarily designed to mitigate brute luck through 
financial inclusion, it falls short in achieving this goal in three ways. The first 
injustice that can be pointed out about the Murabaha contract is the charging of a 
premium, particularly in the case of business contracts. It is worth noting that in 
the case of personal contracts, it is the borrower’s decision to pay a premium on 
the price of a commodity, either a vehicle or a home. The borrower does not buy 
these commodities for sufficiency, or else she should seek Zakah funding. Thus, 
beyond the sufficiency threshold the person is taking a decision to buy a 
commodity. In this case the practice would be contributing to the financial 
inclusion of the poorer segments of the society. As a matter of fact Murabaha 




seems to effectively contribute to financial inclusion as it provides a group of 
individuals in the society with the opportunity to own expensive commodities 
through instalments and in return for an ‘affordable’ premium. In this case the 
payment of a premium is a decision that each person is taking and is responsible 
for the outcome thereof. However, in case of business Murabaha contract, if the 
entrepreneur is in a state of sufficiency, yet due to brute luck does not have 
enough funds to start a business or to develop an established one, the practice 
may not be sufficiently contributing to financial mitigation. The borrower may be 
in need to accept the contract with a large premium in order to gain access to 
finance. In such a case, the Murabaha contract is putting the borrower in a bad 
financial position that is mainly resulting from brute luck.  
The second injustice with regard to Murabaha’s contribution to brute luck 
mitigation is evident in imposing charges on defaulting clients. When evaluated 
against the sufficiency-constrained luck egalitarian principle this can be seen to be 
contradictory with the Islamic conception of distributive justice, as it imposes a 
further burden on the borrower who defaults through no fault of her own. In 
other words, imposing such charges allows in many cases for brute luck to affect 
the borrower and for her to suffer accordingly. It is understood that the cause for 
imposing premiums is to avoid moral hazard, yet it may also entail injustice 
towards the disadvantaged who defaults due to brute luck. 
The third form of injustice in Murabaha is present in the lack of profit and 
loss sharing. In the case of Murabaha the risk of profit and loss generated by the 
purchase of the commodity is not shared by both parties. In other words, the bank 
will receive the payments regardless of how the business is operating, and even if 




the client defaults a third party will recover the cost. Thus, the client is indeed 
disadvantaged due to brute luck, which is considered unjust. 
From this brief evaluation of Murabaha in the light of the Islamic 
distributive justice principles, I conclude that the practice is not entirely just, as it 
is highly sensitive to brute luck and in some cases allows for borrowers to suffer 
from bad brute luck.  Although the practice seems Shariah compliant in the sense 
that it does not impose interest, it allows in some cases for brute luck to have 
direct consequences on the financial situation of individuals by imposing 
penalties on defaulting borrowers. Instead of preventing extreme inequality, its 
application may contribute to more forms of injustices. Accordingly, the practice 
is technically Shariah compliant, applying the sufficiency constrained luck 
egalitarian principle sheds light on the injustices that arise from it and how it may 
not be entirely compatible with the objectives of Islamic finance, as well as with 
the overall philosophical axioms that guide it. It may be fair to note, however, 
that the Murabaha business contract is contributing to some extent to financial 
inclusion and financial opportunities by offering those who attempt to improve 
their businesses, and subsequently enhance their financial position, with 
opportunities for finance that they are not capable of on their own. However, it is 
essential to ensure that this financing opportunity does not push borrowers into 
more debt due to an overpriced premium or a penalty to defaulting customers. 
 
2. Recommendations for Murabaha 
Now we can have a closer look at the practice in the light of the sufficiency 
constrained luck egalitarian principle in an attempt to guide it towards more 




mitigation and financial inclusion. First, although Murabaha may appear to open 
channels for financial inclusion and operate as a choice-sensitive tool, the amount 
of the premium needs to be regulated so as not to discourage either borrowers 
from seeking this channel or lenders from entering into the contract. Such an 
adverse impact on the willingness of either parties to participate will result in 
fewer financial opportunities and financial inclusion, and accordingly high 
sensitivity to brute luck.  
Second, in the case of default, there needs to be examination of individual 
cases. There is indeed a moral hazard in not imposing any penalty on defaulting 
borrowers, as it becomes an easy option not to attend to the instalments (Ismail, 
107). However, there is also an evident injustice in imposing penalties on 
borrowers who default through no fault of their own, such as a borrower who 
becomes redundant due to financial crisis, or a borrower who becomes ill and not 
able to meet financial obligations. In such cases the practice is sensitive to brute 
luck and holds participants accountable for harsh consequences that are of no 
fault of their own.  
Thus, there seems to be a need to assess each case of default individually 
in order not to allow individuals to be disadvantaged due to brute luck. Murabaha 
needs to clearly differentiate between borrowers who default due to choice and 
option luck and those who default due to brute luck. Pre-emptive measures need 
to be taken in the former case, yet for the latter there needs to be a preferential 
treatment in place in order to mitigate the effects of brute luck that led them into 
default.  
Similar reformation to Murabaha is also suggested by Ismail, albeit in a 
different context. Ismail assesses the case of a cheating entrepreneur who pretends 




to be defaulting in the case of a commodity price going above the original price 
plus mark up. In such a case the entrepreneur will cheat the bank to terminate the 
contract and benefit from the price difference before price goes down (Ismail, 
2015: 102). Ismail explains that such cases also create moral hazard and “it is 
important to prevent entrepreneur to do such a moral hazard by finding what 
condition that can trigger it to happen, how big the probability is and how Islamic 
bank can discourage it” (Ismail, 2015: 103). Thus, Ismail suggests the 
investigation of the individual cases immediately once an entrepreneur declared 
default to identify the truth behind the claim and if it is a case of moral hazard 
(Ismail, 2015: 103).  
Such consideration of individual cases will guide the practice towards 
becoming more choice sensitive and more attentive to mitigation of brute luck. 
Individualised evaluation of defaulting cases will help identify borrowers who 
default due to choice and not luck and have them bear the consequences of their 
decisions. This is a clear example of luck egalitarian conception of justice, and 




In this chapter I presented the practical implications of my proposed Islamic 
distributive justice theory. I used the sufficiency-constrained luck egalitarian 
principles to assess and to guide three of the most important aspects of Islamic 
finance practice, namely sufficiency obligations, luck insensitivity and choice 
sensitivity and mitigation through financial inclusion. 




In the first section, I discuss the importance of practice-dependence 
principles in practice evaluation and guidance. Practice-dependence principles are 
criticised by some theorists for their emphasis on existing arrangements. 
Opponents of practice-dependence argue that these principles should be limited to 
the descriptive role they provide. However, I argued that practice-dependence 
principles are capable of offering evaluative and action guidance. This is 
particularly so as they are derived from the explanation and interpretation of the 
practice, its objectives and the viewpoint of its participants, and by realising this 
function they are in the best position to serve evaluative and guiding roles. They 
are capable of serving as moral standards that help us assess and evaluate existing 
practices.   
In the second section I discussed the practical implications of the 
sufficiency constrained luck egalitarian principle. I started with a brief account of 
what the principle entails, followed by a quick reality check of the current 
situation in the countries where Islamic finance practice prevail. It became clear 
that the status quo does not reflect the desired and expected outcome of the 
practice, as millions still live in poverty even in very affluent countries such as the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. This dichotomy between the objectives of the practice 
and the practical outcome emphasises the importance of an assessment and 
action guidance of the practice. Thus, I utilised the principle to assess and guide 
the practice with regards to three integral aspects of sufficiency constrained luck 
egalitarianism: sufficiency obligation, luck insensitivity and mitigation. 
I discussed how obligations to ensure sufficiency are a primary concern of 
Islamic distributive justice, and are primarily expected to be achieved through 
Zakah, which is clearly integrated within Islamic finance practice and Islamic 




financial institutions. However, a problem with regards to Zakah is the fact that 
Islamic financial institutions tend to detach themselves from the functions of 
Zakah. Although they give out Zakah on behalf of clients and give out 
purification funds to charity, etc. Islamic banks tend to neglect their role in the 
collection and distribution of Zakah. The principle thus recommends three 
essential changes that Islamic financial institutions need to consider to perform a 
stronger and more rigorous role in needs fulfilment. First, Islamic financial 
institutions are expected to integrate internal Zakah units that can assess 
individual cases that are eligible for Zakah funds. Second, a stronger 
collaboration is needed between Islamic financial institutions and existing non-
governmental initiatives such as Islamic aid and Islamic relief to distribute Zakah. 
Third, Islamic banks and Islamic financial institutions need to be considered as 
profitable business that are required to pay business Zakah.  
This was followed with an assessment of Islamic finance practice with 
regard to luck insensitivity and choice sensitivity, a main aspect of luck 
egalitarianism. Luck insensitivity is evident in the prohibition of riba and 
uncertainty, and it is designed to be achieved in Islamic finance practice through 
partnership agreements. However, when a partnership agreement such as 
Mudarabah is assessed against the principle, it becomes evident that it allows 
brute luck to have adverse effects on disadvantaged individuals. The practice 
creates reluctance among investors and encourages a risk-return environment that 
allows borrowers to suffer due to bad brute luck. Accordingly the practice 
requires changes to allow it to be more luck insensitive. This is recommended by 
prioritizing its objectives to start the practice with conditions that promote 
mitigation and inclusion. Yet in order to avoid reluctance from the lenders and 




thereby a decrease in financial opportunities, the practice needs to alter the 
relationship once brute luck is mitigated to encourage risk sharing among parties. 
 Finally with regards to the mitigation aspect of the principle, it is clear 
that Islamic finance principle attempts to achieve mitigation through a number of 
practices such as salam, istisnaa, takaful and Murabaha. However, when 
assessing Murabaha, which is a debt finance tool in more depth, the assessment 
reveals that the practice is defeating the mitigation objective through imposing 
premiums, charges on defaulting customers and lack of partnership and sharing. 
Thus it requires alterations to allow for higher levels of mitigation, which can be 









Very simple was my explanation, and plausible 
enough – as most wrong theories are! 
--H.G. WELLS (2006, 39) 
 
 
1. Islamic Finance and Distributive Justice 
  
The Islamic economic system is based on a moral paradigm that holds socio-
economic justice at its core. It takes notions such as wealth distribution and 
poverty eradication very seriously and guides Islamic practices accordingly. 
Given the centrality of debates about wealth distribution and (in)equality in 
contemporary political theory we might expect to find some discussion of Islamic 
distributive justice. However, there is a clear absence of the Islamic tradition and 
the focus of attention within this debate is primarily on Western ideas and 
western practices. This limitation overlooks and alienates many important 
economic practices that exist outside the Western sphere and it ignores the 
contributions that those practices can offer to debate about economic justice  
There is also a parallel absence in the literature on Islam and finance. The 
literature which addresses the Islamic economic system can be divided into two 
categories and both appear to be inadequate in addressing the idea of an Islamic 
distributive justice. Firstly, Islamic economics literature is mainly concerned with 





other economic systems. Some few Islamic economists have attempted to address 
the issue of distribution in an Islamic context, yet the literature lacks on a 
systemically identified Islamic conception of distributive justice. Islamic 
economists in their understanding of different Islamic conceptions such as 
distributive justice appear to emphasised different dimensions and responded to 
different aspects of the Islamic economic system. They thereby produced diverse 
and sometimes contradictory perspectives on these notions, and no significant 
work was conducted to compare their standpoints and provide a comprehensive 
understanding thereof (Haneef, 2005: 3-4).  
Secondly, there is a literature concerned with Islamic finance practice, 
how to development it, and how its rules and procedures differ from the 
conventional financial system. Most of this work focuses on the banking sector 
and how they operate differently from conventional banks. Some empirical work 
is also conducted to examine Islamic finance performance in a certain country, 
customers’ perception of the service, Islamic banks financial profitability, etc. 
However, little attention is given to normative and moral ideas in this set of 
literature as the focus is limited to the practicality of Islamic finance and banking.  
This thesis has sought to address this significant gap in both the political 
theory and Islamic economics literatures. It attempted to reveal the moral rules 
that regulate Islamic finance practice in order to establish an Islamic conception 
of distributive justice. The thesis was questioning the principles guiding Islamic 
finance practices and how they regulate the distribution of burdens and benefits 
between participants. To this end, the thesis exposed the correlation between 
Islamic finance practice, its cultural context and its directing Islamic axioms to 





constructed theory offered in this thesis was interpreted from the existing and well 
established Islamic finance practice and it provided specific principles that guide 
the practice towards establishing justice in the financial system and in the 
distribution of burden and benefits among the participants of the practice.  
In seeking to answer this research question and by providing this theory, 
this thesis addresses the fundamental gap in literature by presenting an important 
comparative political theory project in line with call of political theory critics 
(Dallmayr, 1997, 2004, 2009, 2011; Euben, 2002, 2004; March, 2009) to integrate 
absent non-Western traditions in a wider project that seeks to understanding 
across political discontinuities, explores unfamiliar grounds and introduces non-
Western approaches of addressing common problems of inquiry. Also, by 
offering this Islamic conception of distributive justice the thesis is addressing the 
fundamental gap in Islamic literature, by offering a systemic foundational 
understanding of an important Islamic conception that reflects its religious and 
moral paradigm. 
2. Justice in Islamic Finance 
 
To offer a systemic conception of Islamic distributive justice in absence of a clear 
agreement between Islamic economists on what it entails, this thesis addressed 
the well established Islamic finance practices that regulate Islamic banks, lending, 
insurance etc. The successful and rapid growth of the practice over the past 
decades alongside its superior performance during the financial crisis, in 
comparison to its conventional counterpart, increased the interest in Islamic 





which it sits. The thesis  identified Islamic finance practice as a salient site of 
distributive justice on the grounds that it has a profound impact on the lives of the 
participants and the distribution of burdens and benefits between them. It claimed 
that Islamic finance is a social practice that is established to achieve specific 
objectives and that participants take part in it to achieve these goals. As a social 
practice it shapes and alters the kind of relationships between the participants of 
the practice and the interdependence between them, which should be explored in 
depth against the objectives of the practice and the reasons of the participants to 
take part in it. 
As I had identified a clear and distinct practice and my aim was to better 
understand the principles that underpin that practice, it made sense to use a  
practice-dependent approach (PDA), in contrast to the mainstream practice 
independent approach to moral theorizing. PDA is a relatively new approach, 
which has only recently gained attention from some theorists to address 
distributive justice issues, particularly global justice. This approach places a 
special emphasis on the existing practices and institutions in the construction of 
principles. The principles constructed from Islamic finance practice in this thesis 
win their objectivity from the comprehensive interpretation of the practice it 
offered. By interpreting the existing Islamic financial institution as a whole entity 
as well as its constituting parts in the light of the cultural context including the 
objectives of the practice and the reasons of participants to take part in it, the 
principles claim objectivity.  
The constructive interpretation of the Islamic finance practice, offered in 
this thesis, reveals that an Islamic conception of justice is guided by a 





interpreted, in the light of its point and purpose and the view point of its 
participant, the practice places high priority on sufficiency and the needs 
fulfilment of all persons, alongside equality between people through mitigation of 
brute luck and sensitivity to individual choice and responsibility. The practice 
uses the sufficiency principle to tamper and constrain extreme inequalities that 
can arise from a strict luck egalitarian principle, thereby revealing a sufficiency-
constrained luck egalitarian conception of justice. 
To examine the implications of the theory, the thesis used those principles 
to evaluate and guide the practice. In contrast to the objections addressed to PDA 
and the idea that practice principles only play descriptive a roles the thesis 
demonstrated that the principles were clearly able to assess the practice and locate 
existing injustices associated with it. These injustices were mainly preventing the 
practice from achieving its objective and were in direct conflict with a sufficiency-
constrained luck egalitarian conception of justice. The thesis also used the 
assessment to offer recommendations for the practice to be more consistent with 
its objectives and the sufficiency-constrained luck egalitarian conception of justice 
it is trying to achieve. The principles appeared clearly capable of guiding the 
course of action for the transformation of the practice to become more just.  
3. Contribution  
 
This thesis claims to have contributed to the enrichment of political and Islamic 
literature in different and various directions. First, it does not only offer an 
important CPT project that introduces an absent non-Western tradition into 





Western and non-Western ideas do not necessarily mean a hegemonic dominance 
of the Western tradition. Second, it extends the use of the constructivist approach 
to different scopes of justice. Third, it demystifies the Islamic understanding of 
distributive justice and theorizes it, providing thereby foundational work to enrich 
the Islamic economic literature. Fourth, it contributes to the development of 
Islamic finance literature and practice. Fifth, it develops practice-dependence 
literature by offering a practical employment of constructed principles to evaluate 
and guide existing practice. I will go through each of these contributions in more 
details in the rest of this section. 
This thesis is a significant comparative political theory project that 
addresses Islam, a tradition almost absent in normative political theory. The 
Islamic tradition is laden with moral and ethical values that are derived from 
moral authoritative sources that are unfamiliar to the Western tradition. 
However, Islam is still very briefly present and only considered for more 
theorizing with regards to religious extremism and radicalisation. By 
demystifying what the Islamic conception of distributive justice entails, this thesis 
is presenting a new perspective on the Islamic tradition and its financial practice, 
offering thereby a non-Western perspective to an issue that is of global common 
interest.  
A consequence of engaging in comparative political theory is that it also 
reveals important connections between two very different traditions. By 
considering Islamic finance as a social practice and identifying the distributive 
justice principles that regulate it, this thesis has demonstrated how western 
concepts and ideas can be usefully employed in a non-western context. By 





egalitarian conception of justice, this thesis not only made use of a western 
principle in a non-western context but it revealed that Islamic financial practices 
embody western ideals in a way that both predates western thinking about 
economic justice and is, in many ways, more just than existing financial practices 
in the west. This novel approach succeeds in demonstrating how similarities in 
ideas between cultures do not necessarily indicate a hegemonic approach by the 
Western tradition, but rather reveals how parallel ideas can exist in different 
cultural contexts and, by implication, shows how cultures can learn from one 
another.  
This similarity between the Western literature and Islamic finance does 
not only prove possible hybridity between Western and non-Western ideas 
without hegemonic dominance. It can also highlight how a non-Western practice 
can be of greater relevance to the Western moral debate than its Western 
equivalent. This thesis illustrated several crucial differences between Islamic 
finance practice and the conventional financial system. It demonstrated how 
financial transactions in the Islamic tradition need to be based on a risk sharing 
mentality. Participants in the financial system need to share potential risk in a 
way that corresponds with their share in the practice and their responsibility for 
any made Although the moral paradigm governing Islamic finance is derived 
from sources that are lack authority in the Western context, the resulting practice 
revealed more similarities and worked in accordance with debates in moral and 
political theory. Such a close relationship between Western ideas and non-
Western practices is a significant contribution of this thesis. Understanding and 
appreciating the ethical importance of Islamic finance could open the way to a 





of how financial institutions could be reformed in order to realise the moral socio-
economic objectives of western theories of distributive justice.  
Another important contribution is relevant to the constructivist approach 
as presented here. The thesis employed the constructivist approach to construct 
principles from an unconventional social practice. Constructivism has 
traditionally been applied to the scopes of either the state or global systems. Little 
work, however, has been dedicated to employ the constructivist methodology 
outside of both scopes. Introducing the practice of Islamic finance to the 
constructivist approach presents an original idea that can open new dimensions to 
the utilization of constructivism in political theory on scopes and subject matters 
that were not considered before. 
Although the thesis has indicated ways in which political theory can 
benefit from a better understanding of Islamic justice, and expanded the scope of 
the constructivist approach, the primary achievement of the thesis was the 
account it gave of Islamic financial distributive justice. This thesis thereby 
provided Islamic economic literature with a fully elaborated Islamic conception 
of distributive justice as interpreted from Islamic finance practice, which is 
established according to the Shariah. Such a clearly defined conception is 
currently lacking in Islamic finance literature and the introduction of the Islamic 
conception constructed through this thesis should enrich the literature and lead to 
engagement of more scholars into the understanding of Islamic distributive 
justice. As well as to more structured examination of other Islamic conceptions of 
common topic of inquiry such as human rights, war practices, etc. The thesis does 





Islamic distributive justice, but also with a new approach to addressing the 
Islamic economic philosophy and practices. 
The Islamic conception offered in this thesis contributes also to Islamic 
finance practice. The thesis argued that Islamic finance practice is regulated and 
guided by a sufficiency-constrained luck egalitarian principle, pointed out the 
injustices in the system and clarified how to prevent and, later on, avoid them in 
designing new tools and techniques. This is fundamental for Islamic finance  
practice, because the identified principle does not only elucidate where the 
practice is standing in relation to its objectives, but also provides the tool for its 
development and improvement. Islamic finance practitioners are offered a 
valuable tool by which they can evaluate their practice and ensure higher levels of 
credibility and Shariah compliance.  
This contribution is also fundamental for Islamic finance literature, which 
can benefit from the constructed principles of justice in conducting more 
empirical research to pinpoint the details of any injustices and provide detailed 
empirical recommendations for the development of the practice to be more just 
and in line with the Islamic moral paradigm. By offering this conception, Islamic 
finance can base empirical assessment of exiting performance or future 
developments of the practice on the sufficiency constrained luck egalitarian 
principle. Their analysis of credibility, performance, and development can be 
assessed in relation to the principle.  
The thesis did not stop at constructing principles of a new form of social 
practice, but it also extended the contribution to present the evaluative and action 
guiding implications of the constructed principles on the practice. The thesis 





and actually should, be more than descriptive principles, by highlighting how the 
reliance on existing practices does not rid the principle of its critical potential. The 
thesis practically demonstrated how principles constructed from existing practices 
are more sensitive to the context in which they operate, thereby being more 
capable of highlighting the existing in justices and guide our decisions in 
designing the practice to stop existing injustices and prevent future ones. 
4. Limitation and Future Research 
 
As much as this thesis is regarded as a foundational contribution to several fields 
of inquiry, it also opens up new possibilities for future research within them. This 
thesis extends opportunities of future research within Islamic economics and 
finance, comparative political theory, and constructivism and practice-
dependence.    
The primary question of this thesis was concerned with the principles of 
distributive justice that govern Islamic finance practice and dictate the just 
distribution of burdens and benefits among its participants. Due to the nature of 
the question, the research work of this thesis was primarily theoretical as it was 
concerned with the ethical dimension of the practice. Not much attention was 
given to the empirical aspects, particularly with regards to the suggestions for the 
practice and how to correct and prevent injustices. Consequently, the primary 
limitation of this thesis is its theoretical orientation and this limitation should 
initiate more research in Islamic finance.  
The thesis explained which principles apply to Islamic finance and showed 





recommendations for the reform of  Islamic financial institutions, we would need 
to undertake considerably more  empirical research in order to understand how 
best to apply those principles and bring the practice of Islamic institutions to a 
point where it better meets its objectives and move closer towards a more 
sufficiency-constrained luck egalitarian justice. More empirical research can draw 
on the principles constructed in this theory and the recommendations provided 
for reformation and build more detailed policies and frameworks for action 
guidance. 
For CPT, this project did not only offer a non-western perspective on a 
common problem, but it also highlighted how similarities can indicate more 
about each culture. For example in this thesis, the similarity between the practice 
and the sufficiency-constrained luck egalitarian conception of justice showed how 
CPT projects should not shy away from exploring new avenues and 
unconventional traditions and practices. By investigating new traditions and 
approaching them differently many more unexpected similarities and differences 
will appear. This thesis is pushing CPT project further. 
On the other hand, the debate of luck egalitarians and sufficientarians can 
be invaluable to the debates in Islamic economics and Islamic finance. 
Arguments of luck egalitarians and sufficientarians can enrich Islamic economic 
literature and attract more Islamic economists to engage with their arguments and 
apply them to Islamic finance practice. Islamic economists need to delve more 
into distributive justice literature, particularly luck egalitarianism, and examine 
how the conception is theorized and how it can contribute to existing debates in 





I would also like to think of this thesis as an attempt to open new 
possibilities and horizons to the constructivist approach to explore different and 
unconventional scopes. It offers a good demonstration of how the constructivist 
approach could extend beyond its traditional uses. Instead of conventional 
constructivist scopes on state and global systems, other existing practices and 
institutional establishments can be interpreted for the construction of principles. 
Expanding the limits on the constructivist approach can open ways to better 
understanding of the world as it exists and provide normative answers to make 
existing establishments more just. 
5. Conclusion  
 
This thesis offered a new and different perspective on a tradition commonly either 
neglected or associated with terrorism and radicalisation. I have argued that the 
moral framework of the Islamic economic tradition requires more analysis and I 
have sought to begin that analysis by providing what I believe to be a persuasive 
account of the principles of justice that underpin Islamic finance. In so doing, I 
have presented a systemic account of the Islamic conception of distributive 
justice, which contributes both to the political theory on distributive justice and 
the existing literature on Islamic economics and finance. This thesis enriches the 
overall CPT project by expanding its contribution to political theorizing, how we 
understand it, and how it contributes to both Western and non-Western ideas. On 
the other hand, this conception of Islamic distributive justice, I have argued, will 
engage more Islamic economists into debates about Islamic distributive justice 
and support Islamic finance scholars and practitioners in developing Islamic 





think of this thesis as only a beginning to new understandings of different 
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